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CHIUS LIBERATA
OR THE OCCUPATION OF CHIOS
BY THE GREEKS IN 1912

AS DESCRIBED IN CONTEMPORARY DOCUMENTS

AND

CHIOS DURING
THE GREAT WAR

EDITED

WITH AN INTRODUCTION

BY

PHILIP P. ARGENTI



JOHN LANE
THE BODLEY HEAD LTD.

THE third volume which Mr. PHILIP ARGENTI has compiled from contemporary documents on the history of Chios covers the period of the Balkan War and the Great War from 1912 to 1922. Soon after the outbreak of the Balkan War the Greek Government decided to send an expedition under Colonel Delogrammatikas to capture the island of Chios. The expedition was entirely successful and by the middle of December the Turks had been cleared out and the island was finally restored to Greece after a period of over 300 years of unbroken foreign occupation.

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1933

TO
MY DEAR FRIEND
DEMIE PETROCOCHINO
A GREAT CHIAN
AS A SOUVENIR OF
MANY PLEASANT YEARS OF COLLABORATION
IN MATTERS CONNECTED WITH CHIOS
AND AS A TOKEN OF GRATITUDE
IS THIS VOLUME
DEDICATED

 **SISMANOGGIO**
MECARO

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN

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SISMANOGLIO
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PART I
THE OCCUPATION OF CHIOS
BY THE GREEKS IN 1912

 **SISMANGLIO**
MICARDO

INTRODUCTION
THE OCCUPATION OF CHIOS
BY THE GREEKS IN 1912

A CAREFUL examination must lead to the conclusion that the ultimate objective of any and every policy of the Balkan States during the nineteenth century had always been in some way to reduce Turkish ascendancy in south-eastern Europe. On more than one occasion a Balkan Union had been the idea of the moment; but, owing to political and racial jealousies among these States, such a Union had never materialized. These jealousies were carefully nurtured and embittered by Austria and Turkey, who had every interest in their perpetuation.

Early in 1911 the initiative came from Athens. Indirectly and with the greatest secrecy proposals were transmitted to Sofia for the formation of an offensive alliance against Turkey. The Bulgarian Government at first distrusted the Greek offer, but, realizing the moment for action to be opportune, initiated negotiations in Vienna with the Serbian representatives. These *pourparlers* were destined to have a most satisfactory issue, and on the 13th March 1912 a Treaty of Alliance was signed between the two States. Simultaneously, official negotiations were now opened in Sofia between the Greek and Bulgarian Governments, who signed a secret treaty on the 29th May 1912. Montenegro also made arrangements for participation with Greece and Bulgaria, and finally signed the treaty with Serbia in September of the same year.

The Allies at once began to mobilize, and sent a joint ultimatum to the Porte, demanding immediate

application of reforms. On the 8th October Montenegro openly declared war.

The European Powers were really divided in face of this situation. Russia was ready to fish in the troubled waters of a Balkan War, in order to open the Straits, but had not enough support from her ally France or her new friend England. Austria and Italy were intent on keeping Serbia out of the Adriatic. Germany did not wish to be dragged into war over a Balkan crisis to save Austrian interests, or possibly still held Bismarck's view that intervention in the Eastern question 'was not worth risking the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier'. England and France were unwilling to promote Russian desires. All parties (excepting Russia) feared a change of equilibrium. Russia was also well aware of the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty and was anxious to be its patron; but, finding little encouragement in France and England, she joined ultimately with Austria, on behalf of the other Powers, in jointly informing the Balkan States that, whatever the issue of the war, the territorial *status quo* would be enforced. But this warning was not presented until the 7th October.

The Balkan States appear to have been convinced that this intervention of the Great Powers was not the external manifestation of their real sympathies, but was due to their conviction that only an overwhelming Turkish victory could be the outcome of the conflict: in this case the European Chanceries would conveniently have been from the beginning on the side of the victors and could thus more easily secure advantageous solutions of many impending matters, not excluding concessions, in which they had direct interests. Possibly the Entente Powers wished to prove to Turkey that *they* were *also* friends of Islam with a view to neutralizing German influence

at Constantinople, or possibly they foresaw the Great War and remembered Aesop's fable of the Lion and the Mouse. The Balkan States, in pursuing this line of thought, were inevitably led to the conclusion that, if on the other hand *they* were the victors, the Great Powers would not lack *souplesse* in changing front in the face of accomplished facts. They thus discounted, in advance, Mr. Asquith's benevolent and philanthropic announcement of the 9th November, 'that the victors are not to be robbed of the fruits which cost them so dear'.

Whatever may be the correct interpretation of the undercurrents of European diplomacy, the Balkan States wasted no time in joining Montenegro, who had already declared war; on the 13th October they sent notes to Austria and Russia and also to the Porte, in which they formulated a demand, among others, for the autonomy of European Turkey. The Porte, indignant at such insolence, proudly recalled her representatives from Belgrade and Sofia, and on the 17th October declared war on these two neighbours. The whole peninsula was thus ablaze.

Lightning successes followed all the enterprises undertaken by the Greeks. Their army marched northward, overwhelming the superior Turkish forces at every encounter. These victories culminated in the Battle of Sarantaporon on the 22nd October and that of Jenitsà on the 1st-2nd November. On the 8th November the Greek army entered Salonika, one of the great centres of *Grecia Irredenta*.

A few days before the victorious entry of the Greek troops into Salonika under the then Crown Prince (Diadoch) Constantine, the latter sent an order to General Constantine Kallaris, the officer in command of the 2nd Division, ordering him to organize an expedition for the capture of Chios. On the 6th

November, 1912, at 8 p.m., General Kallaris sent to the officers in command of the 1st and 7th Infantry Regiments, and of the 2nd Regiment of Field Artillery, instructions to have in readiness two battalions of the 1st Regiment and one battalion of the 7th Infantry Regiment, to proceed with full equipment. These three battalions were to constitute a full regiment under the command of Colonel Delagrammatikas, under whose orders was placed also a battery of the 2nd Regiment of Field Artillery.¹

Two hours after receipt of these instructions the whole Expeditionary Force was in complete readiness and awaiting marching orders. On the 7th November, however, the above order was modified, so that the 7th Infantry Regiment provided two battalions, and the 1st Regiment only one.² This latter order in no way modified the composition of the Expeditionary Force; it was solely due to administrative requirements. On the 8th November, at 4 p.m., the officer in command of the Expeditionary Force received instructions from his superior, the general in command of the 2nd Division, to embark the Expeditionary Force upon the s.s. *Patris* and *Sappho*.³ Following this order the whole force left Salonika Barracks at 5 p.m., with the exception of the Battery of Field Artillery, which remained behind. At 6 p.m. this force was drawn up at the Docks, but owing to adverse weather the actual embarkation was not effected until 8.15 a.m.

¹ General Constantine Kallaris' order to the officers commanding the 1st and 7th Infantry Regiment and the 2nd Regiment of Field Artillery, dated Salonika, 6th November 1912, No. 599. [See page 3.]

² General Constantine Kallaris' order to the officers commanding the 1st and 7th Infantry Regiment and the 2nd Regiment of Field Artillery, dated Salonika, 7th November 1912, No. 601. [See page 3.]

³ General Constantine Kallaris' order to Colonel N. Delagrammatikas, officer commanding the Chios Expeditionary Force, dated Salonika, 8th November 1912, No. 607. [See page 4.]

of the following day, the 9th November, when the first ship sailed out of the harbour. At 8.15 a.m. on the 10th November the two ships reached the harbour of Mytilene, where a detachment of the Greek Fleet lay at anchor. At 3 p.m. Colonel Delagrammatikas, together with his adjutant, went on board the flagship *Hesperia* to confer with Captain Damianò. It was decided that the whole force should leave Mytilene at midnight on the 10th November, and with the support of the Fleet make an attempt to land at Chios. Captain Damianò also handed to Colonel Delagrammatikas a telegraphic order from the Ministry of Marine, addressed to the Harbour Master of Salonika, ordering the troops to embark on the s.s. *Patris* and *Sappho*, and giving instructions to head for the harbour of Chios Town at full speed. Until the landing had been effected the troops were to be under the command of the Senior Naval Officer, Captain Damianò.¹ Captain Damianò at the same time informed Colonel Delagrammatikas of the instructions, which the Harbour Master had passed on to him from the Minister of Marine, and by which he was ordered to sail as quickly as possible for their destination, a pilot being placed at his disposal to take his ship out of Salonika Harbour.²

On the 11th November, at 10 a.m., the Division of Auxiliary Cruisers and the *Patris* and *Sappho*, which were conveying the landing force, under the immediate command of Squadron Commander Damianò, anchored before Chios Town, and after making a demonstration they moored outside the harbour. A

¹ N. Stratos, Minister of Marine, Athens, to the Harbour Master of Salonika, No. 1490. [See page 4.]

² The order of the Harbour Master of Salonika, Sakkalis, to the commanding officer of the s.s. *Patris*, dated Salonika, 9th November 1912, No. 5960. [See pages 4 and 5.]

deputation, representing the officers commanding the Fleet and the Army, consisting of Lieut.-Commander Chazikyriakos, and Lieut. Stephan Tryphou, landed and proceeded to the Government House, where they met the Turkish civil and military authorities of the island. Lieut.-Commander Chazikyriakos demanded that the island be immediately surrendered to the Greek forces, and that the Turkish Army should capitulate and hand over all ammunition and armaments within a definitely stated period, requiring an immediate reply to his summons. The civilian authorities, knowing that their position was hopeless and not wishing to expose the Turkish civilian population to destruction, decided to accept the Greek ultimatum. But the military commandant, Zichny Bey, refused to conform to such a decision, and announced that it was his intention to resist to the end and thus save the honour of the Turkish Army. This was undoubtedly a very courageous attitude, for the Greek Fleet under Admiral Coundouriotis had successfully blockaded the Dardanelles and thus paralysed the Turkish Fleet, which, with the exception of one or two ships, was shut into the Sea of Marmora. The position, therefore, of the Turkish Army at Chios in 1912 was almost identical with that of the Greek population of the island in 1822 during the raid of the Samians, which resulted in the massacre of the islanders. That massacre was due to the fact that the Greek Navy, during the War of Independence, had not command of the Aegean. These facts were known to Zichny Bey before he made his bold decision; and, owing to the fact that he had lived in Chios for some time, he was fully aware that hatred rankled in the hearts of the Greek population who might now justifiably seek to avenge the cruelties of 1822.

After this declaration of the Turkish military com-

mander, the Turkish civilian authorities had no other alternative than to comply with Zichny Bey's orders. At the same time, however, they sent a deputation consisting of the Orthodox Archbishop Hieronymos, the Mayor Nicholas Kouvelà, Constantine Ladopoulos, Fouàd Bey, and two other Turks, who proceeded on board the *Hesperia* to communicate to Captain Damianò and to Colonel Delagrammatikas their refusal to accept the ultimatum. They pointed out to the Greek Commanders that the island was not fortified and in accordance with International Law should be deemed to be outside the area of hostilities, and that in the event of a forced landing, or of attack, the Turkish Army would resist in accordance with the strict orders which had been received, and that then the destruction of the town would be inevitable.

To these diplomatic subtleties the Greek Commanders answered by a *tu quoque*, stating that they also had categorical orders from their superiors to occupy the island at whatever cost, and that consequently the responsibility for any destruction or bloodshed would devolve upon the Turkish authorities. They agreed, however, to a short prolongation of the period fixed for the surrender.

Shortly after the departure of the deputation from the flagship, the foreign Consuls, at the request of the Turkish Governor, went on board the *Hesperia* and requested the Greek Commanders to do their utmost to spare the town and not to bombard it. The Greek officers agreed not to attack the town, and undertook to land their forces at some other point on the island.

After the departure of the Consuls the Turkish authorities sent a written protest, repeating their arguments and underlining the fact that Chios was not a fortified island. After this *démarche* they retired to the interior and the Greek Fleet proceeded to the south.

The Expeditionary Force was composed of 74 Army officers and 1,365 men besides 2 officers of the Marines with 80 marines. The Turkish Force, including the Gendarmerie, consisted of 2,500 men, 1 platoon of Cavalry, and 2 batteries of Mounted Artillery which were disposed in the following way :

1. In the town of Chios	900 men
2. At Vrondado	100 „
3. At monastery of Aghios Markos	200 „
4. At Kondari	240 „
5. At Amythounda	400 „
6. At Volissòs	60 „
7. At Kardamyla	60 „
8. Dispersed in the various villages	500 „

with the relative complement of officers.

Kondari was selected by the Greek Commanders as being the point on the island where a landing could be most easily effected. As soon as the Turks in the town had been apprised of this decision, 900 men, together with their officers, were rushed from Chios Town to reinforce the garrison at Kondari. The Greek landing, therefore, met with stubborn resistance. The landing was to take place at 3 p.m., and the Commander-in-Chief of the Land Forces issued instructions to the Commanding Officer of the 3rd Battalion of the 1st Infantry Regiment, and to those in command of the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 7th Regiment, as well as to the Mountain Artillery, that the 3rd Battalion of the 1st Infantry Regiment was to be the first unit to land, and that the first Company to reach the shore was to advance and establish contact with the enemy, in order to cover as much as possible the landing of the other troops. After the landing of the whole battalion they were to advance inland and take up positions to cover the landing of the battalion of the

7th Regiment, as well as that of the Mountain Artillery.¹

At 3.15 p.m. the 9th Company of the 3rd Battalion of the 1st Infantry Regiment began to land from the s.s. *Patris*. This was followed by a machine-gun battery and the remaining three companies of the same battalion. As soon as the 9th Company came within range the enemy opened fire simultaneously from all their entrenchments, and were supported by a heavy artillery bombardment. This, however, in no way caused the boats to slacken their speed, but on the contrary caused the troops to be all the more eager to hasten to reinforce their comrades.

At the same time the officer in command of the Naval Squadron gave the signal to open fire. The repercussion of this gun-fire was tremendous, for, owing to the natural conformation of the ground, every detonation was echoed and re-echoed in the overhanging mountains beyond. The bombardment continued until the Turkish entrenchments had been completely destroyed and the enemy in panic took to the mountains. In the meantime the landing of the remaining forces continued, and already by 5.30 p.m. half the Expeditionary Force had set foot on the island. At this juncture the colonel in command sent a wireless message to the Ministry of War and to His Royal Highness the Diadoch, reporting the unsatisfactory outcome of the previous negotiations and also the subsequent landing, which had been effected successfully and was continuing unimpeded.²

¹ Colonel N. Delagrammatikas to the officers commanding the 3rd Battalion of the 1st Regiment, and the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 7th Regiment, and the Mountain Artillery, dated Kondari Bay, 11th November 1912, 2.50 p.m. [See page 5.]

² Colonel N. Delagrammatikas' Dispatch to the Ministry of War, Athens, and to H.R.H. the Diadoch, Salonika, dated 'On board the s.s. *Patris*, 11th November 1912, 5.10 p.m.' [See page 6.]

Under the bombardment of the Fleet the Turks continued to retreat throughout the night. They finally rallied at Karyès at the monastery of Aghios Markos and at Nea Monì, where they took up new positions. During the actual landing the Greek casualties were insignificant. This is most unusual in the annals of warfare, as a landing, when met with resistance, generally results in very heavy losses to the aggressor.

On the night of the 11-12th November, information reached the Greek staff that the Turkish Army had definitely retired to Karyès; thereupon it was decided to enter the town on the morning of the 12th, and to march along the Kondari-Chios road. The colonel in command consequently issued instructions to all units under him informing them that it had been decided to proceed at 9 a.m. to occupy Chios Town. The Naval Detachment was drafted into the 3rd Battalion of the 1st Regiment and constituted the Advance Guard, under the orders of Captain Aristeides Kouvelis. At a distance of 800 yards behind the advance guard marched the 1st Battalion of the 7th Regiment as first section of the main body, followed by the Artillery and the 3rd Battalion of the 7th Regiment which later provided a platoon as rearguard.¹ Steps had at the same time to be taken to protect the town from any chance attack by the enemy, during the advance of the Expeditionary Force, and to this end the 1st Battalion of the 7th Regiment was instructed to continue its march, after reaching the town of Chios, to the north-east as far as the village of Karyès, and there to establish contact and attack the enemy, who it was rumoured were concentrated there, so as to prevent them from consolidating their positions.²

¹ Colonel N. Delagrammatikas' Order to all units under his command, dated Kondari, 12th November 1912, 5 p.m. [See page 6.]

² Colonel N. Delagrammatikas' Order to the Officer commanding

The march actually began at 7 a.m. and the capital of the island was entered by 8 a.m. As instructed, the 1st Battalion of the 7th Regiment, together with a machine-gun platoon, proceeded to the north-west of the town and took up their position at Aghios Demetrios, where advance guards were established in order to watch the enemy's movements at Karyès and the monastery of Aghios Markos.

The population of the town went mad with joy. They rang church bells. They sang *Christòs Anésti* and *Anastáseos Himéra*. They strewed the streets with flowers, and from the windows they rained down roses and rice upon the soldiers.

Shortly after the occupation of the town, Colonel Delagrammatikas installed himself in the offices of the Military Governor. He then issued a Proclamation in the name of His Majesty the King of the Hellenes, declaring the island occupied by Greece and calling upon the inhabitants to submit, promising them protection and safety without any distinction of race or creed.¹

The Ministry of War was also informed of this Proclamation and of the occupation of the town.²

Immediately following the Proclamation all the local authorities presented themselves before the Commander of the Forces of Occupation and took the oath of allegiance to His Majesty the King of the Hellenes, as the representatives and in the name of all the inhabitants of the island. A Thanksgiving Service in the Orthodox Cathedral immediately followed and the Greek flag was hoisted over the house of the Military Governor.

the 1st Battalion of the 7th Regiment, Captain Papakyriazis, dated Kondari, 12th November 1912, 5.20 a.m. [See page 7.]

¹ Proclamation of Colonel N. Delagrammatikas to the Inhabitants of Chios, dated Chios, 12th November 1912. [See page 7.]

² Colonel N. Delagrammatikas' Dispatch to the Ministry of War, Athens, dated Chios, 12th November 1912, 8.45 a.m. [See page 8.]

To return to the military situation. At 2 p.m. the Turkish forces at Karyès, and at the monastery of Aghios Markos, opened both rifle and artillery fire against the advance pickets at Aghios Demetrios, which was held by the 3rd Battalion of the 7th Infantry Regiment. Owing to the fact that the Turkish forces were occupying the higher ground, it was clear that the advance picket would in time be forced to give up their positions, as they were unable to return the fire effectively. Consequently the Commander of the Forces of Occupation ordered six companies and the artillery battery to advance and attack the enemy. The encounter lasted until the evening, when finally the Greek forces succeeded in driving the enemy into the rocky heights of Mount Piganios, to Nea Monì, and the monastery of Aghiōn Paterōn.

The day of the 13th November passed off in comparative calm with the exception of the bombardment of advance pickets at Karyès. At 5 p.m. Captain Kouvelis reported to head-quarters that, although the enemy on the heights commanding Karyès were in small numbers, their positions were quite inaccessible and impregnable, and that, if Karyès was to be occupied by Greek forces, the safest course to adopt would be to send another unit against their north flank, which could easily expel them from their positions owing to the fact that the attack could be made from places situated almost on the same level.¹ At 10 p.m. of the same day the Commander of the Troops of Occupation received definite instructions from the Minister of War 'to pursue the Turks until they were defeated and forced to surrender'.²

¹ Captain Aristides Kouvelis' report to Colonel Delagrammatikas, dated the 13th November 1912. [See page 8.]

² Eleftherios Venizelos, Minister of War, Athens, to Colonel N. Delagrammatikas, dated Athens, 13th November 1912. [See page 9.]

The execution of this order was somewhat difficult, not to say impossible, as is easily understood by anybody who is familiar with the peculiar formation of the ground in that particular part of the island. However, on the 14th November at 6 a.m., the Commander of the Troops of Occupation informed Captain Kouvelis that, according to intelligence received, the enemy had withdrawn to the north of Karyès to Kochlià, a very inaccessible position distant about four and a half hours, and instructed him to attack immediately the small enemy detachment which still remained on the ridge stretching from Karyès to the monastery of Aghios Markos. To facilitate the execution of this order he sent the Captain reinforcements, making up the force at his disposal to a full battalion. At the same time he communicated his decision to operate himself south of the monastery of Aghios Markos. Whilst, however, the Commander of the Troops of Occupation was communicating the above information and instructions to Captain Kouvelis, it had not yet come to the Commander's knowledge that this officer, on his own initiative, had reconnoitred during the night of the 13-14th November with the object of finding means of reaching the ridge from Karyès to the monastery of Aghios Markos. At 6 a.m. on the 14th November (i.e. at the same time as the Commander's orders were being sent), the Captain reported to the Commander that the result of his reconnoitre during the night had been fruitless, because only one small bridle-path existed along which they could get to the ridge, and that the small Turkish force actually situated on the ridge appeared to belong to a larger body of unknown strength.

On the 14th November the Commander of the Troops of Occupation, in view of intelligence received from various sources, was convinced that an attack

against the enemy at the present juncture was most ill-advised and would inevitably result in very severe losses. He therefore decided to occupy all the harbours and the inhabited regions round the enemy, and thus not only to encircle his opponent, but also to confine him to the rugged and unfertile area of the island and so force him to surrender. With this objective the 1st Battalion of the 7th Infantry Regiment was sent to Aghios Georgios with orders to occupy the village of Daphnona and thus cut off the enemy forces at the monasteries of Aghios Markos and Nea Moni from their supply centres. This order was successfully carried out on the very same day.




The 3rd Battalion of the 7th Regiment received orders to relieve the 3rd Battalion of the 1st Regiment at Karyès and to proceed to the occupation of the monastery of Aghios Markos. This operation was attempted twice in the morning of the 15th, but did not meet with any success, and the officer in command reported his failure to the Commander of the Forces, adding that twenty-five men posted at the monastery of Aghios Markos were quite sufficient to keep a whole legion at bay.¹

At this point a short digression from the narrative of the military operations may be considered relevant. It may be difficult for anybody who is not familiar with the very peculiar formation of the ground to understand why such insurmountable difficulties presented themselves to the Greek forces. Immediately to the north of Karyès the plain continues along the seashore as far as Vrondado. Within approximately three-quarters of a mile of the shore the ground suddenly rises abruptly to such an extent that even to-day the road, which is to connect Chios Town with the

¹ Captain Aristeides Kouvelis' report to Colonel Delagrammatikas, dated 15th November 1912. [See page 9.]

Map of ISLAND OF CHIOS

Illustrating
Military Operations 1912.



second largest town of the island, Volissòs, remains unfinished, although the work was actually begun some years ago and is still being continued. It is therefore obvious that a very small force in possession of a such a plateau or tableland entirely commands all the roads from the south of the island and from the town, and would be sufficient to hold in check very superior numbers. The monasteries of Aghios Markos and Nea Monì are also strongholds in themselves, being constructed upon lofty and rugged peaks. It is consequently easily comprehensible that the only means of clearing the island of the enemy without incurring very heavy casualties was by starvation. The enemy would thus be obliged to withdraw to the natural strongholds, but had to face the unpleasant fact that these were situated in an almost barren and deserted district, and, if confined to such regions, they would inevitably be forced to capitulate.

At 1 p.m. on the 15th November, Captain Kouvelis attempted the ascent from Karyès. After four and a half hours' fighting the Greek troops were compelled to retire. As it was impossible for the advance guard of Karyès to make a frontal attack upon the enemy without incurring disproportionate casualties, it was decided to attempt the capture of the heights of the Aepos and those to the north of Aghios Georgios, as well as of those which commanded the monastery of Aghiōn Paterōn, by a surprise attack at night. This operation was entrusted to the 9th Company of the Machine Gun Platoon and to the Naval Detachment, these troops being placed under the command of Captain Kouvelis. At 4 a.m. the attack was begun and the Greek troops succeeded in reaching the top of the ridge and in capturing the Turkish outposts, who were asleep. The officer in command of the Naval Detachment, without having received specific

orders, apparently allowed his enthusiasm to carry him away and directed his men to the left flank of the advancing Company and thus quickly reached the top of the ridge. He then gave the order to advance. He considered this to be the only method to unmask the enemy, who held positions of great natural strength, and to drive him into the interior. The Commander of the Company, having reconnoitred, was persuaded that the enemy were possessed of superior forces and gave instructions to the Naval Detachment not to continue their advance, pointing out that in accordance with the order issued by the Commander of the Forces of Occupation, the advance was only to be continued if strong resistance was not encountered. Captain Kouvelis reported to the Commander of the Forces of Occupation, requesting immediate dispatch of reinforcements. The officer in command of the Naval Detachment again allowed his enthusiasm to get the better of his sense of discipline, apparently having the idea that the enemy's forces were not considerable, and ordered his detachment to advance once more on the left flank, in order to attack the enemy and cut off his retreat.

Soon after this new advance, the Naval Detachment came to hand-to-hand fighting with the enemy and succeeded in forcing him to abandon his position. After their success the Naval Detachment continued their advance and conceived the plan of occupying the ridge of hills from which they could command the enemy, and hoped thus to be in a position to protect the operations of the infantry units. At the same time, however, their commander informed the Company Commander that after executing this manœuvre he would maintain himself on the defensive upon the ridge. However, before he was able to complete this manœuvre he found himself between *three*

fires. A sharp encounter then ensued against very superior enemy forces, and would have been disastrous to the Naval Detachment had not the 9th Company hastened in time to its relief. The 11th Company of the 1st Infantry Regiment and the 2nd and 12th Companies of the 7th Regiment also rushed to the rescue, and succeeded in extracting the Naval Detachment from the ambush into which they had been lured and had dashed headlong. In this way the plateau of Aepos was captured.

Zichny Bey, after this reverse on Aepos, decided to attack the Greeks from another direction. On the 16th November the Turkish advance guard at the village of Pytiòs proceeded to attack the Greek volunteer corps, which occupied the heights of Grià, with the object of seizing the town of Kardamyla. The Turks advanced from Karphotòs (Pytiòs) at midday and stormed the heights of Grià. After a very sharp engagement the Turkish troops proved unable to dislodge the Greek volunteers from their positions. The engagement lasted until 5 p.m.

Possibly the presence of a volunteer corps calls for some explanation. In the early part of 1912 a volunteer corps had been organized at Kardamyla with the object of resisting any attempt at landing by Italian troops, which Austrian intervention alone prevented as is disclosed by Baron Sonnino.¹ The formation was carried out with the greatest possible secrecy, and this organization was utilized as the nucleus for other similar formations, which, before the Greek landing, had as their object a revolution in Chios and so the annexation of the island either to Crete or to the Dodekanese. There were rumours at that

¹ William Miller, *The Ottoman Empire and its Successors, 1801-1927*, Cambridge, 1927, Chap. XXI, p. 527 and footnote (1), Documenti Diplomatici (Seduta del 20 Maggio 1915), p. 25.

time that the Dodekanese was to be declared independent by the Great Powers. These volunteer corps were chiefly maintained by private individuals.

An unsuccessful attempt was also made to capture the heights of Aghiōn Paterōn. The Commander of the Forces of Occupation, after receiving fuller reports of the various operations, was convinced that it was quite impossible with the forces at his disposal to advance against the enemy without incurring altogether disproportionate casualties, and decided to request the Ministry of War to send reinforcements immediately. He requested the dispatch of one complete regiment and a machine-gun company. He reported that the Turkish forces amounted to two thousand two hundred, had at their disposal heavy artillery, occupied inaccessible positions, and were fighting with guerrilla tactics. He also added that they knew nothing of the events in European Turkey, and their morale was excellent.¹

On the 17th November the Minister of War telegraphed orders to use some other means to attain the desired objective without incurring great casualties, and that, if necessary, a landing at some other point of the island should be effected by arrangement with the Admiral in command of the Cruiser Squadron.² It certainly seems difficult to understand the reason for this reply; if the Officer commanding the Forces of Occupation had not in his own estimation sufficient forces and so had requested the dispatch of reinforcements, how would it be possible for him without reinforcements to carry out a landing at some

¹ Colonel N. Delagrammatikas' report to the Ministry of War, Athens, dated Chios, 16th November 1912, No. 269. [See page 9.]

² Eleftherios Venizelos, Minister of War, Athens, to Colonel N. Delagrammatikas, dated Athens, 17th November 1912, No. 94117. [See page 10.]

other point of the island, since this would mean the dispersion of his present strength and consequently a weakening of his line? It is still less easy to comprehend, with the limited material at our disposal, what was, or rather could be, the *other means* to attain the desired objective without incurring great casualties.

On the 18th November the Commander of the Forces of Occupation agreed to undertake a landing at Volissòs. The s.s. *Macedonia* proceeded to the Gulf of Volissòs and bombarded the monastery of Moundōn where, according to information received, the enemy forces had been concentrated. At the same time a naval detachment was landed and proceeded to the above monastery and succeeded in taking prisoners the Turkish contingent which had been stationed there. A volunteer corps was formed at Volissòs, where it was armed and trained.

From this date it was clear that Zichny Bey would be forced to surrender. He was completely surrounded by land and blockaded by sea; seeing the town of Volissòs fallen into the hands of the Greeks, the capture of the detachment which had hitherto been stationed at the monastery of Moundōn, the failure of his troops against the volunteer corps, and his consequent failure to reach Kardamyla, the Turkish Commander in desperation issued an order to the main body of his troops of the Aepos to make a surprise attack against the Greek outpost pickets, who had only just reached the fringe of the plateau. On the 18th November the enemy attacked in full force. The Greek advance-guard's pickets had, however, been reinforced by the 3rd Battalion of the 1st Regiment, and succeeded not only in sustaining the attack, but in forcing the enemy to retreat with comparatively heavy losses.

In addition to the volunteer corps at Volissòs, the

Officer commanding the Forces of Occupation sent by sea suitable officers with equipment and ammunition to organize an even more efficient corps of volunteers from amongst the inhabitants, in order to protect the town against the eventuality of a chance attack by the desperate enemy. When this corps had been duly trained, units were sent out to the villages of Amades, Viki, Kambià, and Phytà, to organize similar corps in these places. This was successfully carried out, and thus the Turkish forces were robbed of these small centres from which they might get supplies.

The Turkish forces were thus entirely confined to the central mountainous plateau, including the strongholds of the monasteries of Aghios Markos, Nea Monì, and Aghiōn Paterōn as well as the positions, Kochlià, Tessara Pigadia, Amythounda, and the village of Pytiòs.

On the other hand, the Greek Troops of Occupation and the various volunteer corps had possession of the southern part of the plateau of Aepos, the spurs of Mount Piganios, including the villages of Karyès, Daphnona, and Paphilida, the heights of Kakis Rachis, the town of Volissòs and Kardamyla, and the villages of Lithì, Phytà, Kambià, Viki, Amades, and Langada. These forces were increased by the arrival of another battalion and of the 34th Company of Evzones. The Greek Commander, even after the arrival of these reinforcements, did not wish to expose his troops to any more risk than was necessary, and, being convinced of the untenable position of the enemy, decided to defer any aggressive operations. The next few days were occupied with a few skirmishes.

The cold, however, was so intense that the Commander decided to withdraw the advance pickets from the uninhabited regions to places where they might enjoy the comfort of billets. On the 21st November

he communicated this decision to the Ministry of War in Athens, and underlined the fact that, in this way, the Greek troops were maintained in good condition and without casualties, whereas the enemy was confined to the mountainous district and was deprived of all means of getting supplies. The Navy, at the same time, kept a strict blockade by sea, and in the majority of the outlying villages volunteer corps had been organized.¹

In accordance with the above plan steps were taken to re-form the front line, and by the 23rd November all the advance-guard pickets had taken up their new positions. On that day the troops were reinforced by the arrival of a battery of mountain artillery and also by a corps of volunteers which proceeded to Lithì.

On the 24th November at 9 a.m. the Turkish Commander realized that the Greek troops had withdrawn from the southern fringe of the Aepos plateau and from the heights; the Turkish troops proceeded to bombard Vrondado. They were, however, very surprised to be themselves in turn bombarded by the heavy guns of the Fleet and retreated almost at once.

On the 29th November the Admiral in command of the Greek Fleet sent an urgent telegram from Moudros requesting information on the situation,² and Colonel Delagrammatikas replied informing him of the suspension of operations and of the maintenance of the blockade of the Turkish forces in the plateau of Aepos.³ A detachment of Cretan volunteers, who

¹ Colonel N. Delagrammatikas' report to the Ministry of War, Athens, dated 21st November 1912, No. 334. [See pages 10 and 11.]

² The Admiral commanding the Greek Fleet, Paul Coundouriotis, to Colonel Delagrammatikas, dated Moudros, 29th November 1912, No. 1217. [See page 11.]

³ Colonel N. Delagrammatikas' telegram to the Admiral Commanding the Greek Fleet, Paul Coundouriotis, dated Chios, 29th November 1912, No. 425. [See page 11.]

during the Balkan Wars had carried all in front of them, had been sent to Chios, and it was apparently expected that their mere presence would immediately frighten the Turks into surrender, for shortly after their arrival busybodies in Athens became impatient owing to the protracted nature of the military operations in the island, and these presumably brought pressure to bear upon the Ministers of War and Marine. Probably it was at their instigation that the Minister of Marine sent a telegraphic order to Colonel Delagrammatikas enjoining him to advance without delay against the main body of Turkish troops and to wipe them out, in co-operation with the officer in command of the Naval Forces. This the Minister considered particularly desirable, as a general armistice was expected to be concluded by the end of that week. The Minister also added that with the addition of the Cretan volunteer corps the numbers of the Expeditionary Force had thus been increased to four thousand and were therefore numerically double in strength to the enemy.¹

The colonel in command immediately replied to the Ministry that, owing to the enemy positions being very strongly fortified and inaccessible, the execution of his order would entail very heavy casualties, and that the result of such a general engagement was very doubtful: that the enemy positions had been carefully chosen and organized for defence for over one year and had been prepared to resist an Italian occupation: that no roads existed: that there were only paths so that the troops would have to advance in single file: that owing to casualties and illness the strength of the Regiment had been reduced to two thousand one hundred: and that the recent dispatch of nine hundred

¹ Nicholas Stratos, Minister of War, Athens, to Colonel N. Delagrammatikas, No. 94504. [See page 12.]

and fifty untrained men had in no way increased the fighting capacity of the troops under his command. The Colonel also informed the Ministry that only one ship remained in the neighbouring waters and that he was submitting a detailed report, which was being sent by special messenger.¹

In the detailed dispatch the Colonel reported that the enemy's forces amounted to two thousand three hundred, and that these forces occupied the precipitous mountain peaks situated in the north part of the island, the majority of which were out of range, and that, owing to their natural formation, a handful of men was sufficient to maintain not only the positions themselves, but also all the converging approaches; that the Greek forces amounted to two thousand one hundred, three battalions of which occupied the line from Aghios Georgios to Vrondado (the fourth being in reserve), that the north-western part of the island was occupied by the Cretans and the various volunteer corps and that thus the enemy was entirely encircled and confined to a region which only contained three villages from which he could draw supplies. It was consequently obvious that a decisive attack against positions of this character, which had been very efficiently organized for defence, could not be undertaken with any great hopes of success, but that on the contrary heavy losses were certain and that the result could not be the isolation of the enemy to one locality. This would require a far larger force; even if it were possible to expel the enemy from these positions and to occupy them with small detachments, the advancing sections would be exposed to fire from all sides and would run the risk of being surrounded. Another important factor was that the Greek troops could not

¹ Colonel N. Delagrammatikas to the Minister of War, Athens, No. 430. [See pages 12 and 13.]

be utilized as a whole body for co-operation from the same spot, owing to the conformation of the ground and the complete lack of roads. It was consequently obvious that if such an attack were made and the Turks succeeded in breaking the iron ring which had been placed round them, the advantages hitherto gained would have been seriously endangered. The Colonel also informed the Minister that the bearer of the present dispatch was in a position to provide him with any supplementary information.¹

In the meanwhile Zichny Bey was receiving signals from the Asiatic shore that the Turkish arms had been successful in the other theatres of war. He consequently made up his mind to rival the successes of his comrades. He therefore ordered a general attack to be made on the 29th November against the advance pickets of the Greek army which were stationed round the edge of the Aepos plateau.

The enemy attacked in the early morning from the direction of Mount Piganios and the monastery of Aghios Markos. They had as their objective the Greek positions at Karyès. The Turkish detachments from Nea Monì and Aghiōn Paterōn, and from Mount Provation descended and attacked the volunteer corps at Paphlidi, and the positions at Aghios Georgios and Lithì. A very obstinate engagement was fought, and only at 4.30 p.m. did the Greek forces succeed in repulsing the attack and forcing the enemy to retire in disorder to the mountains. The losses of the Turkish forces in this engagement were sufficient to persuade Zichny Bey that the information which was being flashed from Tchesmé and other points on the coast of Asia Minor was not altogether accurate, and consequently that from now onwards it was

¹ Colonel N. Delagrammatikas' report to the Ministry of War, Athens, dated Chios, 28th November 1912. [See pages 13 and 14.]

to his advantage to confine his activities to guerrilla warfare.

The result of this successful engagement was immediately reported to the Greek Ministry of War, who had in the meantime received the report sent by special messenger. The Minister telegraphed acknowledging receipt of the report and definitely cancelled his previous order for a general attack.¹

The following fortnight was marked by no important event, although the troops in the front line fought a number of minor skirmishes. On the 16th December staff Captain Eleftherios Vernardos arrived at Chios bearing a dispatch from His Royal Highness, the Diadoch Constantine, who was in supreme command of the Greek Army, informing Colonel Delagrammatikas that the bearer of the dispatch would communicate the views of the generalissimo upon the operations in Chios and that this officer was in future to act as *liaison* between him and the supreme command.²

During the last few days some reinforcements and ammunition had arrived from Mytilene, following instructions from the Ministry of War in Athens. The Turkish population of the capital had consequently begun to get very uneasy, seeing that the Greeks were determined at all costs to bring the operations at Chios to a successful end. They also realized that from a strategic point of view, Zichny Bey's position was quite untenable and that it was merely a question of time before the whole Turkish force would be forced to capitulate; it was also not absent from their minds

¹ N. Stratos, Minister of War, Athens, to Colonel N. Delagrammatikas dated 30th November 1912, No. 94514. [See pages 14 and 15.]

² His Royal Highness, Constantine Diadoch, General Officer Commanding in Chief of the Hellenic Army to Colonel N. Delagrammatikas, dated Salonika, 29th November 1912, No. 1474. [See page 15.]

that the Greek population might seize this opportunity to avenge upon them the massacres of 1822 and thus visit the sins of the fathers upon the children. Owing to these opinions, or rather convictions, the three most prominent members of the Turkish population, namely, Asim Bey, Nourì Bey, and Nail Bey, obtained leave from the Commander of the Greek Forces of Occupation to send a letter to Zichny Bey, in which they pointed out the hopeless situation of the Turkish forces and begged him to receive a deputation to discuss on what grounds he would be prepared to negotiate. In answer to this communication, Zichny Bey replied:

Monday, 17th December 1912, European hour 10.30.

To the Notables of the Island, ASIM BEY, NOURÌ BEY, and NAIL BEY,

I have just received the letter which you sent by Akil Bey. In accordance with your declaration I am ready to discuss matters with the members of the deputation, which may come to-morrow at mid-day to the Monastery of Aghiōn Paterōn.

The Military Governor of Chios.

ZICHNY.¹

On the following day a deputation of Turkish notables proceeded to the monastery of Aghiōn Paterōn to confer with Zichny Bey. After a long and protracted discussion he dismissed them with the Spartan reply, 'Let them come and take' (Μολὼν λαβέ).

As soon as the result of the negotiations was made known to the Greek authorities, they decided to

¹ This is a translation of the Greek text published by Peter G. Karakassonis, the original of which was written presumably in Turkish and is not available. Consequently, it is not reproduced amongst the official dispatches.

wait no longer but to make the general attack at once.

On the morning of the 18th, Major Michael Kotoula, in command of a company, left for the village of Viki. At the same time the officer commanding the Troops of Occupation issued to the commanders of all units the following order:

ORDER OF THE ARMY OF OCCUPATION

1. The enemy forces, according to our information, number from 1,500 to 1,800, and are concentrated in an open space stretching from Mount Pilinaios and the heights situated to the north and north-east of the villages of Pytiòs; they occupy all the peaks situated to the south of this line as far as the range of Vroulià. The largest concentration of troops is on the heights from Aepos to Amythounda.

2. The Troops of Occupation will attack on the 19th of December in close collaboration with the volunteer forces and of the Fleet.

3. The unit of Paparrodos, consisting of the 1st Battalion of the 7th Regiment, four guns and the volunteer corps under Sub-lieutenant Lopi, together with a squad, will attack in the direction of Vroulià, Salikovouno, and Koumari, towards Mount Provation; the Lopi unit will attack from the line Leprou-Avgonyma towards the line Salikovouno-Koumari.

The attack will begin not later than 7 a.m. on the 19th of December.

To-night you will send a *liaison* officer to my headquarters. The Fleet from the Bay of Lithi will assist the advance by bombarding Mount Provation and the heights situated to the south.

4. Two Companies of the reserve-depôt Battalions under Major Papadimitriou, under whose orders the volunteer corps of Paphilida will be placed, will hold during the morning of the 19th the line Aghios Ioannis-Karyès-Paphilida. As soon as the enemy's line is pressed by the attack of the main body they will attack, having as their

objective the line Aghios Markos to the monastery of Aghiōn Paterōn.

5. The main body will consist of the Battalions Zerva, Kouveli, Manousaki, of the Company of Evzones and of the Artillery, which will advance as follows :

- (a) The Zerva Battalion at Vrondado, together with two machine-guns, will move off at 6.30 a.m., following the high road towards Epos. Its objective being the capture of the hills, which it held before the retirement, as soon as they attain their objective they will await further orders. This advance will be supported by the Fleet.
- (b) The remaining units will proceed according to the aforesaid order of march, the artillery following the Battalion of Kouveli at 6.30 a.m. from the town of Chios, and make for Vrondado, where they will await further orders.

The battalion transports will follow in the rear of their respective battalions according to the order of march, and will halt facing the road leading out of the village of North Vrondado, facing Aepos, where they will await further orders.

6. The two companies of Plastira at Langada, together with the volunteer corps, will head for the occupation of the heights Sarakina-Siderika. The attack will begin not later than 7 a.m. on the 19th December.

7. The mixed section of regular troops and volunteer corps under Warrant-Officer Starida, which is at Kardamyla, will arrange to occupy the heights, Karphotòs, opposite the village of Pytiòs and will commence the attack not later than 7 a.m. on the 19th December. The advance will be supported by the Fleet.

8. One company of the reserve-depôt Battalion under Major Kotoula will land to-day, the 18th December, in the Bey of Viki. This company, together with the volunteer corps, which is at Viki and Amades under Emiri Tzortzaki, Phiotaki, and Pritzolaki, will place themselves under the

orders of Major Kotoula and will move off from Viki, with its objective the capture of Kritikolakos and of the heights dominating Amythounda. The attack will begin not later than 7 a.m. on the 19th December.

9. The mixed force of Gavathà at Volissòs consisting of regulars and volunteers (Ikarians, Cretans, and inhabitants of Volissòs) will advance via Katavasis, with its objective the occupation of the heights situated to the west of Aghios Isidoros, and will afterwards advance to Oros, as soon as they see the main body advancing to the north.

10. The ammunition column will take up station at the village of South Vrondado.

11. I will march with the main body.

Intelligence to be sent to Vrondado from 7.30 a.m. of the 19th December.

Chios, 18th December 1912.

N. DELAGRAMMATIKAS,
Officer Commanding the Troops
of Occupation.¹

Immediately after signature the above order was sent to the officers in command of all units and was received by them before midday of the 18th December.

At 3 p.m. on the 18th December, Major Pappadimitriou, the Officer in Command of the Outposts at Karyès, reported to Colonel Delagrammatikas that Major Housein Bey and Lieut. Enver Effendi, both officers in the Turkish Army, had approached his lines bearing a white flag, and had stated that they had been sent by the Commander of the Turkish troops in order to negotiate in his name the terms of surrender.

Colonel Delagrammatikas immediately sent Captains Kouvelis and Vernardos to Karyès to meet them. He

¹ Colonel N. Delagrammatikas to all officers commanding units under his command, dated Chios, 18th December, 1912. [See pages 15-18.]

himself, together with his adjutant, remained in the church of Aghios Demetrios to await the outcome of the negotiations. At 6.30 p.m. the officers returned and reported that the Turkish representatives were not in possession of clear and definite instructions, and as they did not know whether the terms would be acceptable to the Commander of the Turkish troops they requested that another meeting should take place on the same spot on the following day, the 19th December, promising to bring the definite decision of their chief. Although the outcome of these attempted negotiations in no way improved the situation, the Commander of the Greek forces decided to postpone the order of attack in the hope of thus sparing his troops any unnecessary casualties, and issued instructions to this effect. He ordered all commanders to await further orders, and in the meantime, to stand by and hold their present positions.¹

At the same time the officer in command reported to the Ministry of War in Athens, apprising it of the details of the situation, and asking for instructions as to what terms he should accept, and especially whether the Turkish troops should be allowed to retain their arms and be transported to Asia Minor.² On the 19th December, the Turkish officers, who had been empowered to negotiate, arrived at Karyès and produced their credentials.³

They were met by the Greek officers who had also

¹ Colonel N. Delagrammatikas' order to all officers commanding units under his command, dated Chios, 18th December 1912, time 7 p.m. [See page 18.]

² Colonel N. Delagrammatikas' report to the Ministry of War, Athens, dated Chios, 18th December 1912, No. 772. [See pages 18 and 19].

³ Lieut.-Colonel Zichny Bey, officer in command of the Turkish troops in Chios, to Colonel Delagrammatikas, officer in command of the Greek Troops of Occupation, dated 18th December 1912. [See page 19.]

been previously furnished with a letter signed by their superior officer empowering them to negotiate on his behalf.¹

Unfortunately, these preliminaries did not produce any agreement, as the Turkish Commander formulated the demand that hostilities should be terminated on condition that the Turkish troops, together with their arms, munitions, and supplies, should be transported in Greek boats to Tchesmé, and that the Greek troops should previously render him military honours.

Such demands were obviously unacceptable to the Commander of the Greek forces, indeed, when the desperate situation of the Turkish troops is taken into account, they may well appear impertinent. The officer in command had no other alternative but to cancel by a fresh order his previous instructions postponing the general attack.²

This order for some reason or other had not been marked confidential. In some unaccountable manner its contents had spread with lightning rapidity throughout the island, and a deputation of Turkish notables presented themselves once more before the Commander of the Greek troops and begged him to allow them to go and meet the Turkish Commander-in-chief with the object of persuading him to surrender.

Colonel Delagrammatikas with charming chivalry allowed them to pass the line, and gave them a letter to Zichny Bey informing him of his intention to attack at 7 a.m. the following morning.

When the deputation arrived at their destination and Zichny had been informed of the situation, he was convinced that the Greek Commander was bluffing,

¹ Colonel N. Delagrammatikas to Lieut.-Colonel Zichny Bey, dated Chios, 18th December 1912. [See page 19.]

² Colonel N. Delagrammatikas to all officers commanding units under his command, dated Chios, 19th December 1912. [See page 20.]

otherwise he was certain that he would never have received such an intimation, and consequently the Turkish Deputation failed to carry to a successful end the mission that their compatriots had entrusted to them.

At 6 p.m. telegraphic instructions were received from the Ministry of War in Athens that the Greek Commander was not to agree that the Turkish officers and troops should remain as prisoners of war in Chios, and that if such a demand were to be formulated by the Turkish Commander further instructions were to be sought by Colonel Delagrammatikas.¹ Shortly after the receipt of these instructions, another urgent telegram was received from the Ministry of War stating that the uttermost concession to be made to the Turkish Commander was that the officers would be allowed to bear their arms and be transported to Athens, whereas the troops would be disarmed and treated as prisoners of war and transported to some concentration camp. All war material was to be declared as booty.²

Both these telegrams were immediately acknowledged by the Colonel in command, who stated that all negotiations had failed because the Turks insisted on retaining their arms and that the general attack would begin on the following day.³

At 7 a.m. on the 20th December the whole island was shaken by the repercussion of the naval bombardment. The *Hesperia* directed her fire against the monastery of Aghiōn Paterōn and Mount Provation,

¹ N. Stratos, Minister of War, Athens, to Colonel Delagrammatikas, dated Athens, 19th December 1912, No. 6482. [See page 20.]

² N. Stratos, Ministry of War, Athens, to Colonel Delagrammatikas, dated Athens, 19th December 1912, No. 104,244. [See pages 20 and 21.]

³ Colonel N. Delagrammatikas to N. Stratos, Minister of War, Athens, dated Chios, 19th December 1912, No. 731. [See page 21.]

the *Macedonia* against the enemy position on the Aepos plateau, the *Mykali*, which was anchored at Marmaron, the harbour of Kardamyla, against the position situated to the north-west of the village of Pytiōs, and the torpedo destroyers from the bay of Volissōs against the enemy's stronghold to the west of Aghios Isidoros. Simultaneously the general advance of all the units composing the Army of Occupation began.

(a) The Battalion of Zerva at Vrondado moved off at 6.30 a.m. up the plateau of Aepos. It was supported by the fire of the *Macedonia*, and succeeded in capturing its objective and in establishing itself on the defensive in positions facing the Mountain Prophet Elias, so as to help the advance of the main body.

(b) The remaining forces of the main body under the personal command of Colonel Delagrammatikas moved off at 6.30 a.m. in marching order and by 9.10 a.m. had ascended on to the Aepos plateau. After a short reconnoitre the Colonel gave orders to the two battalions (the 3rd Battalion of the 1st Infantry Regiment and the 3rd Battalion of the 7th Regiment) to advance against the enemy north of Aepos, against the heights Mandra, and against the enemy positions situated to the east. This advance was effected with the support of the Artillery. The Battalion of Manousaki and Pavlopoulos as well as the Company of Evzones under Warrant-Officer Kalapotharakos were retained in reserve. The Artillery immediately began to bombard the enemy's positions and the two battalions of attack established contact with the enemy, and after a fairly keen engagement the enemy were forced to retire by 10.30 a.m. to the north and north-west of their previous positions, which were duly occupied by the advancing Greek Army.

At 11 a.m. the Aepos ridge was in the hands of the Greek Army. Here they captured a quantity of

abandoned war material. The enemy, pressed on all sides, continued his retirement to the positions Tessara Pigadia, Achlada, and Aghios Georgios Phlorì. At these places the enemy offered but a weak resistance, and being pressed by the advance of the volunteer corps were outflanked and retired westward, in order to concentrate at Tessara Pigadia; but this position they were unable to consolidate and at 2 p.m. were forced southwards towards Kochlià.

In order to cut off the enemy forces at Pytiòs and Amythounda a battalion was ordered to march to the north-west and another was sent in pursuit in the direction of Kochlià. Both these movements were carried out with complete success and the communication between the two sections of the enemy's forces were thus severed. The battalion under Major Manousaki arrived at Kochlià and attacked the enemy, who held the position known as Duo Adelfia, which he succeeded in occupying by 4 p.m.

(c) The 1st Battalion of the 7th Regiment under Lieut.-Colonel Paparrodos, together with a Battery of Mounted Artillery and the detachment at Lithì, began their operations at 7 a.m. in the following manner. Under the support of the Artillery the Infantry attacked from Aghios Georgios Sikousis and by 9 a.m. had occupied the enemy positions of Veroulià, Saliakovouno, Stavròn, Korakonero, and Koumarai. The detachment of Lopi proceeded from Lithì through Avgonyma and effected a junction with this battalion, and the two continued the attack towards Mount Provation. This operation, however, was extremely difficult in its execution owing to the very rugged formation of the ground, which the enemy had succeeded in fortifying to the best possible advantage. Nevertheless, by 4 p.m. this force was able to capture this mountain and the monastery of Aghiòn Pateròn.

Here they halted for the night, and on the following day continued the pursuit of the enemy who was retreating to the north-east.

(d) The depot battalion under Major Papadimitriou, together with the volunteer corps of Paphilida, advanced and occupied the monastery of Aghios Markos which the enemy had evacuated after a brief bombardment by the Fleet.

Zichny Bey, seeing that his main body of troops at Kochlià had been completely surrounded, and realizing that any further resistance could only result in their total annihilation, sent a flag of truce to Major Papadimitriou, to whom he handed a communication proposing a capitulation. The information was immediately communicated to the colonel in command that a flag of truce had been received (the same officer who on the previous day had been entrusted with the negotiations), and intimated that the Turkish Commander was prepared to accept a capitulation on the conditions laid down by the Greek Minister of War.¹

Zichny Bey, however, knowing that the distance between Major Papadimitriou and the officer in supreme command was considerable, and fearing the total annihilation of his forces, sent another herald, through whom he declared his willingness to capitulate unconditionally together with the officers and troops under his command. At 8 p.m. Zichny Bey, accompanied by his officers, arrived at Karyès and placed himself at the disposal of Major Papadimitriou. Immediately following the surrender of the Turkish leader, the troops on the southern sector, amounting to 1,200 men, also capitulated at 9 a.m. on the following day, the 21st December.

¹ Major Papadimitriou, Officer commanding the Independent Depot Battalion, to Colonel Delagrammatikas, dated Karyès, 20th December 1912, time 4.30 p.m. [See page 21.]

While the above events were taking place at Karyès the Detachment under Sergeant Plastira at Langada, consisting of an Infantry Section of local volunteers and also of Cretans, had attacked the enemy at 7 a.m. along the line Rodinon-Phlori-Kouphogia-Pyrgon-Panaghia Koilianousa. The engagement was fairly evenly contested, but at midday the attacking force succeeded in effecting a breach in the Turkish line and the enemy retired rapidly towards Psira and thence southwards to Kochlià, in order to effect a junction with their main body.

In the north part of the island the operations were carried on exclusively by the volunteer corps, which had pressed the enemy southward from Kardamyla. From the village of Viki the same operation had been completed, but the Commander of the Detachment had not received the order of postponement of operations and had consequently attacked on the morning of the 19th. Only after very evenly contested engagement did this force succeed in capturing the position of Aghia Elene and in pursuing the enemy as far as the ridge Prinòn-Persi-Psathophyllo. The enemy retired to Kritikolakos.

Shortly after this engagement the order by which the operations had been postponed reached the Commander of the Detachment, who forthwith gave orders to cease all operations. On the following day, the 20th December, operations were renewed and the Greek forces succeeded in capturing the positions of Kritikolakos and the heights dominating Amythounda.

From Volissòs a similar kind of operation was carried into effect, and the volunteer corps succeeded in capturing the monastery of Moundòn and the villages of Diefchà and Katavasis, their advance being supported by the Fleet moored in the Bay of Volissòs.

This engagement lasted for three hours, at the end of which the enemy was forced to retreat to Aghios Isidoros, and by 3 p.m. the Greek troops had occupied the mountain ridge between the rivers Aghios Isidoros and Ligarià with the intention of continuing on the following day the advance to Oros and Pytiòs. On the morning of the 21st December, just as the detachment from Volissòs was preparing to attack, the Turkish forces opposite to them situated between Amythounda and Aghios Isidoros hoisted the white flag and surrendered to the Greek Detachment. The enemy's forces which had capitulated amounted to 1,994 officers and men. A very large quantity of war material and provisions fell into the hands of the Greek Army, and these by their quantity alone gave eloquent proof that these positions had been organized for defence long before the Greek descent upon Chios had been contemplated.

Immediately preparations were made for the transport of the Turkish prisoners to Greece and for the evacuation of the island by the Greek troops, which were already needed to take their place in other sectors of the theatre of war; only quite a small force was left in Chios to maintain order and to ensure the safety of the island.

It is no exaggeration to say that the successful outcome of the operations in Chios in 1912 was in great part due to the presence of the Greek Fleet, which at that time had become master of the Aegean, with the result that, after the defeat by land of the Turkish forces actually occupying the various islands, no further troops were necessary than those required for the maintenance of order and of the safety of the island. The Greek sovereignty over all the islands of the Aegean was being maintained by the Navy, which successfully blocked the exit of the Dardanelles. The

naval position of Greece towards Turkey in 1912 was very similar to that of England towards Germany during the Great War, as they each held their respective enemy's fleet blockaded. Fortunately for Greece, Turkey had no submarines.

The news of the capitulation of the Turkish forces filled the hearts of the inhabitants with indescribable joy and feeling of relief. From the lips of all emanated proud words that at last the massacres of 1822 had been avenged by the destruction of the *regular armed forces* of their oppressors; history will record that not one Greek soldier or civilian had raised a hand against the defenceless Turkish population, and that in this way the superiority of their civilization and their moral character had been permanently established; but it need not be imagined that they had forgotten that the despots of 1822 had not confined their activities to the pursuit and defeat of the raiding band of Samians, but had turned upon the *defenceless civilians* by whose massacre they had sought to quench their relentless thirst for blood.

The whole of the main square of the town of Chios, as well as the neighbouring streets, was thronged with people of all classes and both sexes, who for hours never ceased giving vent to their feelings. As soon as the approach of the defeated Turkish commandant and officers was announced, the immense crowd, as if obeying an order of some unseen power, observed the most absolute silence.

Zichny Bey was allowed to march in this dead silence through the streets to the ship which was to convey him and his officers as prisoners of war to Greece. So ended the longest period of continuous sovereignty, three hundred and forty-six years, recorded in the history of the island, and the Chians were destined to enjoy a period of absolute freedom, which had

been unknown to the inhabitants of the island since the days of the Genoese dominion.

Of the descendants of the martyrs who were hanged on the 6th May 1822, few had the privilege of taking part in the operations which freed their native island from the Turkish yoke. These few may proudly claim, and others may proudly envy them, the personal satisfaction of having in some way contributed to avenge the massacres of their ancestors. Their names are the following :

AUGUSTUS STEPHEN AGELASTO ; Left London to enlist as a private in the Reserve Battalion of the Manousaki and (to use the words of the General, then Captain and Adjutant, to the Commander of the Troops of Occupation) fought 'As a true hero'. Augustus Agelasto fully justified this opinion of his Superior four years later, when having enlisted as a volunteer in the cause of freedom in the army of his adopted country, he bravely fell in action on the French front on the 8th November 1916.

GEORGE CHOREMI ; Served with the rank of Corporal in the Engineers. Owing to his having spent many years in Chios and to his complete knowledge of every inch of the ground, his services were invaluable to the Commander of the Forces, and on repeated occasions he was detailed as guide to the advancing troops. In this capacity he was continuously exposed to danger throughout the operations of 1912. Immediately following the capitulation of the Turkish forces, Colonel Delagrammatikas submitted to the Ministry of War a report, of which we append a translation:

'Great services have been rendered to me by George Choremi, who was attached to my staff from Salonika. Owing to the lack of a map of Chios and to his complete knowledge of the mountainous districts of the island, he has

provided me with most valuable information concerning the lie of the ground and the general disposition of the enemy forces. Basing myself on these lines, I was able to form an opinion concerning the possibility of attack and pursuit of the enemy. He himself succeeded with the help of the inhabitants, and at his own expense, in constructing bridges and other means of communication for the ascent of the Aepos. By these means it was made possible to mount the Field Artillery on the top of the ridge; and in general by his behaviour and his actions he has proved to be an ardent patriot, and I consider him to be worthy of the highest award on behalf of the State. What the State has done for this young man I do not know; but his own island of origin should consider him as one of the chief originators of its freedom.'

PHILIP CHRYSOVELONI; In 1897 left his home in England and enlisted in the Engineers, taking part in the whole campaign which ultimately proved so disastrous to the fortunes of Greece. In 1912 he again enlisted as a private in the Battalion of Manousaki. On several occasions during the operations which resulted in the freedom of Chios, his name was mentioned in dispatches by his commanding officer. He is the grandson of John Chrysoveloni, who played a prominent part during the War of Independence and enjoyed the confidence of Count Capodistria.

NOTE—Practically all the information relative to the capture of Chios by the Greeks has been taken from General Peter G. Karakassonis' 'Ιστορία τῆς Ἀπελευθερώσεως τῆς Χίου κατὰ τὸ 1912.—'Αθήναι 1928. The author of this work was at the time of the Occupation Adjutant to the officer commanding the Troops of Occupation, serving with the rank of Captain. With the idea of one day publishing the history of the campaign, he kept a detailed diary, and consequently the information is in no way the product of recollections. General Karakassonis very kindly consented to free use being

made of his account and of whole passages being translated. I express my sincere gratitude to General Karakassonis for his courtesy. The majority of the orders reproduced are embodied *in extenso* in the final report No. 1037 and dated 12th January 1913 submitted by Colonel N. Delagrammatikas from Kanetta, Epirus, to the Ministry of War, Athens. This report is preserved in the Archives of the General Staff, Athens, with file number 147/B. It was received at the Ministry of War on the 15th February 1913, A/143, and transmitted to the General Staff on the 16th February 1913 bearing the number 366.

PART II
CHIOS DURING THE GREAT WAR



SISMANOGLIO
MICARIO

INTRODUCTION

CHIOS DURING THE GREAT WAR

FOR Greece the Great War began in 1912 and ended in 1922, during which period the Greek Army realized the heights of glory, winning the admiration of Europe, and touched, too, the depths of a defeat as serious and as far-reaching in its consequences as any which have attended field operations.

During the Balkan Wars of 1912 to 1913, Chios, as we have seen, formed an integral part of the Turkish Empire, and consequently the inhabitants of the island were unable to provide a fighting force for their country: they were, however, well represented in the ranks of the Greek army by a great number of volunteers who enlisted and took part in the Balkan Wars.

At the beginning of the European War, Greece found herself in the throes of a bitter political controversy, between those who were in favour of immediate participation in the World War and those who were in favour of observing neutrality as being more advantageous to a small country.

Owing to the great connexions of Chios with England and France, the sympathy of the inhabitants was very strongly in their favour, and they were also mindful of the fact that they had gained their freedom from the Turkish yoke under the auspices of the government and diplomacy of Eleftherios Venizelos. For these reasons they were enthusiastic supporters of the latter's political party in the State, and when in 1916 the provisional government of Salonika was formed, the Chians were among the first to join the movement.

Nicholas Plastiras, shortly after the Balkan Wars,

had been sent by the General Staff to draw up an accurate topographical map of the island: it has been seen, in the account of the capture of Chios in 1912, that they did not possess such a map. Lieutenant Plastiras during his survey of the island so far won the affection and admiration of many that, when the question arose who was to be entrusted with the training of the unit to be contributed by Chios to the army of the provisional government, the islanders asked to be placed under his leadership. Their demand was satisfied and Plastiras undertook the training of the Chian Regiment, which was styled the 6th Regiment of the Archipelago Division. After a very arduous six months' training the Regiment was sent to the Macedonian Front and took part in all the battles in which the Greek Army was involved, including the memorable victory of Skrà on the 17th May 1918, in which it played a leading part. The Chian Regiment was destined to receive a very severe baptism of fire as soon as it took up its position on the Macedonian Front. In the words of its leader 'the behaviour of two companies will always remain imprinted vividly in my memory; they were suddenly bombarded when in the open plain by very severe artillery fire, during which about 2,000 shells were fired in the space of half an hour. Although it was their baptism of fire, the Chians behaved with admirable *sangfroid*, and on their own initiative took all the necessary measures that the circumstances demanded and consequently sustained negligible losses.'¹

After five months' service in the line, a very important strategic section was entrusted to the Chian detachment, which was specially chosen by the Divisional Commander, as these islanders had already gained

¹ See Κ. Αμάντου—Χιακά Χρονικά—έν' Αθήναις, 1919, Τεύχος 4^{ον}, p. 136.

a reputation for intelligence and adaptability to circumstances, as well as for bravery.

A few years ago, owing to the great experience of Nicholas Plastiras, then Colonel,¹ I asked him if he would give me his candid opinion of the Chian as a soldier. Shortly afterwards I received the letter which is reproduced among the documents, and of which part is here translated:

I was attached to the Mission which was sent to Chios to train the first conscripts, and I arrived there in 1914. I worked as conscientiously as I could, both then and during the period of 1916, when I returned to Chios on the orders of the provisional government of Salonica. For this reason I venture to say that I am more qualified than any one else to pronounce an opinion about the Chian as a soldier. The Army is the real civilian school, where one has the best opportunity of analysing the civic virtues of a people, and thus I had the opportunity of appreciating the rare qualities of character and intelligence of the Chian.

I particularly noticed the intelligence of the raw recruits and their natural facility for learning, their enthusiasm, their proud carriage, and their unusual comprehension of their duty. Later on, when the recruit became trained, I found him to be capable and ready for any sacrifice on behalf of his Country, full of goodwill and always very sure of himself. Wherever I met him it was always the same. I have had a very large number of Chians under my orders, and during long periods both on the Macedonian Front, in the Ukraine, and also in Asia Minor, the Chian was always the first in the attack and the last in the retreat, brave, dogged, and keen for distinction. The consideration I have for the Chian soldier is based on my own experience and on what I have seen with my own eyes. In the 6th Regiment of the Division of the Archipelago nearly all my men were Chians, and I am therefore in a position to state that the reputation for cowardice, which others imputed to the Chians during the

¹ Now General.

events of 1822, has been shown to be absolutely fantastic. This reputation was proved during the Great War to belong to the realm of mythology. On what, may I ask, could to-day be founded a reputation for cowardice of the Chians? Upon the epic struggles of Skrà or Petsovo? Or on the Homeric fights of Asia Minor?

It is certain that men are not born heroes but that they become such by dint of habit, behaviour, and instruction. If these aptitudes did not exist, even though latent, in the very character, in the depths of the soul of these high-spirited Islanders—aptitudes cherished and accentuated by their home life and local upbringing—never could they have been awakened to such perfection. The treasure of the soul of the Chian soldier was brought out in all its brilliance in the military atmosphere and under the bivouac; lively, original, inventive, indefatigable, patient, frugal, intelligent, and patriotic to a fanatical degree, the Chian regained all his internal moral strength as soon as he breathed the mountain air which had filled the lungs of the heroes of 1821, and of our courageous youth of contemporary wars.

I may, therefore, say without any hesitation that the Chian soldier showed always and everywhere an exemplary behaviour, and this he proved during all the expeditions and battles in which he took part, offering himself spontaneously on the sacred Altar of his Country without complaint, but always fully cognizant of the high ideal which was being pursued. He was never tired and never discouraged, but always a keen and dogged watchman of the behests of his Fatherland; even at moments of the greatest sufferings and privations his soul remained invulnerable, an ideal personification of the soldier of ancient times, worthy of Homeric praise because the battles in which he took part were truly also Homeric. In order to imagine the struggles and to have an exact idea of the superb conduct of the Chian under arms, it is enough to consult the relevant army orders. I consider that it is of the greatest interest to do so, in order that our descendants may know, precisely and completely, the details of events which are so closely bound up with the contemporary history of Chios.

Following General Plastiras' recommendation and owing to his personal intervention, it has been possible to collect a selection, reproduced amongst the documents, of these army orders, the last of which is the order of the day when the General, then Colonel, handed over the commandship of the Chian Regiment.

In 1914 the Chian Regiment was styled the 44th Infantry Regiment. In 1917 it was named the 5th Regiment of the Archipelago Division and, after the revolution of 1922 and the subsequent reorganization of the Army, the 23rd Independent Battalion.

When in May–June 1914 the Young Turk Government had decreed the expulsion of the Greek element in the population, 36,000 refugees from the Erythrea peninsula fled to and settled in Chios, where they remained until the end of 1918. But when Greece was authorized by the Great Powers to occupy the Smyrna *enclave*, these refugees practically all returned to their homes in the assurance that these had become an integral part of their mother country. A different fate however awaited them! The defeat of the Greek Army in August 1922 entailed a second emigration, and 60,000 refugees descended upon Chios. Of these to-day only 18,000 (4,300–4,500 families) have remained permanently in the island, the remainder having been settled in different parts of Greece. The majority of them reside in the town of Chios, whose population in 1920 was 20,032 and to-day has been increased to 33,000.

Of these 4,500 families, 1,700 are engaged in agriculture and are distributed as follows: 900 in the town, 100 in the neighbouring villages of the Campos, 120 at Cardamyla, 40 at Volissòs, 240 in the mastic-producing villages of the south, and 300 in the small adjacent islands of Oinousae (Spalmadores)

and Psarà. Of the 900 families which live in the town of Chios, 300 work in the gardens of the Campos and the remainder in the factories and brick-kilns (tiles), in the manufacture of the local sweetmeats for which the island is famous, and in weaving of cotton materials.¹

In 1922, exactly one hundred years after the Massacres, Chios was again destined to be closely connected with one of the greatest disasters in the history of modern Greece.

Towards the end of August and the beginning of September, Chios was the theatre of a tragic scene. A great Greek Army, the first since the days of Alexander the Great to tread the soil of Ionia, had suffered irretrievable defeat, had been expelled bag and baggage from Asia Minor, together with the civilian Greek population which for thousands of years had been the driving power and made up the educated classes of those regions. Owing to its geographical proximity to Smyrna, Chios had been chosen as the clearing-house for these unfortunate military and civilian refugees. Within a few days, not only had the majority of the Army arrived, but civilians in tens of thousands flooded the island, having fled in panic from their homes to avoid the sword of the victorious Turk, whom they knew from experience to be *such a gentleman!* The small harbour of Chios was black with ships which, as soon as they had disembarked one cargo, immediately returned to the mainland to fetch another.

The escape of the Greek Army and of the civilian population in 1922 was entirely due to the admirable behaviour of the Fleet, whose discipline, in spite of

¹ This information about the refugees was provided by Mr. Alexander Pallis, one of the chief members of the Commission for the Settlement of Refugees in Greece, whose work in this connexion has won universal admiration. [See pages 41-56.]

the rout, had remained unimpaired. To the Fleet is largely due the fact that the islands of the Aegean are still under Greek sovereignty. It will be remembered that the sovereignty of Greece over the islands of the Aegean was only recognized by Turkey by Article XVI of the Treaty of Lausanne, which was signed in the year following the expulsion of the Greek Army from Asia Minor. Had the Fleet at this moment been contaminated with the insubordination which was beginning to be discernible in the ranks of the Army, nothing could have stood between the victorious Turkish Army and the islands of the Aegean, and possibly the centenary of the Massacres of 1822 might have been celebrated, if possible, in an even more tragic manner. It is entirely outside the sphere of this work to discuss the pros and cons of the policy of the various Allied Powers, to whose instigation or consent the presence of the Greek Army in Asia Minor was due, nor in any way to examine the intricate controversies of the political factions in Greece in this connexion, but simply to record the sequence of events in so far as these affected the local history of Chios.

As early as the spring of 1922, several officers had realized that the campaign in Asia Minor had reached a deadlock. The Greek Army neither had the means to advance, nor could it possibly entertain the permanent maintenance of its huge front while retreat entailed disaster. Suggestions of a pronunciamiento had been made, but these were wisely rejected by those who realized that Kemal Pasha was about to launch a general attack. The wisdom of this decision is unquestionable, but unfortunately it did not prevent the growth of the greatest feeling of discontent among the officers, who were suffering the direst privations but never failed to be conscious of the critical condition of their country. But similar feelings, engendered among

the rank and file, owing to lack of education or comprehension of the situation, gave rise to incidents of insubordination. Luckily, however, the wiser counsels of the officers prevailed, and no political outburst took place whilst the Army was still in the field. But immediately after their defeat, when they found themselves derelict and scattered throughout the islands of the Aegean, definite revolutionary tendencies were unmistakably discernible. The most prominent leader was Colonel Plastiras, who had made his way with his Regiment to Chios. Chios had been chosen as the most suitable centre of 'operations': first of all because *there* had been collected by far the greatest numbers of the defeated army: secondly, because this island was nearest to the coast of Asia Minor, and consequently transportation was more easily effected: thirdly, because it was conveniently situated on the route to Athens, which was the objective of the discontented officers: and finally, because at Chios was concentrated the largest division of the Fleet, whose adherence to any such projected movements was absolutely indispensable, for otherwise the revolutionary elements would have found themselves in the extraordinary position of having been driven out of the mainland by the enemy, and of having taken refuge in the Islands of the Aegean where they could have been blockaded and starved out by their own National Fleet had they not been able to prevail upon it to fall in with their views concerning the actualities of the day.

The day following his arrival in Chios, namely the 3rd¹ September, Colonel Plastiras immediately began

¹ The dates in this account are according to the Julian calendar which was then in use throughout Greece. It was during the revolutionary régime that subsequently Greece officially adopted the Gregorian calendar.

tentative negotiations. The first meetings took place on the 4th September at the house of George Choremi, situated at the end of the ancient street Aplotarià; here Colonel Plastiras met various naval officers who were able through their influence to communicate his views to their fellow officers in the Navy, and consequently within a very few days all the ships of the Greek Navy at Chios with the exception of the battle-cruiser *Kilkis* had joined the revolutionary party. It was fortunate for the revolutionaries that the *Kilkis* received the order on the 8th September to repair to Mytilene, and thence to Salonica where the Government feared that incidents of mutiny among the troops might take place. Either in the house of George Choremi or in that of John Livanoù, Colonel Plastiras continued his negotiations, which every day were growing more and more extensive. In the meantime, however, a similar revolutionary outbreak had taken place amongst the officers who had been landed on the neighbouring island of Mytilene, where Colonels Mamouris and Protosyngelos were the leaders in regular communication with Colonel Plastiras. Colonel Gonatàs, who had arrived at Mytilene in command of the remnants of the first Army Corps, when at first approached, was very guarded in his replies. Later on, however, when the news of the spread of the revolution reached Mytilene, Colonel Gonatàs abandoned all reserve and decided to place himself at the head of the movement in Mytilene. It was unquestionably very difficult for the negotiations between Chios and Mytilene to be carried on in secrecy, without the knowledge of the authorities. This, however, was effected by aeroplane and by ships. It is difficult to understand how this secrecy was maintained at all, because the very fact of an aeroplane plying frequently between two islands would surely have

awakened suspicions of the local military and civil authorities, which remained faithful to the Athens Government. It was, however, in the general interest that secrecy be maintained in order to avoid the clash of arms between the revolutionary party and the faithful adherents of the Athens Government, for any such unfortunate incident might conceivably have led to the outbreak of civil war; had such a misfortune immediately followed the defeat of the Army, the very existence of the State would have been imperilled.

The 7th September proved an eventful day, and possibly the turning-point of the fortunes of the revolutionary party. News arrived at Chios that the revolution was rapidly spreading throughout Mytilene, and Commander Voutsras, Captain of the destroyer *Niki*, joined the revolutionary ranks, together with the whole crew of the ship. The commander of the battle-cruiser *Lemnos* also adhered to the movement and offered to place himself at the head of the units of the Fleet which had already joined in the revolution. Finally, on the same day, the first division, including the Regiments of the 1st/38th Evzones and the 4th and 5th Infantry Regiment, declared themselves in favour of the revolutionaries. To these were added the 22nd, 23rd, and 37th Regiments as well as the other units of the Second Army Corps. On the 21st the Regiments of the 3rd/40th Evzones and the 25th, 26th, and 32nd Infantry Regiments of the 4th and 5th Divisions did likewise. On the 25th, under the leadership of Colonel Plastiras, his famous 5th/42nd Regiment of Evzones, together with the 2nd, 3rd, and 62nd Regiments and with units of the 18th and 31st Infantry Regiments, openly declared themselves in favour of the Revolution, under the leadership of Colonel Plastiras himself. It must not, however, be imagined

that complete secrecy had been maintained. The authorities had grave suspicions regarding the loyalty of the troops, but amidst the chaos which accompanied the defeat, they were unable to take effective measures.

On the 9th September, after previous consultation between the leaders of the units which had secretly declared themselves in favour of the Revolution, a committee consisting of Colonels Nicholas Plastiras, Panaghiotis, Gardika, and Miltiades Koimisis, under the Presidency of the first-named, was entrusted with the leadership of the Revolution. Major Euripides Bakirdzis was appointed chief of the staff. On the evening of that same day the first order emanating from the Revolutionary Committee was drawn up, written in pencil and bearing no signatures, and was immediately distributed to the various units.

On Saturday, the 10th September, all was ready. It was no longer necessary to maintain secrecy, the majority of the units having already confidentially communicated their desire to join the movement, and Colonel Plastiras took up his head-quarters in the house of John Livanou, which overlooks the canal of Chios. On that day the chief of staff drew up the first official order of the Revolutionary Committee, which contained detailed instructions and was communicated to all units.¹

Just as the above instructions had been issued, a few moments of uneasiness were experienced about midnight on Saturday, 10th-11th September, when news arrived at the revolutionary head-quarters that the local military authorities had realized the situation and were taking certain precautionary measures. For

¹ This order is reproduced *in extenso* as being historically interesting from a local point of view and throwing light on the events which took place in Chios in September 1922. [See pages 41-47.]

a few hours the execution of the instructions was delayed, but without bloodshed the Revolution succeeded in outmanœuvring the loyalist authorities, and at 2 a.m. of the 11th September the Revolution was officially declared. Various units of the Fleet were boarded and their officers overpowered. On Sunday, the 11th September, the revolutionaries were complete masters of the island. The same fortune had attended their movements in Mytilene. At this juncture, however, a very slight divergence of opinion occurred between the leaders in Mytilene and the leaders in Chios. Those in Mytilene wished, before descending upon Athens, to assure themselves of the adherence of all the officers of the Army and the Navy. Colonel Plastiras, however, and all his staff at Chios desired as quickly as possible to take the Athenian Government by surprise, before they had time to take any precautionary measures. After very few negotiations an amicable compromise was reached. Immediately upon the outbreak of the Revolution all the military and civilian authorities in Chios were replaced. Dr. Apostolos Psaltos of Smyrna was appointed Governor-General, Colonel John Kotoulas Military Governor, and Leonidas Mylonàs, Mayor, while the Constabulary and Police were entrusted to Major E. Papanikolaou.

On the night of the 11th September, the units were already on board the ships that were to convey them to Piræus. Colonel Plastiras went on board the battle-cruiser *Lemnos*, and at midnight on the 11th September the Revolutionary Army and the Fleet left the shores of Chios under the leadership of Commander Petropoulaki. On the evening of the 12th September they effected a junction on the high seas with the Revolutionary Forces from Mytilene, the leaders of which at 8 a.m. on the 13th September went on

board the *Lemnos* and held lengthy conferences concerning the objects to be pursued by the Revolution. The leadership of the Revolution was entrusted to Colonel Stylianòs Gonatàs. The Revolutionary Committee was increased to 12 members, and the Executive was entrusted to a triumvirate, consisting of Colonels Stylianòs Gonatàs, Nicholas Plastiras, and Commander Phocàs.

The evolution of subsequent events being in no way immediately connected with the local history of the island of Chios, there is no object in recording them here. It is enough to mention that King Constantine was forced to abdicate, his son King George II was allowed to reign from the 14th September 1922 to the 10th December 1923, when he was dethroned. The Republic was proclaimed on the 25th March 1924 by vote of the fourth National Assembly. Thus it may be seen in summary how far-reaching, for the history of modern Greece, were the political results of the Revolution which had broken out in Chios and Mytilene. To-day we are still too near to such important events to be able to judge impartially whether they were the outcome of wisdom alone; and the bitter political feeling, to which these events gave rise, was far too keen until recently for it to be possible for an unbiased opinion to be formed. Thus we have reached the last milestone in the contemporary history of Chios, and it may be left to one of the younger generation to frame an opinion for the guidance of posterity. The object of this work will have been attained if the foregoing account be considered by a future historian of Chios as a true and accurate statement of facts, providing sufficient material of local interest to ensure that the events which took place in the Island, and the part played by it in the history of modern Greece should not be lost in

oblivion and all traces effaced by the devastating march of time.

NOTE—The greater part of the information relating to the Revolution of 1922 was courteously provided by the late Mr. Christophoros Rodocanachi, former Senator for Chios, who closely collaborated with General Plastiras during the preparation of the *coup d'état*. I am sincerely grateful to him.

DOCUMENTS

PART I

MILITARY DISPATCHES AND ORDERS

I

MILITARY DISPATCHES AND ORDERS

GENERAL CONSTANTINE KALLARIS, *Officer Commanding the* [1]
2nd Division, to the OFFICERS COMMANDING the 1st and
7th Infantry Regiments and the 2nd Regiment of Field
Artillery.

[Αριθ. 599]

Ἄμα τῇ λήψει τῆς παρούσης νὰ ἐτοιμασθῶσι δύο τάγματα τοῦ Ιου συντάγματος, πλὴν τοῦ τάγματος τοῦ ἔχοντος τὴν φρουράν, καὶ ἓν τάγμα τοῦ 7ου πεζικοῦ συντάγματος δι' ἐκκίνησιν μὲ πλήρη ἐφοδιασμόν. Τὰ τρία ταῦτα τάγματα θὰ ἀποτελέσωσι πλήρες σύνταγμα ὑπὸ τὰς διαταγὰς τοῦ συνταγματάρχου Δελαγραμμάτικα, ὑφ' οὗ τὰς διαταγὰς θὰ τεθῆ καὶ μία πυροβολαρχία τοῦ 2ου συντάγματος πεδινοῦ πυροβολικοῦ ἐτοίμη ἐπίσης πρὸς ἐκκίνησιν.

Ἀναφέρατε τὴν ὥραν, καθ' ἣν ἡ δύναμις αὕτη θὰ εἶναι ἐτοίμη, ὅπως ἀναμείνη διαταγὰς ἐκκινήσεως.

Ἐν Θεσσαλονίκῃ, τῇ 6ῃ Νοεμβρίου 1912.

Κ. Καλλάρης,

Ἕποστράτηγος.

GENERAL CONSTANTINE KALLARIS, *Officer commanding the* [2]
2nd Division, to the OFFICERS COMMANDING the 1st and
7th Infantry Regiments and the 2nd Regiment of Field
Artillery.

[Αριθ. 601]

Κατόπιν τῆς χθεσινῆς ὑπ' ἀριθ. 599 διαταγῆς μου ἐντέλλομαι, ὅπως τὸ 7ον σύνταγμα χορηγήσῃ δύο τάγματα ἀντὶ τοῦ Ιου, ὅπερ θὰ χορηγήσῃ ἓν μόνον τάγμα.

Ἐν Θεσσαλονίκῃ, τῇ 7ῃ Νοεμβρίου 1912.

Κ. Καλλάρης,

Ἕποστράτηγος.

[3] GENERAL CONSTANTINE KALLARIS, *Officer commanding the 2nd Division, to* COLONEL N. DELAGRAMMATIKAS, *Officer commanding Chios Expeditionary Force.*

[Αριθ. 607]

Ἡ πυροβολαρχία καὶ τὰ τάγματα, τὰ διαταχθέντα νὰ ὦσιν ἔτοιμα πρὸς ἐκκίνησιν, θέλουσιν ἐπιβιβασθῆ τὸ ταχύτερον εἰς τὰ ἀναμένοντα ἀτμόπλοια “Πατρίδα” καὶ “Σαπφώ”.

Ἐν Θεσσαλονίκῃ, τῇ 8ῃ Νοεμβρίου 1912.

Κ. Καλλάρης,
Ἵποστράτηγος.

[4] N. STRATOS, *Minister of Marine, Athens, to the* HARBOUR MASTER, SALONIKA.

[Αριθ. 1490]

Ἐπιβιβάσατε διατεθὲν ὑπὸ Ἀρχιστρατήγου σύνταγμα ἐπὶ “Πατρίδος” καὶ “Σαπφούς”, διατάξατε ταῦτα ν’ ἀποπλεύσωσι πρὸς τὸ ἑσπέρας καὶ κατευθυνθῶσι πρὸς τὴν πρωτεύουσαν τῆς Χίου Κάστρο δι’ ἀνωτάτης ταχύτητος τῶν ἔξωθεν ταύτης θὰ συναντήσωσι τὸν στόλον καὶ θὰ τεθῶσιν ὑπὸ τὰς διαταγὰς τοῦ μοιράρχου Μοίρας Εὐδρόμων πλοιάρχου Δαμιανοῦ, ἐπιβαίνοντος τῆς “Ἐσπερίας”. Τηλεγραφήσατε ἀπόπλουν καὶ ταχύτητα.

Στράτος,
Ἵπουργὸς Ναυτικῶν.

[5] SAKKALIS, *Harbour Master of Salonika, to the* COMMANDING OFFICER *s.s. Patris.*

[Αριθ. 5960]

Λιμενικὴ Ἀρχὴ Θεσσαλονίκης πρὸς τὸν Κυβερνήτην τῆς “Πατρίδος”.

Κατόπιν τοῦ ὑπὸ χθεσινὴν ἡμερομηνίαν ὑπ’ ἀριθ. 57 ἐγγράφου μας σὰς γνωστοποιούμεν ὅτι τὸ προϊστάμενον Ἵπουργεῖον διὰ τῆς ὑπ’ ἀριθ. 1490 τηλεγραφικῆς διατα-

γῆς του, ληφθείσης τὴν 3 μ. μ. ὥραν, παραγγελλει, ὅπως πλεύσητε εἰς Μυτιλήνην καὶ ταχθῆτε ὑπὸ τὰς διαταγὰς τοῦ ἐκεῖ ἀρχηγοῦ τῆς ναυτικῆς δυνάμεως πλέοντες εἰς τὸν πρὸς ὄν ὄρον, ὡς οἶόν τε τάχιον, κεχωρισμένως δὲ τῆς “Σαπφούς” πλησιάζοντες εἰς τὰς ἀκτὰς τῆς Λέσβου θελετε ἐπικοινωνήσει διὰ τοῦ ἀσυρμάτου πρὸς τὰ ἐκεῖ ὀρμούντα ἡμέτερα πολεμικὰ πλοῖα καὶ θελετε λάβει τὰς διαταγὰς τοῦ ἀρχηγοῦ αὐτῶν. Ἡ πλοηγὸς πρὸς ἀπόπλουν ἐκ τοῦ κόλπου Θεσσαλονίκης θὰ εἶναι ἔτοιμος, ὅπως ἀπάρη τὴν 5,30’ π. μ. ὥραν.

Θεσσαλονίκη, 9 Νοεμβρίου 1912.

Σακκαλῆς,
Λιμενάρχης.

COLONEL N. DELAGRAMMATIKAS, *Officer commanding the* [6] *Troops of Occupation, Chios, to the* OFFICERS COMMANDING *the 3rd Battalion of the 1st Regiment and the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 7th Regiment and the Mountain Artillery.*

Πρὸς τὸν διοικητὴν τοῦ 3ου τάγματος 1ου συντάγματος, διοικητὰς 1ου καὶ 3ου ταγμάτων 7ου συντάγματος, καὶ ὀρειβατικὴν λυομένην πυροβολαρχίαν.

Τὸ ὑφ’ ὑμᾶς τάγμα θ’ ἀποβιβασθῆ πρῶτον, ὁ ἀποβιβασθεὶς πρῶτος λόχος σας θὰ προελάσῃ κατὰ τοῦ ἐχθροῦ, ἐφ’ ὅσον τοῦ εἶναι δυνατόν, ἵνα ὑποστηρίξῃ καὶ τὴν ἀπόβασιν τῶν λοιπῶν. Μετὰ τὴν ἀποβίβασιν ὀλοκλήρου τοῦ τάγματός σας νὰ προελάσῃτε ἔτι περισσότερον κατὰ τοῦ ἐχθροῦ, ἵνα οὕτως ὑποστηρίξῃτε τὴν ἀποβίβασιν τῶν ταγμάτων τοῦ 7ου συντάγματος καὶ τῆς λυομένης ὀρειβατικῆς πυροβολαρχίας.

Μετὰ τὴν ἀποβίβασιν ὀλοκλήρου τοῦ στρατοῦ καὶ τὴν ἐπέλευσιν τοῦ σκότους νὰ ἐγκαταστήσῃτε προφυλακὰς μάχης πρὸς τὴν διεύθυνσιν τοῦ ὑποχωρήσοντος ἐχθροῦ.

Ὅρμος Κοντάρη, 11 Νοεμβρίου 1912, ὥρα 2,50’ μ. μ.

Ν. Δελαγραμμάτικας,
Διοικητὴς στρατοῦ Κατοχῆς.

[7] COLONEL N. DELAGRAMMATIKAS, *Officer commanding the Troops of Occupation, Chios, to the MINISTRY OF WAR, ATHENS, and to HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE DIADOKH, Salonika.*

Πλοῖον " Πατρίς ", 11-11-12, ὥρα 5,10' μ. μ.

Πρὸς τὸ Ὑπουργεῖον τῶν Στρατιωτικῶν, Ἀθήνας.

Πρὸς τὴν Α.Β.Υ. τὸν Λιάδοχον, Θεσσαλονίκη.

Ἀρνηθέντος στρατιωτικοῦ διοικητοῦ Χίου παραδοῦναι πόλιν, διέταξα βιαίαν ἀποβίβασιν στρατοῦ εἰς παραλίαν Κοντάρι ὑπὸ προστασίαν στόλου. Ἀπεβιβάσθη ἡμισυ δυνάμεώς μου καὶ θὰ ἐξακολουθήσῃ ἀποβίβασις μέχρι πέρας αὐτῆς.

Εὐρίσκομαι μίαν ὥραν μακρὰν τῆς πόλεως. Λίαν πρῶι ἐπιχειρήσω κατάληψιν αὐτῆς.

Ν. Δελαγραμμάτικας,

Διοικητῆς στρατοῦ Κατοχῆς.

[8] COLONEL N. DELAGRAMMATIKAS, *Officer commanding the Troops of Occupation, Chios, to ALL UNITS under his command.*

Κοντάρι 12-11-12, ὥρα 5 π. μ.

Ὁ Διοικητῆς τοῦ στρατοῦ Κατοχῆς Χίου πρὸς τὰ ὑπ' ἐμὲ τμήματα στρατοῦ.

Ἄπασαι αἱ περὶ τοῦ ἐχθροῦ πληροφορίες εἰσὶν εὐχάριστοι. Ὁ στρατὸς τῆς Κατοχῆς θὰ ὀδεύσῃ σήμερον τὴν 9ην πρωινήν ὥραν πρὸς κατάληψιν τῆς πρωτεύουσας τῆς νήσου (Χίου). Πρὸς τοῦτο τὸ 3ον τάγμα τοῦ 1ου συντάγματος, εἰς ὃ προσκολλῶ καὶ τὸ ναυτικὸν ἄγημα, θ' ἀποτελέσῃ τὴν ἐμπροσθοφυλακὴν. Διοικητῆς τῆς ἐμπροσθοφυλακῆς ὁ λοχαγὸς Ἀριστείδης Κουβέλης. 800 μέτρα ὀπίσω τῆς ἐμπροσθοφυλακῆς τὸ 1ον τάγμα τοῦ 7ου συντάγματος ὡς κεφαλὴ τοῦ κυρίου σώματος, μετ' αὐτὸ ἡ πυροβολαρχία καὶ μετ' αὐτὴν τὸ 3ον τάγμα τοῦ 7ου συντάγματος, ὅπερ θ' ἀφήσῃ ἓνα οὐλαμὸν ὡς ὀπισθοφυλακὴν.

Ν. Δελαγραμμάτικας,

Διοικητῆς στρατοῦ Κατοχῆς.

COLONEL N. DELAGRAMMATIKAS, *Officer commanding the Troops of Occupation, Chios, to CAPTAIN PAPA KYRIAZIS, Officer commanding the 1st Battalion of the 7th Regiment.*

Κοντάρι, 12-11-12, ὥρα 5,20' π. μ.

Ὁ Διοικητῆς τοῦ στρατοῦ τῆς Κατοχῆς πρὸς τὸν Διοικητὴν τοῦ 1ου τάγματος, 7ου συντάγματος λοχαγὸν Παπακυριαζῆν.

Ἄμα ὡς τὸ σύνταγμα φθάσῃ εἰς τὴν πόλιν Χίου, θὰ ἐξακολουθήσῃτε τὴν πορείαν σας προελαύνοντες ΒΔ πρὸς τὸ χωρίον Καρυὰς πρὸς συνάντησιν καὶ ἐπίθεσιν κατὰ τοῦ ἐκεῖ εὐρισκομένου ἐχθρικοῦ τμήματος (κατὰ πληροφορίας, ἃς ἔχω), μετὰ τὴν ἐκδίωξιν δ' αὐτοῦ ἐκείθεν νὰ ἐγκαταστήσῃτε προφυλακὰς μὲ διεύθυνσιν ΒΔ τοῦ χωρίου Καρυῶν.

Ν. Δελαγραμμάτικας,

Διοικητῆς στρατοῦ Κατοχῆς.

Proclamation of COLONEL N. DELAGRAMMATIKAS, Officer commanding the Troops of Occupation, Chios, to the INHABITANTS OF CHIOS. [10]

ΒΑΣΙΛΕΙΟΝ ΤΗΣ ἙΛΛΑΔΟΣ

Γεώργιος Α', Βασιλεὺς τῶν Ἑλλήνων.

Ἐν ὀνόματι τοῦ Βασιλέως τῶν Ἑλλήνων Γεωργίου τοῦ Α' καταλαμβάνω τὴν νήσον Χίου καὶ προσκαλῶ ἅπαντας τοὺς κατοίκους εἰς ὑποταγὴν ὑποσχόμενος αὐτοῖς ἄνευ διακρίσεως φυλῆς καὶ θρησκευματος ἀσφάλειαν ζωῆς, τιμῆς καὶ περιουσίας.

Ἐν Χίῳ, τῇ 12-11-12.

Ὁ Ὑπασπιστῆς Ὁ Διοικητῆς τοῦ στρατοῦ Κατοχῆς
Π. Καρακασσώνης,

Λοχαγὸς πεζικοῦ.

Ν. Δελαγραμμάτικας,

Συνταγματάρχης πεζικοῦ.

[11] COLONEL N. DELAGRAMMATIKAS, *Officer commanding the Troops of Occupation, Chios, to the* MINISTRY OF WAR, *Athens.*

Ἐπιτελεῖται ἐν τῷ Ὑπουργείῳ Στρατιωτικῶν, Ἀθήνας.

Ἦρα 8η πρωίας κατέλαβεν Ἑλληνικὸς βασιλικὸς στρατὸς τὴν πρωτεύουσαν τῆς Χίου. Ὁ ἐν αὐτῇ τουρκικὸς στρατὸς καὶ ὁ ἐν Κοντάρι τοιοῦτος συμποσούμενος εἰς 1800 διεσπάρη εἰς τὰ ὄρη. Ἐδημοσίευσεν προκήρυξιν ὅτι κατέλαβεν τὴν νῆσον Χίον ἐν ὀνόματι τοῦ Βασιλέως τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ ἐκάλεσα τοὺς πολίτας εἰς ὑποταγὴν ὑποσχεθεὶς αὐτοῖς ἀσφάλειαν ζωῆς, τιμῆς καὶ περιουσίας ἀνεξαρτήτως θρησκευματος.

Ἐν Χίῳ, τῆ 12-11-12, ὥρα 8,45' π. μ.

Ν. Δελαγραμμάτικας,
Διοικητὴς στρατοῦ Κατοχῆς.

[12] CAPTAIN ARISTEIDES KOUVELIS, *Officer commanding the Advance Guard pickets at Karyès, to* COLONEL N. DELAGRAMMATIKAS, *Officer commanding the Troops of Occupation, Chios.*

Ὁ εἰς τὰ ὑπερθεῖν τῶν Καρυῶν ὑψώματα ἐχθρὸς δὲν εἶναι μὲν μεγάλης δυνάμεως, μένει ὅμως ἐκεῖ καὶ πυροβολεῖ ἐκ τοῦ ἀσφαλοῦς, διότι ἢ ἐντεῦθεν ἀνάβασις εἶναι ἀδύνατος καὶ ἐπομένως εὐρίσκεται ἐν ἀσφαλείᾳ. Ἐὰν δέον νὰ κατέχωμεν τὸ χωρίον Καρυὰς καὶ Ἅγιον Μάρκον, ὅστις εὐρίσκεται εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ ὕψος καὶ δεξιόθεν τῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐχθροῦ κατεχομένων ὑψωμάτων, ἀνάγκη νὰ σταλῇ τμημά τι, ὅπερ πλευρικῶς (βορείως) νὰ ἐκδιώξῃ αὐτὸν τῶν θέσεων, ἃς κατέχει.

Ἐκ τῶν ἀραιῶν πυροβολισμῶν ἐτραυματίσθησαν δύο στρατιῶται εὐτυχῶς τόσον ἐλαφρῶς, ὥστε δὲν ἔχουσιν ἀνάγκην νοσηλείας.

Τῆ 13-11-12.

Κουβέλης,
Λοχαγός.

ELEFThERIOS VENIZELOS, *Minister of War, Athens, to* [13] COLONEL N. DELAGRAMMATIKAS, *Officer commanding the Troops of Occupation, Chios.*

Πρὸς τὸν Συνταγματάρχην Δελαγραμμάτικαν, διὰ τοῦ Κυβερνήτου τοῦ ὑπερωκεανίου "Πατρίδος".

Καταδιώξατε τουρκικὸν στρατόν, μέχρις οὗ καταστρέψῃτε αὐτὸν καὶ ἀναγκάσητε πρὸς παράδοσιν.

Ἐν Ἀθήναις, τῆ 13-11-12.

Βενιζέλος,

Ἐπιτελεῖται ἐν τῷ Ὑπουργείῳ Στρατιωτικῶν.

CAPTAIN ARISTEIDES KOUVELIS, *Officer commanding the* [14] *Advance Guard pickets at Karyès, to* COLONEL N. DELAGRAMMATIKAS, *Officer commanding the Troops of Occupation, Chios.*

Δύο ἀπόπειραι ἐντεῦθεν (ἐκ Καρυῶν) ἀπέτυχον, διότι 20-25 ἄνδρες ἐν Ἅγίῳ Μάρκῳ ἀμυνόμενοι εἶναι ἀρκετοὶ νὰ κρατήσωσιν ὀλόκληρον λεγεῶνα.

Τῆ 15-11-12.

Κουβέλης.

COLONEL N. DELAGRAMMATIKAS, *Officer commanding the* [15] *Troops of Occupation, Chios, to the* MINISTRY OF WAR, *Athens.*

[Ἀριθ. 269]

Ἐπιτελεῖται ἐν τῷ Ὑπουργείῳ Στρατιωτικῶν, Ἀθήνας.

Ἄνευ ἀποστολῆς ἐνὸς τοῦλάχιστον συντάγματος μετὰ μιᾶς πυροβολαρχίας ταχυβόλων ὀλοσχερῆς κατάληψις τῆς νήσου ἀδύνατος. Ὑπάρχουσι 2200 Τούρκοι μετὰ δύο πυροβόλων καὶ κατέχουσιν ὀχυρωτάτας καὶ δυσπροσίτους θέσεις. Μάχονται κατὰ σύστημα Μπόερς. Τουρκικὸς στρατὸς διατελῶν ἐν ἀγνοίᾳ συμβάντων Εὐρωπαϊκῆς Τουρκίας ἔχει ἠθικὸν ἀκμαῖον.

Ἐν Χίῳ, τῆ 16-11-12.

Ν. Δελαγραμμάτικας,
Διοικητὴς στρατοῦ Κατοχῆς.

[16] ELEFTHERIOS VENIZELOS, *Minister of War, Athens, to*
COLONEL N. DELAGRAMMATIKAS, *Officer commanding the*
Troops of Occupation, Chios.

[Αριθ. 94117]

Συνταγματάρχην Δελαγραμμάτικαν, Χίον.

Φροντίσατε δι' ἄλλης ὁδοῦ νὰ ἐπιτύχητε ποθοῦμενον ἀποτέλεσμα ἄνευ μεγάλων θυσιῶν. Μεταχειρισθῆτε ἀποκλεισμόν, ἐν ἀνάγκῃ δὲ καὶ ἀπόβασιν εἰς ἄλλην ἀκτὴν ἐκ συνεννοήσεως μετὰ ναυάρχου, ὑφ' οὗ τὰς διαταγὰς διατελείτε.

Ἐν Ἀθήναις, τῆ 17-11-12.

Βενιζέλος,

Ἵπουργὸς Στρατιωτικῶν.

[17] COLONEL N. DELAGRAMMATIKAS, *Officer commanding the*
Troops of Occupation, Chios, to the MINISTRY OF WAR,
Athens.

[Αριθ. 334]

Ἵπουργεῖον Στρατιωτικῶν, Ἀθήνας.

Κατόπιν τῆς ὑποβληθείσης ἐκθέσεώς μου λαμβάνω τὴν τιμὴν νὰ ἀναφέρω ὅτι ἐκ τῶν ῥαγδαίων συνεχῶν βροχῶν καὶ τοῦ ψύχους δὲν εἶναι δυνατὸν ἐπὶ πλεόν τὸ στράτευμά μου νὰ μείνῃ ἐπὶ τοῦ ὄρους Αἴπους, καὶ ἔλαβον τὴν ἀπόφασιν νὰ ἀποσυρθῆ καὶ καταλάβῃ κατωκνημένα μέρη ἐγκαθιδρύον πρὸ αὐτῶν τακτικὰς προφυλακὰς μὲ μικρὰς δυνάμεις, τὸ δὲ ὑπόλοιπον στράτευμα νὰ ἀναπαύηται, διότι ἔνεκα τῶν ταλαιπωριῶν, τῆς μεγάλης ἐργασίας, τοῦ ψύχους καὶ τῶν ἀπωλειῶν ἔχει ἀνάγκην ζωογονήσεως. Τοιοῦτοτρόπως δὲ τὸ μὲν στράτευμά μου τηρῶ ἐν καλῇ καταστάσει καὶ ἄνευ ἀπωλειῶν, τὸν δὲ ἐχθρὸν περιορίζω εἰς τὰ ὄρη ἀποστερῶν αὐτὸν καὶ τοῦ ἐλαχίστου ἐπισιτισμοῦ ἐκ τῶν κατωκνημένων μερῶν, καὶ εἶμαι ἐν τάξει μὲ προγενεστέραν διαταγὴν ὑμῶν. Τῆ παρακλήσει μου ὁ ἀρχηγὸς τῆς Μοίρας Εὐδρόμων κ. Δαμιανὸς ἀνελαβε νὰ

ἀποκλείσῃ θαλασσίως τὰ Καρδάμυλα καὶ Βολισσόν, χωρὶα παράλια καὶ μεγάλα, ἀπέχοντα μακρὰν τῆς πρωτεύουσης, παρ' ὧν ἡδύνατο νὰ σιτίζηται. Εἰς τὰ χωρὶα ταῦτα ἔχω κάμει καὶ ὀργάνωσιν ἐθελοντῶν, ὀπλισθέντων παρὰ Κυβερνήτου τῆς Μακεδονίας μὲ ὄπλα Γκρά, ὡς ἐν ἐκθέσει μου ἀναφέρω.

Ἐν Χίῳ, τῆ 21-11-12.

Ν. Δελαγραμμάτικας,
Διοικητὴς τοῦ στρατοῦ Κατοχῆς.

PAUL COUNDOURIOTIS, *Admiral commanding the Greek Fleet, [18]*
to COLONEL N. DELAGRAMMATIKAS, *Officer commanding*
the Troops of Occupation, Chios.

[Αριθ. 1217]

Λίαν ἐπεῖγον.

Συνταγματάρχην Δελαγραμμάτικαν, Χίον.

Πληροφορήσατε ἡμᾶς τηλεγραφικῶς περὶ σημερινῆς καταστάσεως πολεμικῆς ἐπιχειρήσεως.

Ἐν Μούδρῳ, τῆ 29-11-12.

Κουντουριώτης,
Ἄρχηγὸς στόλου.

COLONEL N. DELAGRAMMATIKAS, *Officer commanding the [19]*
Troops of Occupation, Chios, to the PAUL COUNDOURIOTIS,
Admiral commanding the Greek Fleet, Mudros.

[Αριθ. 425]

Ἄρχηγὸν στόλου ὑποναύαρχον Κουντουριώτην, Μούδρον.

Ἐγκατελείφθη ἐπιθετικὴ ἐπιχείρησις καὶ ἐνεργοῦμεν ἀποκλεισμόν τῶν κατωκνημένων μερῶν. Ἐνεργείας μας ἐγνωρίσαμεν ὑπουργεῖον.

Ἐν Χίῳ, τῆ 29-11-12.

Δελαγραμμάτικας,
Διοικητὴς στρατοῦ Κατοχῆς.

[20] NICHOLAS STRATOS, *Minister of War, Athens, to COLONEL N. DELAGRAMMATIKAS, Officer commanding the Troops of Occupation, Chios.*

[Αριθ. 94504]

Συνταγματάρχην Δελαγραμμάτικαν, Χίου.

Ἀφίκοντο ἤδη αὐτόθι οἱ ἀποσταλέντες Κρήτες ἐθελονταί, διετέθη οὕτω δύναμις τετρακισχιλίων περίπου ἀνδρῶν μετὰ μιᾶς ὀρειβατικῆς πυροβολαρχίας δι' ἐπιχείρησιν κατὰ τουρκικοῦ στρατοῦ Χίου, ἀνερχομένου κατὰ τὰς ὑμετέρας πληροφορίας εἰς δισχιλίους διακοσίους. Ἡ διπλασία κατ' ἀριθμὸν δύναμις αὕτη μετὰ τὴν παρασχεθεῖσαν ἤδη ἀνάπαυσιν θεωρῶ ἐπάναγκες νὰ προελάσῃ ταχέως πρὸς καταστροφὴν τοῦ κυρίου τμήματος τοῦ ἐπὶ τῆς νήσου τουρκικοῦ στρατοῦ καὶ καταστρέψῃ τοῦτον πρὸ τῆς ἀναμενομένης περὶ τὸ τέλος τῆς ἐβδομάδος ἀνακωχῆς ἐν συνεννοήσει μετὰ τοῦ ἀρχηγοῦ τῆς αὐτόθι ναυτικῆς δυνάμεως.

Στράτος,

Ἵπουργὸς Στρατιωτικῶν.

[21] COLONEL N. DELAGRAMMATIKAS, *Officer commanding the Troops of Occupation, Chios, to the MINISTRY OF WAR, Athens.*

[Αριθ. 430]

Ἵπουργεῖον Στρατιωτικῶν, Ἀθήνας.

Διαταχθεῖσα προέλασις θὰ κοστίσῃ πολὺ αἶμα, ἀπέλεσμα αὐτῆς ἀμφίβολον, ἐχθρὸς κατέχει ὀχυρωτάτας καὶ δυσπροσίτους θέσεις, μελετηθείσας καὶ ὀργανωθείσας παρ' αὐτοῦ πρὸ ἔτους, ἐπικειμένης ἰταλικῆς κατοχῆς. Οὐδεμιᾶς ὁδοῦ ὑπαρχούσης, προελαύνων στρατὸς θὰ διέλθῃ δι' ὀρισμένων ἀτραπῶν κατ' ἀνδρα κατεσπαρμένος καὶ ἄνευ συνοχῆς. Ἐνεκεν ἀπωλειῶν καὶ ἀσθενειῶν ἐμπόλεμος δύναμις συντάγματος περιωρίσθη εἰς 2100. Ἀποσταλείσα ἐσχάτως δύναμις 950 ἀνδρῶν ἀνάσκητος καὶ διοικουμένη παρ' ὀλίγων στελεχῶν ἀπάντων ἐφέδρων ἀνίκανος δι' ἐπιθετι-

κὴν ἐνέργειαν. Κρήτες διετέθησαν διάφορα σημεῖα διὰ κλεπτοπόλεμον.

“Ἐσπερία” μόνον ὑπάρχει ἐδῶ, λοιπῶν πλοίων διατεθέντων ἀλλαχοῦ. Ταχυδρομικῶς λεπτομερῆς ἔκθεσις. Διατάξατε.

Διοικητῆς στρατοῦ Κατοχῆς.

N. Δελαγραμμάτικας,

Συνταγματάρχης.

Report of COLONEL N. DELAGRAMMATIKAS, *Officer commanding the Troops of Occupation, Chios, sent by special messenger to the MINISTRY OF WAR, Athens.* [22]

Ὁ ἐχθρὸς ἀνερχόμενος εἰς 2200—2300 ἐκτὸς τῶν ἀκολουθησάντων πολιτῶν κατέχει διὰ τοῦ πλείστου μέρους τῆς δυνάμεως του τὰς μεγαλειτέρας ἀφανεῖς καὶ ἴσως ἐκτὸς βολῆς ἀποκρήμους κορυφὰς τῶν ὀρέων τῆς βορείου Χίου, διὰ μικρῶν δὲ ἀποσπασμάτων 20—80 ἀνδρῶν τὰς ἐξ ἴσου ἀποτόμους, ὅπωςδῆποτε ὅμως χαμηλοτέρας κορυφὰς, ὡς καὶ τὰς εἰς ταύτας ἀποληγούσας προσβάσεις (χαράδρας, ἀτραποὺς κ.λπ.)

Ὁ ἡμέτερος στρατὸς, ἀνερχόμενος εἰς 2100, κατέχει διὰ μὲν τῶν τριῶν ταγμάτων ἀπὸ Ἁγίου Γεωργίου μέχρι Βροντάδων (τοῦ τετάρτου μένοντος ὡς ἐπιφυλακῆς), διὰ τῶν ἀνταρτῶν δὲ Κρητῶν καὶ ἐθελοντῶν τὰ ΝΔ μέρη ἀποκλείων οὕτω τὸν ἐχθρὸν καὶ περιορίζων τοῦτον εἰς ἃς κατέχει θέσεις καὶ ἐν αἷς τρία μόνον χωρία περιλαμβάνονται, ἐξ ὧν ἐλαχίστας ποσότητας δύναται νὰ πορισθῇ τροφῶν κ.λπ.

Σοβαρὰ καὶ ἀποτελεσματικὴ ἐπίθεσις κατὰ τῶν θέσεων τοῦ ἐχθροῦ παρεσκευασμένου εἰς ἄμυναν καὶ γνώστου τοῦ ἐδάφους πρὸ 15 μηνῶν δὲν δύναται νὰ γίνῃ μὲ πολλὰς ἐλπίδας ἐπιτυχίας, τούναντίον θὰ ἔχῃ ὡς ἀσφαλὲς καὶ βέβαιον ἀπέτελεσμα τὴν ἐκτὸς μάχης διάθεσιν μεγάλου ἀριθμοῦ ἀνδρῶν, χωρὶς νὰ κατορθωθῇ ὁ ἐν ἐνὶ καὶ περιω-

ρισμένῳ χώρῳ ἀποκλεισμός αὐτοῦ, διότι τοιοῦτόν τι ἀπαιτεῖ μεγάλας δυνάμεις, ἵνα, ἐφ' ὅσον ἐκδιώκεται τῶν θέσεων, καταλαμβάνονται αὐταὶ διὰ τμημάτων, ἔστω μικρᾶς δυνάμεως, διότι ἄλλως τὰ προχωροῦντα τμήματα θὰ ὑφίστανται τοῦλάχιστον πυρὰ ἐξ ὅλων τῶν σημείων, ἂν οὐχί, ὅπερ καὶ βέβαιον κατὰ τὴν γνώμην μου, κύκλωσιν. Ταῦτα, διότι ἡ ὑπάρχουσα δύναμις ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς φύσεως τῆς χώρας δὲν δύναται νὰ διατεθῇ ἐξ ὀλοκλήρου πρὸς δράσιν ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ σημείου ἢ μᾶλλον ἐκ τῆς αὐτῆς ἀτραποῦ, καθ' ὅσον λύοντες τὸν ἀποκλεισμόν καὶ ἀφίνοντες τὰ λοιπὰ σημεία ἠθέλομεν διακυβεύσει καὶ τὰ μέχρι τοῦδε κτηθέντα, ἀποτελοῦντα, ὡς γνωστόν, τὸ σύνολον τῆς κατωκημένης νήσου. Ἐπὶ πλέον προσθέτω ὅτι ὡς δύναμιν διὰ τοιαύτην ἐπιχείρησιν δὲν ἔχω ἢ μόνον τοὺς 2100 ἄνδρας κατὰ μέγιστον ὄριον, τῆς λοιπῆς δυνάμεως ἀποτελουμένης ἐξ ἀνδρῶν ἐντελῶς ἀγυμνάστων (μὲ ἐλάχιστα στελέχη καὶ ταῦτα ἐφεδρικὰ) καὶ ὑποκειμένων εἰς τὴν ἐλαχίστην περιστασιν εἰς διάλυσιν, ὡς τοῦτο συνέβη καὶ κατὰ τὴν πρώτην τῶν ἐγκατάστασιν εἰς προφυλακὰς συνεπείᾳ βροχῆς.

Περὶ ὅλων τῶν ἀνωτέρω λεπτομερεῖς καὶ σαφεῖς πληροφορίας θέλει παρέξει ὑμῖν ὁ ἐπὶ τούτῳ ἀποστελλόμενος λοχαγὸς καὶ διοικητὴς τοῦ 3ου τάγματος 1ου συντάγματος Κουβέλης Ἀριστείδης, γνώστης τελείως τῆς καταστάσεως.

Χίος, 28 Νοεμβρίου 1912.

Ν. Δελαγραμμάτικας,
Διοικητὴς στρατοῦ Κατοχῆς.

[23] N. STRATOS, *Minister of War, Athens, to* COLONEL N. DELAGRAMMATIKAS, *Officer commanding the Troops of Occupation, Chios.*

[Ἀριθ. 94514]

Συνταγματάρχην Δελαγραμμάτικαν, Χίον.

Ἐμέτερον κρυπτογραφικὸν τηλεγράφημα καὶ ἔκθεσις ἀποσταλέντα διὰ λοχαγοῦ Κουβέλη, ὡς καὶ προφορικαὶ αὐτοῦ ἐξηγήσεις, ἔπεισαν ἡμᾶς νὰ ἀναστειλῶμεν προσω-

ρινῶς ἐκτελέσιν τελευταίας διαταγῆς μας περὶ ἀμέσου ἐπιθέσεως, ἐπικειμένης ἀνακωχῆς. Λοχαγὸς Κουβέλης ἀναχωρεῖ διὰ πρώτης εὐκαιρίας Χίον.

ἐν Ἀθήναις, τῇ 30-11-12.

Στράτος,

Ἐπιτελετὴς Στρατιωτικῶν.

HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS PRINCE CONSTANTINE, DIADOKH, [24]
General Officer commanding in chief of the Hellenic Army,
to COLONEL N. DELAGRAMMATIKAS, *Officer commanding*
the Troops of Occupation, Chios.

[Ἀριθ. 1474]

Τὸ Γενικὸν Στρατηγεῖον Στρατοῦ Θεσσαλίας

Πρὸς

Τὸν Συνταγματάρχην τοῦ πέζικου Δελαγραμμάτικαν, Χίον.

Πέμπῳ ὑμῖν τὸν λοχαγὸν τοῦ Ἐπιτελείου μου Βερνάρδον Ἐλευθέριον, ὅστις, ἀφοῦ τεθῇ ὑφ' ὑμῶν ἐν γνώσει τῆς ἐν Χίῳ καταστάσεως, θέλει ἀνακοινώσῃ τὰς ἐπὶ τῶν ἐκεῖ ἐπιχειρήσεων σκέψεις μου. Ὁ ἴδιος θέλει χρησιμεύσει ὡς σύνδεσμος ὑμῶν μετὰ τοῦ Γενικοῦ Στρατηγεῖου.

Θεσσαλονίκη, 29 Νοεμβρίου 1912.

(Τ. Σ.) Κωνσταντῖνος,
Διάδοχος.

COLONEL N. DELAGRAMMATIKAS, *Officer commanding the* [25]
Troops of Occupation, Chios, to ALL OFFICERS *commanding*
Units under his command.

Διαταγὴ στρατοῦ Κατοχῆς.

1. Ὁ ἐχθρὸς ἀνερχόμενος κατὰ πληροφορίας εἰς 1500—1800 ἄνδρας περίπου εὐρίσκεται ἐν ἐκτεταμένῳ χώρῳ, ἐκτεινομένῳ ἀπὸ Πηλιναίου ὄρους καὶ τῶν ὑψωμάτων βορείως καὶ βορειοανατολικῶς τοῦ Πυτιοῦ, καὶ κατέχει

πάσας τὰς πρὸς νότον τῆς γραμμῆς ταύτης κορυφὰς μέχρι τοῦ ὄροπεδίου Βρουλιὰ περίπου. Αἱ μεγαλύτεραι του συγκεντρώσεις εὐρίσκονται κατὰ πληροφορίας ἐπὶ τῶν κορυφῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ Αἴπους μέχρι Ἀμυθοῦντος.

2. Ὁ στρατὸς τῆς Κατοχῆς θὰ ἐπιτεθῆ τὴν 19 Δεκεμβρίου, συμπραττόντων καὶ πάντων τῶν ἐθελοντικῶν σωμάτων καὶ τοῦ στόλου.

3. Τὸ ἀπόσπασμα Παπαρρόδου, συγκείμενον ἐκ τοῦ 1ου τάγματος 7ου συντάγματος, 4 πυροβόλων καὶ τοῦ ὑπὸ τὸν ἀνθυπολοχαγὸν Λόπην σώματος ἐθελοντῶν μετὰ διμοιρίας, θὰ ἐπιτεθῆ διὰ Βρουλιὰ, Σαλιακόβουνο, Κουμάροι πρὸς Προβάτιον ὄρος. Τὸ σῶμα Λόπη θὰ ἐπιτεθῆ ἐκ τῆς γραμμῆς Λεπρού-Αὐγώνυμα πρὸς τὴν γραμμὴν Σαλιακόβουνο-Κουμάροι.

Ἡ ἐπίθεσις δέον νὰ ἀρχίσῃ οὐχὶ βραδύτερον τῆς 7ης τῆς πρωίας τῆς 19ης Δεκεμβρίου.

Νὰ ἀποσταλῆ σύνδεσμος εἰς τὸ στρατηγεῖόν μου τὴν ἐσπέραν τῆς σήμερον. Ὁ στόλος θὰ βοηθήσῃ τὴν προέλασιν βάλλων ἐκ τοῦ ὄρου Λιθὶ κατὰ τοῦ Προβατίου ὄρους καὶ τῶν πρὸς νότον ὑψωμάτων.

4. Μία διλοχία τοῦ ἀνεξαρτήτου ἐμπέδου τάγματος ὑπὸ τὸν ταγματάρχην Παπαδημητρίου, ὑπὸ τὰς διαταγὰς τοῦ ὁποίου τίθεται τὸ σῶμα προσκόπων Παφιλίδος, θὰ τηρῆ κατὰ τὴν πρωίαν τῆς 19ης τὴν γραμμὴν Ἅγιος Ἰωάννης-Καρναὶ-Παφιλίδα καὶ θὰ ἐπιδιώξῃ τὴν κατάληψιν τῆς γραμμῆς μονῆ Ἁγίου Μάρκου, μονῆ Ἁγίων Πατέρων, εὐθὺς ὡς ἢ ἀπέναντί του ἐχθρική δύναμις χαλαρωθῆ λόγῳ τῆς ἐπιδράσεως τῆς πορείας τῶν κυρίων δυνάμεων τοῦ στρατοῦ Κατοχῆς.

5. Ἡ κυρία δύναμις τοῦ ἀποσπάσματος ἀπαρτιζομένη ἐκ τῶν ταγμάτων Ζέρβα, Κουβέλη, Μανουσάκη, τοῦ λόχου τῶν εὐζώνων καὶ τοῦ πυροβολικοῦ θὰ προελάσῃ ὡς ἐξῆς.

(α') Τὸ εἰς Βροντάδο τάγμα Ζέρβα μετὰ δύο πολυβόλων

θὰ ἐκκινήσῃ τὴν 6½ πρωινὴν καὶ διὰ τῆς ἀμαξιτῆς ὁδοῦ Αἴπους θὰ διευθυνθῆ πρὸς κατάληψιν τῶν λόφων, οὓς κατείχε πρὸ τῆς ἐκ τοῦ Αἴπους ἀνακλήσεως, ἔνθα θὰ λάβῃ περαιτέρω διαταγὰς. Ἡ προέλασις του θὰ ὑποστηριχθῆ ὑπὸ τοῦ στόλου.

(β') Τὰ λοιπὰ σώματα κατὰ τὴν προμνησθείσαν τάξιν πορείας, τοῦ πυροβολικοῦ ἐπομένου τοῦ τάγματος Κουβέλη, θὰ ἐκκινήσωσι τὴν 6½ πρωινὴν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως Χίου καὶ θὰ διευθυνθῶσιν εἰς Βροντάδο, ἔνθα θὰ λάβωσι περαιτέρω διαταγὰς.

Τὰ μεταγωγικὰ μάχης τῶν ταγμάτων θὰ ἀκολουθήσωσι τὴν οὐρὰν τῆς φάλαγγος κατὰ τὴν τάξιν πορείας τῶν ταγμάτων καὶ θὰ σταματήσωσι μὲ τὴν κεφαλὴν των εἰς τὴν πρὸς Αἴπος ἔξοδον τοῦ χωρίου Νοτίου Βροντάδος ἀναμένοντα περαιτέρω διαταγὰς.

6. Ἡ εἰς Λαγκάδα διμοιρία Πλαστήρα μετὰ σώματος προσκόπων νὰ κατευθυνθῆ πρὸς κατάληψιν τῶν ὑψωμάτων Σαρακίνα-Σιδέρικα. Ἡ ἐπίθεσις του θὰ ἀρχίσῃ οὐχὶ βραδύτερον τῆς 7ης πρωινῆς τῆς 19ης Δεκεμβρίου.

7. Τὸ ὑπὸ τὸν ἀνθυπασπιστὴν Σταρίδαν μικτὸν τμήμα ὀπλιτῶν καὶ προσκόπων, εὐρισκόμενον εἰς Καρδάμυλα, θὰ κατευθυνθῆ πρὸς κατάληψιν τοῦ ἀπέναντι τοῦ Πυτιοῦ ὑψώματος Καρφωτοῦ ἀρχίζον τὴν ἐπίθεσίν του οὐχὶ βραδύτερον τῆς 7ης πρωινῆς ὥρας τῆς 19 Δεκεμβρίου. Ἡ προέλασις του ὑποστηριχθήσεται καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ στόλου.

8. Εἰς λόχος τοῦ ἀνεξαρτήτου ἐμπέδου τάγματος μετὰ τοῦ ταγματάρχου Κωτούλα θὰ ἀποβιβασθῆ σήμερον 18η Δεκεμβρίου εἰς τὸν ὄρον Βίκι. Ὁ λόχος οὗτος μετὰ τῶν σωμάτων προσκόπων τῶν ἐν Βίκι καὶ Ἀμάδες εὐρισκομένων ὀπλαρχηγῶν Ἐμίρη Τζωρτζάκη, Φιωτάκη καὶ Μπριτζολάκη, τιθεμένων ἀπάντων ὑπὸ τὰς διαταγὰς τοῦ ταγματάρχου Κωτούλα, θὰ ἐκκινήσῃ ἐκ Βίκι καὶ θὰ διευθυνθῆ πρὸς κατάληψιν τοῦ Κρητικολάκκου καὶ τῶν ὑψωμάτων τῶν ἐπικρατούντων τῆς Ἀμυθοῦντος. Ἡ ἐπίθεσις

των θὰ ἀρχίσῃ οὐχὶ βραδύτερον τῆς 7ης πρωινῆς τῆς 19ης.

9. Τὸ εἰς Βολισσὸν μικτὸν τμήμα Γαββαθᾶ ἐξ ὀπλιτῶν καὶ προσκόπων (Ίκαρίων, Κρητῶν καὶ Βολισσιωτῶν) θὰ διευθυνθῇ διὰ Καταβάσεως πρὸς κατάληψιν τῶν δυτικῶς τοῦ Ἁγίου Ἰσιδώρου ὑψωμάτων, θὰ προελάσῃ δὲ κατόπιν πρὸς Ὅρος, ὅταν ἴδῃ τὴν κυρίαν φάλαγγα βαδίζουσαν πρὸς βορρᾶν.

10. Ἡ συζυγαρχία πυρομαχικῶν θὰ εὐρίσκηται εἰς Νότιον Βροντάδο.

11. Θὰ βαδίσω μετὰ τῆς κυρίας δυνάμεως.

Πληροφορίαὶ ἀπὸ τῆς 7,30' πρωινῆς ὥρας τῆς 19ης Δεκεμβρίου εἰς Βροντάδο.

Χίος, τῆ 18 Δεκεμβρίου 1912

N. Δελαγραμμάτικας,
Διοικητῆς στρατοῦ Κατοχῆς.

[26] COLONEL N. DELAGRAMMATIKAS, *Officer commanding the Troops of Occupation, Chios, to ALL OFFICERS commanding Units under his command.*

Διοικητὰς στρατιωτικῶν τμημάτων.

Ἀναστέλλω τὴν ἐκτέλεσιν τῆς ὑπὸ σημερινῆν ἡμερομηνίαν διαταγῆς μου περὶ ἐπιθέσεως τοῦ στρατοῦ Κατοχῆς μέχρι νεωτέρας τοιαύτης. Συνεπῶς μὴ ἐπιχειρήσητε αὐριον τὴν 7ην ὥραν πρωίας κατὰ τοῦ ἐχθροῦ, ἀλλὰ νὰ παραμείνητε εἰς τὰς θέσεις, ἃς κατέχετε.

Χίος, τῆ 18 Δεκεμβρίου 1912, ὥρα 7η ἑσπέρας.

N. Δελαγραμμάτικας,
Διοικητῆς στρατοῦ Κατοχῆς.

[27] COLONEL N. DELAGRAMMATIKAS, *Officer commanding the Troops of Occupation, Chios, to the MINISTRY OF WAR, Athens.*

[Ἀριθ. 722]

Υπουργεῖον Στρατιωτικῶν, Ἀθήνας.

Ἐπίθεσις κατὰ τουρκικοῦ στρατοῦ διετάχθη διὰ τὴν

19ην τρέχοντος. Σήμερον 18ην μετὰ μεσημβρίαν, διοικητῆς τουρκικῶν στρατευμάτων ἀπέστειλε δύο ἀξιωματικοὺς πρὸς συζήτησιν διὰ παῦσιν ἐχθροπραξιῶν. Ἀνέστειλα διαταγὴν ἐπιθέσεως καὶ αὐριον μεσημβρίαν 19ην συζητηθῆσονται ὅροι παραδόσεως καὶ ὑπογραφῆσεται πρωτόκολλον. Παρακαλῶ διατάξατε τάχιστα ποίους ὅρους δεχθῶ, ἰδίως ἂν θὰ τοῖς ἀφεθῶσι τὰ ὄπλα καὶ ἂν δύνανται μεταφερθῶσιν Ἀσίαν.

Χίος, τῆ 18 Δεκεμβρίου 1912.

Δελαγραμμάτικας,
Διοικητῆς στρατοῦ Κατοχῆς.

LIEUT.-COLONEL ZICHNY BEY, *Officer in command of the [28] Turkish Troops, Chios, and Military Governor, to COLONEL N. DELAGRAMMATIKAS, Officer commanding the Troops of Occupation, Chios.*

Le 18 Décembre 1912. Major Hussein Loufti Bey, Commandant de la Gendarmerie à Chios, est nommé comme délégué pour la solution pacifique chez Monsieur le Commandant des troupes helléniques.

Commandant des Troupes Ottomanes,
Lieut.-Colonel d'État-Major
Zichny.

COLONEL N. DELAGRAMMATIKAS, *Officer commanding Troops [29] of Occupation, Chios, to LIEUT.-COLONEL ZICHNY BEY, Officer in command of the Turkish Troops in Chios and Military Governor.*

Chios, le 18 Décembre 1912.

Monsieur le Commandant de l'Armée ottomane,

En réponse à votre honorée du 18 décembre j'ai l'honneur de vous informer que de mon côté je nomme comme délégué pour discuter les détails et rédiger le Protocole le Capitaine d'Infanterie H. Kouvelis, Chef-de-Bataillon, et le Capitaine d'État-Major E. Bernardos.

Le Commandant-en-Chef des Troupes Helléniques
d'Occupation, Delagrammatikas.

[30] COLONEL N. DELAGRAMMATIKAS, *Officer commanding the Troops of Occupation, Chios, to ALL OFFICERS commanding Units under his command.*

Διοικητὰς στρατιωτικῶν τμημάτων.

Ἡ ἀναστολὴ τῆς ἐκτελέσεως τῆς χθεσινῆς διαταγῆς μου περὶ ἐπιθέσεως τοῦ στρατοῦ Κατοχῆς κατὰ τοῦ ἐχθροῦ δὲν ἰσχύει. Συνεπῶς αὔριον, 20ῆν τοῦ μηνὸς Δεκεμβρίου, θὰ ἀρχίσητε τὴν ἐπίθεσίν σας.

Χίος, 19 Δεκεμβρίου 1912.

Ν. Δελαγραμμάτικας,
Διοικητὴς στρατοῦ Κατοχῆς.

[31] Ν. STRATOS, *Minister of War, Athens, to COLONEL N. DELAGRAMMATIKAS, Officer commanding the Troops of Occupation, Chios.*

[Ἀριθ. 6482]

Ἐπείγου.

Στρατιωτικὸν Διοικητὴν Χίου.

Εἰς περίπτωσιν παραδόσεως ἐχθρικοῦ στρατοῦ προσπαθήσατε, ὅπως αὕτη συντελεσθῇ ἄνευ εἰδικοῦ ὄρου παραμονῆς αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀξιωματικῶν ὡς αἰχμαλώτων εἰς Χίον, ἐὰν δὲ τυχὸν προβληθῇ τοιοῦτος ὄρος, τότε ἀναφέρετε ἀναμένοντες σχετικὰς διαταγὰς ἡμῶν.

ἐν Ἀθήναις, τῇ 19-12-12.

Στράτος,
Ἐπιτελετὴς Στρατιωτικῶν.

[32] Ν. STRATOS, *Minister of War, Athens, to COLONEL N. DELAGRAMMATIKAS, Officer commanding the Troops of Occupation, Chios.*

[Ἀριθ. 104244]

Ἐπείγου.

Συνταγματάρχην Δελαγραμμάτικαν, Χίου.

Ὅρους παραδόσεως δεχθῆτε ἐξῆς· Κατ' ἀνώτατον ὄρον ἀξιωματικοὶ μετενεχθῶσιν Ἀθήνας φέροντες ὅπλα των, ὀπλῖται ἔσονται αἰχμαλῶτοι πολέμου καὶ μετενεχθῶσιν

Ἑλλάδα, ὡς πάντες Τοῦρκοι αἰχμαλῶτοι, ἄνευ ὀπλων. Ὅπλα καὶ πᾶν ὑλικὸν πολέμου κηρυχθήσεται λεία πολέμου. Πᾶσα ὑπέρβασις ὄρων τούτων γεννᾷ πράγματα μετὰ συμμαχῶν.

Ἐν Ἀθήναις, τῇ 19-12-12.

Στράτος,
Ἐπιτελετὴς Στρατιωτικῶν.

COLONEL N. DELAGRAMMATIKAS, *Officer commanding the Troops of Occupation, Chios, to the MINISTRY OF WAR, Athens.* [33]

[Ἀριθ. 731]

Ἐπιτελετὴν Στρατιωτικῶν, Ἀθήνας.

Συνεννοήσεις περὶ παραδόσεως δὲν ἐτελεσφόρησαν, διότι Τοῦρκοι ζητοῦσιν ἀπέλθωσι μὲ ὅπλα καὶ ἐφόδια. Αὔριον πρῶτ' ἀρχίζει ἐνέργεια ἐπιθετική.

Ἐν Χίῳ, τῇ 19-12-12.

Δελαγραμμάτικας,
Διοικητὴς στρατοῦ Κατοχῆς.

MAJOR PAPADIMITRIOU, *Officer commanding the Independent Depot Battalion, to COLONEL N. DELAGRAMMATIKAS, Officer commanding the Troops of Occupation, Chios.* [34]

Καρναί, τῇ 20-12-912, ὥρα 4,30' μ. μ.

Κύριον Διοικητὴν στρατοῦ Κατοχῆς.

Ταύτην τὴν στιγμὴν ὥρα 4,30' μ. μ. ἀφίκετο κήρυξ ἀπεσταλμένος παρὰ τοῦ ἀρχηγοῦ τῆς τουρκικῆς χωροφυλακῆς, ὅστις διεπραγματεύθη μεθ' ἡμῶν προχθὲς τοὺς ὄρους παραδόσεως, καὶ μοὶ ἐνεχείρισε σημείωσιν, δι' ἧς καθιστῶ γνωστὸν ὅτι εἶναι ἔτοιμοι ν' ἀποδεχθῶσι τὴν παράδοσιν συμφώνως μὲ τοὺς ὑφ' ὑμῶν τεθέντας ὄρους. Ἀναμένω διαταγὰς σας.

Ὁ Διοικητὴς ἀνεξαρτήτου ἐμπέδου τάγματος
Παπαδημητρίου,
Ταγματάρχης.

DOCUMENTS

PART II

- (a) EXTRACTS FROM DISPATCHES RELATING TO THE CHIAN REGIMENT, 1917-18
- (b) INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED BY THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE PROCLAIMING THE REVOLUTION IN CHIOS IN 1922 AND ADDRESSED TO ALL UNITS UNDER THEIR COMMAND
- (c) REPORT ON REFUGEES IN CHIOS IN 1922
- (d) LETTER OF GENERAL N. PLASTIRAS TO THE AUTHOR

II

(a) EXTRACTS FROM DISPATCHES RELATING TO THE CHIAN REGIMENT 1917-1918

Ἀντίγραφον Ἀποσπάσματος

Ἡμερησίας Διαταγῆς τῆς 14ης Αὐγούστου 1917.

Συγχαίρω τὸν 12ον λόχον διότι χθὲς κατὰ τὸν βομβαρδισμόν τοῦ τομέως ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐχθρικοῦ πυροβολικοῦ, διαταχθέντες κατέλαβον τὰς θέσεις ἀμύνης αὐτῶν, παρὰ τὴν θύελλαν τοῦ σιδήρου ἣτις ἐκάλυπτεν τὸν ἀνωτέρω τομέα, ἐν ἄκρᾳ τάξει, συνοχῇ καὶ ψυχραιμίᾳ. Διὰ τῆς διαγωγῆς τῶν ταύτης, ἐπροκάλεσαν τὸν θαυμασμόν τῶν Γάλλων Ἀξιωματικῶν.

Ἀντίγραφον Ἀποσπάσματος

Ἡμερησίας Διαταγῆς τῆς 16ης Αὐγούστου 1917.

Κοινοποιῶ κατωτέρω τὴν ὑπ' ἀριθ. 516 Διαταγὴν τοῦ αὐτοῦ Στρατηγοῦ συγχαίρων καὶ αὐθις τοὺς εἰς τὴν ἀπὸ 14 τρέχ. Η. Δ. μου μνημονευθέντας στρατιώτας τοῦ 11ου λόχου, διότι ἠξιώθησαν τῆς τιμῆς νὰ μνημονευθῶσιν ἐν τῇ Διαταγῇ ὑπηρεσίας τῆς 76ης Γαλλικῆς Μεραρχίας, καὶ προτείνω αὐτοὺς ὡς παράδειγμα μιμήσεως εἰς τοὺς ὀπλίτας τοῦ ἀποσπάσματος εἰς δοθησομένην αὐτοῖς περίπτωσιν, περὶ τοῦ ὁποίου εἶμαι τελείως πεπεισμένος.

Διαταγὴ ὑπηρεσίας

[516-26-8-917]

Ὁ Στρατηγὸς Διοικητῆς τῆς 76ης Μεραρχίας ἐκφράζει τὴν εὐαρέσκειάν του διὰ τὴν δειχθεῖσαν ζωηρότητα καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν περιπόλων καὶ τῶν Γαλλικῶν τοῦ 227ου Συντάγματος Πεζικοῦ αἰτινες ἐπανέφερον εἰς τὰς γραμμάς μας πολεμικὸν ὑλικὸν καὶ τὸ πτώμα στρατιώτου Γάλλου τοῦ 305ου ἀποικιακοῦ Συν/τος. De Vassart.

Ἀντίγραφον Ἀποσπάσματος

Ἡμερησίας Διαταγῆς Συν/τος τῆς 22ας Αὐγούστου
1917.

Ἐκφράζω τὴν πλήρη εὐαρέσκειάν μου εἰς τοὺς ἄνδρας τῆς περιπόλου, εἰς ἣν ἐξεφράσθη καὶ ἡ εὐαρέσκεια τοῦ Στρατηγοῦ Διοικητοῦ τῆς 76ης Μεραρχίας. Ὑποδεκ. Καράβας Παντελῆς, Ὑποδ. Ἀθανασάκης Ἰωάν., Στρ. Καλογεράς Ἰωάν., Στρ. Παππαγιάννης Θεόδ., οὓς καὶ ὀνομάζω ὑποδεκανεῖς.

Ἀντίγραφον Ἀποσπάσματος

Ἡμερησίας Διαταγῆς Συν/τος τῆς 10ης Σεπτεμβρίου
1917.

Κατωτέρω κοινοποιῶ ὡς ἔχει Ἀπόσπασμα Η.Δ.Μ.Α. τῆς 5ης Σεπτεμβρίου 1917 πρὸς γνῶσιν.

Ἀπόσπασμα

Ἡμερησίας Διαταγῆς Μερ. Ἀρχιπελάγους 18
Σεπτεμβρίου 1917.

Λαβὼν ὑπ' ὄψει τὴν διὰ τῆς ὑπ' ἀρ. 10038 (12-7-1917) ἀναφορᾶς τοῦ βου Πεζικοῦ Συν/τος ὑποβληθεῖσαν ἔκθεσιν τοῦ Διοικητοῦ τοῦ 11ου Λόχου καὶ τὰς σὺν αὐτῇ προτάσεις τῶν Διοικητῶν τοῦ Τάγματος καὶ Συν/τος, ἐξ ὧν καταφαίνεται ὅτι ὁ Λοχίας Γηλάβας Γεώργιος, ὑπηρετῶν εἰς τὸν 11ον λόχον τοῦ Συν/τος τούτου, κατὰ τὴν 13ην τοῦ μηνὸς Αὐγούστου ἔ. ἔτους ὅτε ὁ Λόχος ἐκράτει τὰ Χαρακώματα τῆς Γραμμῆς εἰς τὸν δεξιὸν ὑποτομέα παρὰ τὸν ἰσχυρὸν βομβαρδισμὸν τοῦ ἐχθρικοῦ πυροβολικοῦ, οὗτος μὲ τὸ ὄπλον ἀνὰ χεῖρας περιήρχετο τὸ χαράκωμα τῆς ἡμισυμοιρίας του, ἐνθαρρύνων τὰ φυλάκιά του καὶ ἐξελθὼν πρὸ τῶν συρματοπλεγμάτων παρὰ τὴν χάλαζαν τῶν ὀβίδων, ἀνέμενεν ἐκεῖ ὅπως ἀντιληφθῆ κινήσεις τοῦ ἐχθροῦ,

Ἀπονέμω εἰς τὸν Λοχίαν τούτον ὡς ἀμοιβὴν τῆς πράξεώς του ταύτης τὸν βαθμὸν τοῦ ἐπιλοχίου συμφώνως τῷ ἀπὸ 30-6-17 Βασιλ. Διατάγματι ἀπὸ σήμερον.

Ἀντίγραφον Ἀποσπάσματος

Ἡμερησίας Διαταγῆς Συν/τος τῆς 13ης Σεπτεμβρίου 1917.

Ὁμοίως λαβὼν ὑπ' ὄψει τὰς ὑπ' ἀρ. 91, 92, 93 καὶ 94 ἀναφορὰς τοῦ Διοικητοῦ τοῦ 3ου Τάγματος μνημονεύω τοὺς κάτωθι διὰ τὴν ἔναντι αὐτῶν ἀξίαν μνημονεύσεως πρᾶξιν· 12ος Λόχος. (1) Ὑπολ. Κόνταρης Ἐμμ. (2) Ἀνθυπίατρος Καραδημητρίου Ἰάσων. (3) Στρ. Βαλμᾶς Γεώργ. (4) Στρ. Κύρου Ἡλίας. (5) Στρ. Τραυματίας Ἀποστολίδης. (6) Στρ. Τραυμ. Νερατζᾶς Γεώργ., διότι τὴν 8ην τρέχ. μηνὸς ἔσπευσαν ἀμέσως ὅπως παράσχωσι τὰς πρώτας βοηθείας εἰς τὸν θανασίμως πληγωθέντα στρατιώτην Ξανθόπουλον Ξανθόν, ἀψηφούντες τὸν κίνδυνον ἐκ τῶν πυρῶν τοῦ ἐχθρικοῦ πυροβολικοῦ, ἐξακολουθητικῶς καὶ μετ' ἐντάσεως βάλλοντος κατὰ τοῦ σημείου ἐκείνου. Ἰδιαιτέρως μνημονεύω τὸν στρατιώτην τραυματιοφορέα Ἀποστολίδην Ἰωάν. παραμείναντα ἐπ' ἀρκετὸν πλησίον τοῦ τραυματίου μέχρις ὅτου κατάρθωσε νὰ τῷ παράσχη ὅλας τὰς δυνατὰς πρώτας βοηθείας.

Ἀντίγραφον

Ἡμερησίας Διαταγῆς Συν/τος τῆς 15ης-9-1917.

Κατωτέρω κοινοποιῶ ὡς ἔχει ἐπιστολὴν τοῦ Διοικητοῦ τοῦ 227ου Συν/τος Ἀντισυνταγ/χου Saint Hillier.

Πρὸς

Τὸν Ἀντ/χην κ. Τσερούλην Νικολ., Διοικητὴν τοῦ βου Ἑλλ. Συν/τος.

Ἐγκαταλείπων τὴν Διοίκησιν τοῦ δεξιοῦ ὑποτομέως, ὁ Ἀντισ/χης Saint Hillier λαμβάνει τὴν τιμὴν νὰ παρα-

καλέση τὸν Ἀντισ/χην κ. Τσερούλην Νικολ. ὅπως εὐαρεστούμενος χαιρετίση ἐκ μέρους του τοὺς κ. κ. Ἀξιωματικούς Ὑπαξ/κοὺς καὶ στρατιώτας τοῦ Συν/τός του, 1ου, 2ου καὶ 3ου Ταγμάτων διὰ τὴν ἀφωσιωμένην των συνδρομὴν ἣν τῷ ἐπεδαψιλευσαν περὶ τὴν ἐκτέλεσιν τῆς Διοικησεώς του.

Ἄπαντες ἀμιλλῶνται πρὸς τὰ Γαλλ. Στρατεύματα κατὰ τὸ ἐκτελεῖν περιπολίας ἀνδρείως τόσον, ὅσον καὶ περὶ τὴν ἐκτέλεσιν τῶν ἐργασιῶν.

Ὁ ἐχθρὸς ὃν ἔχομεν ἀπέναντι ἡμῶν ματαιοπονεῖ. Δέον μετ' ὀλίγον νὰ ἐννοήσῃ ὅτι δὲν δύναται νὰ μάχηται ἐναντίον μας.

Τὴν ἡμέραν καθ' ἣν ὅλοι ὁμοῦ Ἕλληνες καὶ Γάλλοι θὰ ἐπιτεθῶμεν τελειωτικῶς δέον οἱ Γερμανοὶ καὶ οἱ Σύμμαχοί των νὰ μᾶς ἀφήσωσιν ἐλευθέραν τὴν δίοδον.

Τὴν ἡμέραν ταύτην θὰ εἶνε εὐτυχὲς τὸ 227ον Σύν/μα νὰ ἔχῃ παραπλεύρως του τὸν γενναῖον βον Πεζ. Ἑλληνικὸν Σύνταγμα.

Πρὸς Ὑμᾶς ἐπίσης, Συνταγ/χα μου, ὑποβάλλω πλήρεις τὰς εὐχαριστίας μου διὰ τὰς πολλαπλᾶς συνδρομᾶς, ἃς μοι ἔχετε παράσχει καὶ τελευτῶν ἀναφωνῶ

Ζήτω ἡ Ἑλλάς! Ζήτω ἡ Γαλλία!

Ἀντίγραφον

Ἡμερησίας Διαταγῆς Συν/τος τῆς 19ης Σεπτεμβρίου 1917.

Λαβὼν ὑπ' ὄψει τὴν ὑπ' ἀριθ. 69 ἀναφορὰν τοῦ Διοικητοῦ τοῦ 3ου Τάγματος καὶ κατόπιν τῆς ὑπ' ἀριθ. 11315/1015 ἐπισημ. διαταγῆς Μ. Α. ἀναγράφω τοὺς κάτωθι διὰ τὰς ἃς ἐξετέλεσαν πράξεις ἀξίας μνημονεύσεως.

Ὁ Ἐφεδ. Ἀνθ/τρος κ. Μπιλιράκης Λεων., διότι κατὰ τὴν 24ην π. μ. ἔσπευσεν ἐπὶ τόπου ὅπως παράσχει τὰς πρώτας βοηθείας εἰς τὸν θανασίμως πληγωθέντα στρατιώτην 12ου Λόχου Ρουσιάκην Πλούταρχον ἐπιδείξας ψυχραιμίαν καὶ αὐταπάρνησιν, καθ' ὅσον τὸ μέρος ἔνθα ἐπληρώθη ὁ ὡς

εἴρηται στρατιώτης ἐβάλλετο σφοδρῶς ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐχθρ. πυροβολικοῦ.

Ὁμοίως λαβὼν ὑπ' ὄψει τὴν ὑπ' ἀριθ. 41 (16-8-17) ἀναφορὰν τοῦ Διοικητοῦ τοῦ 3ου Τάγματος καὶ κατόπιν τῆς ὑπ' ἀριθ. 11312/1612 Ἐπισ. Δ. Μ. Α. ἀναγράφω τοὺς κάτωθι διὰ τὰς ἃς ἐξετέλεσαν πράξεις ἀξίας μνημονεύσεως.

(1) Σαλπικτῆς Κασσιώτης Στ. (2) Στρ. Μπιλμές Στέφ. (3) Ὑποδ. Κωνσταντᾶς Δημ., διότι ἐξετέλεσαν πλήρως τὴν ἀποστολὴν των ὡς σύνδεσμοι ὑπὸ χάλαζαν ὀβίδων. (4) Στρ. Τραυμ/ρεὺς Σάρκιας Ἀστέρ. (5) Στρ. Τραυμ/ρεὺς Κολοκοτρώνης, διότι αὐθορμητῶς παραλαβόντες φορεῖον ἐξῆλθον πρὸς ἀναζήτησιν τραυματιῶν, καθ' ἣν ὥραν ὁ ἐχθρὸς σφοδρῶς ἔβαλε διὰ τοῦ πυροβολικοῦ τὸ μέρος ἐκεῖνο.

Ἀντίγραφον

Ἡμερησίας Διαταγῆς Συν/τος τῆς 20ης Σεπτεμβρίου 1917.

Λαβὼν ὑπ' ὄψει τὴν ὑπ' ἀριθ. 42 ἀναφορὰν τοῦ Διοικητοῦ τοῦ 3ου Τάγματος καὶ κατόπιν τῆς ὑπ' ἀριθ. 11301/1608 Ἐπισ. Δ. Μ. Α. ἀναγράφω τοὺς κατωτέρω ἀξιωματικούς καὶ ὀπλίτας τοῦ 12ου λόχου διὰ τὴν ἣν ἕκαστος ἐξετέλεσε πράξιν ἀξίαν μνημονεύσεως.

1. Ἀνθ/στὴν Καρούζον Ἰωάν., διότι διμοιρίτης ὢν κατάρθωσε διὰ τοῦ θάρρους καὶ τῆς ψυχραιμίας του νὰ παραλάβῃ τὴν διμοιρίαν ἐκ τομέως ἰσχυρῶς βαλλομένου καὶ παρασύρη ταύτην εἰς μέρος ἀσφαλέστερον κατὰ τὸν βομβαρδισμόν τῆς 12 π.μ.

2. Λοχίαν Μόσχον Στάμ. διότι διαταχθεὶς ἐν στιγμῇ καταγισμοῦ ὅπως τοποθετήσῃ σκοπὸν ἐν τοῖς χαρακώμασι τοῦ τομέως του κατόπιν ἀναγνωρίσεως, οὗτος ἀψηφήσας πάντα κίνδυνον ἐξετέλεσε τὴν διαταγὴν ταύτην μετὰ θάρρους καὶ ταχύτητος.

3. Τὸν ὑποδεκ. Ζόρζον Γεώργ. διότι, ἀποκοπέισης τῆς διμοιρίας εἰς ἣν ἀνῆκε κατὰ τὸν βομβαρδισμόν τῆς 12 π.μ. ἐ. ἔ. λόγῳ μὴ μεταδόσεως τῆς διαταγῆς, οὗτος ἔσχε τὴν πρωτοβουλίαν νὰ τοποθετήσῃ τοὺς ὑπολοίπους ἄνδρας εἰς μέρη ἀσφαλῆ.

4. Τὸν ὑποδ. Κουνέλην Μιχαήλ διότι, καθ' ἣν στιγμὴν ὁ ἀνωτέρω λοχίας Μόσχος ἐζήτησεν ἄνδρας τῆς διμοιρίας του ἵνα τοποθετήσῃ σκοποὺς εἰς τὰ χαρακώματα, οὗτος παρουσιάσθη ἐθελουσίως καὶ διὰ τῆς ἐνωμοτίας του κατέλαβε τὰς θέσεις παραμείνας ἐκεῖ καθ' ὅλην τὴν διάρκειαν τοῦ βομβαρδισμοῦ.

5. Τοὺς ὑποδ. Κοντοποδιᾶν Ἰωάν. καὶ στρατ. Γεωργαλᾶν Ἀντών. διότι, κατὰ τὸν βομβαρδισμόν τῆς 12 π.μ. χρησιμοποιοθέντες ὡς σύνδεσμοι, ἐπεδείξαντο ψυχραιμίαν ἀπαράμιλλον, διελθόντες διὰ μέρους ἰσχυρῶς βαλλομένου ἵνα μεταδώσωσι σαφῶς καὶ τάχιστα τὰς δοθείσας αὐτοῖς διαταγὰς.

Ἐπίσης κατωτέρω κοινοποιῶ τὴν ὑπ' ἀριθ. 3040 Διαταγὴν τῆς Γαλλικῆς Μεραρχίας διὰ ἧς ἐξυμνῆται ὁ στρατ. Δράκος Δημ. τοῦ 11ου λόχου πρὸς γνῶσιν τῶν ὑπ' ἐμέ.

Ὁ στρατ. Δράκος Δημ. τοῦ 11ου λόχου 6ου Πεζ. Ἑλλην. Συν/τος στρατιώτης ἀνδρείοτατος ὡς φονευθεὶς τῇ 13/26 Αὐγούστου 1917 ἐντὸς τῶν χαρακωμάτων τῆς 1ης Γραμμῆς ἀναμένων ὑπὸ ἰσχυρότατον βομβαρδισμόν τὴν ἐπίθεσιν.

Ὁ Στρατηγὸς Διοικητῆς τῆς Μεραρχίας μνημονεύει αὐτοὺς εἰς τὴν Διαταγὴν τῆς Μεραρχίας.

De Vassart.

Ἀντίγραφον Ἀποσπάσματος

Ἡμερησίας Διαταγῆς Συν/τος τῆς 23ης-9-1917.

Λαβὼν ὑπ' ὄψιν τὴν ὑπ' ἀρ. 38 ἀναφορὰν τοῦ 3ου Τάγματος καὶ κατόπιν τῆς ὑπ' ἀριθ. 11310/1610 ἐπισημ. Διαταγῆς Μ. Α. ἀναγράφω τοὺς κάτωθι διὰ τὴν κατωτέρω πρᾶξιν των ἀξίαν μνημονεύσεως. (1) Δεκ. Μουτάφης

Νικόλ. (2) Δεκ. Πανάγος Κωνστ. (3) Δεκ. Τσαντάρης Ἀπόστ. (4) Ὑποδ. Κωνσταντᾶρος Ἄντων. (5) Ὑποδ. Πονηρὸς Στέφ. (6) Στρ. Λουῖζος Ἐλευθ. (7) Στρ. Ζαφείρην Ἀθάν. (8) Στρ. Παπαχρήστου Παν. (9) Στρ. Ζαγκαρώτος Ἰώνα. (10) Στρ. Σαράντος Δημ. (11) Στρ. Ρεβενικιώτης Ν. (12) Στρ. Τσεμῆς Γεώργ. (13) Στρ. Πυραλῆς Χρ. (14) Ὑποδ. Καραφύλλης Κ. (15) Στρ. Μεσετζῆς Χρῖστος, διότι ἀνήκοντες εἰς τὴν 3ην διμοιρίαν τῆς 1ης γραμμῆς ἐπεδείξαντο λαμπρὰν διαγωγὴν καὶ κρατοῦντες ἀνὰ χεῖρας χειροβομβίδας ἀνέμενον ἔξωθεν σχεδὸν τῶν χαρακωμάτων ὅπως ἀποκρούσωσιν ἐχθρικὴν ἐπίθεσιν.

Ἀντίγραφον Ἀποσπάσματος

Ἡμερησίας Διαταγῆς Συν/τος τῆς 10ης-10-1917.

Λαβὼν ὑπ' ὄψει ὑποβληθεῖσάν μοι ἀναφορὰν τοῦ Διοικητοῦ τοῦ 2ου Τάγματος προὔτεινα παρὰ τῇ Μεραρχίᾳ διὰ τὴν ἀπονομὴν τοῦ πολεμικοῦ Σταυροῦ εἰς τὴν Οἰκογένειαν τοῦ ἀποθανόντος δεκανέως 7ου Λόχου Δεληγεώργη Μιχ., διότι καίτοι πληγωθεὶς θανασίμως κατὰ τὰς τελευταίας στιγμὰς εἶχε τὴν ψυχραιμίαν νὰ ἐνθαρρύνῃ τοὺς ὑποδεεστέρους του.

Ὁμοίως λαβὼν ὑπ' ὄψιν τὴν ὑπ' ἀριθ. 799 ἀναφορὰν τοῦ Διοικητοῦ τοῦ 2ου Τάγματος ἐπαινῶ τοὺς κάτωθι ὀπλίτας 8ου Λόχου. (1) Λοχίαν Βοζονῖκον Ἰωάν. (2) Στρ. Εὐθυμιάδην Γ. (3) Στρ. Μπίζαν. (4) Στρ. Χατζαλέζην Τριαν. (5) Στρ. Ζαννῖκον Κωνστ., διότι τὴν νύκτα τῆς 4-5 τρέχ. περίπολον ἀποτελέσαντες καὶ ἐξελθόντες τῶν συρματοπλεγμάτων ἐξετέλεσαν τὴν ἀποστολὴν των μετὰ θάρρους καὶ ψυχραιμίας.

Ἀντίγραφον Ἀποσπάσματος

Ἡμερησίας Διαταγῆς Συν/τος τῆς 30ης-10-1917.

Λαβὼν ὑπ' ὄψιν τὴν ὑπ' ἀριθ. 209 ἀναφορὰν τοῦ 3ου Τάγματος, ποιούμαι μνείαν ἐξαιρετικὴν τοῦ Σαλπικτοῦ

της τάξεως Κασιώτη Στέφ. διότι, διαταχθείς ὅπως καταβῆ
πρὸς ἀναζήτησιν μεταγωγικῶν τοῦ λόχου του, ἀνεῦρεν εἰς
τινα χαράδραν σχεδὸν ἡμιθανῆ τὸν Στρατ. τοῦ 10ου
Λόχου Πάσχαρη Νικολ. τελείως ἐξηντλημένον ἐκ τῆς κο-
πώσεως, καὶ τοῦτον ἀμέσως ὁ εἰρημένος Σαλπικτῆς μετὰ
πολλῶν κόπων ἔφερεν εἰς τὴν Διοίκησιν τοῦ 3ου Τάγματος,
ὅπου τῷ παρεσχέθησαν αἱ δέουσαι ἰατρικαὶ περιθάλψεις,
ἄνευ τῶν ὁποίων οὗτος θὰ ἀπέθνησκεν.

Ἀντίγραφον

Ἡμερησίας Διαταγῆς Συν/τος τῆς 20ης-11-1917.

Κατωτέρω κοινοποιῶ τὴν ὑπ' ἀρ. 108111/670 108112/
670 καὶ 108196 Δ.Τ.Σ. δι' ἧς κοινοποιεῖται Β.Δ. περὶ
μονιμοποιήσεως τοῦ ὑπ' ἐμέ Ἐφέδρου Ἀνθ/γοῦ Βασιλάκη
Νικολ. πρὸς γνῶσιν τῶν ὑπ' ἐμέ.

Ἀλέξανδρος

Βασιλεὺς τῶν Ἑλλήνων

Προτάσει τοῦ Ἡμετέρου ἐπὶ τῶν Στρατ. Ὑπουργοῦ,
στηριζόμενοι ἐπὶ προτάσει τοῦ Σ.Σ.Ε.Α. καὶ ἔχοντες ὑπ'
ὄψιν τὸ ὑπ' ἀριθ. 337 τῆς 28-10-916 Διάταγμα τῆς
Προσωρινῆς Κυβερνήσεως, περὶ ἀπονομῆς ἠθικῶν ἀμοι-
βῶν διὰ πράξεις διακεκριμένας ἐπὶ τοῦ πεδίου τῆς μάχης
ἀπεφασίσασαμεν καὶ διατάσσομεν,

Κατατάσσομεν

Ἐν τῷ ἐνεργῷ Στρατῷ διὰ διακεκριμένας αὐτῶν πρά-
ξεις ἐπὶ τοῦ πεδίου τῆς μάχης μὲ τὸν βαθμὸν τοῦ Ἀνθ/γοῦ
Πεζικοῦ τὸν Ἐφεδρον Ἀνθ/γὸν Βασιλάκην Νικολ.

Ἀθῆναι, τῇ 11ῃ Ὀκτωβρίου 1917.

Ἀλέξανδρος

Μιχαλακόπουλος,
Ὁ Ὑπουργός.

Ἀντίγραφον Ἀποσπάσματος

Ἡμερησίας Διαταγῆς Συν/τος τῆς 7ης-12-1917.

Λαβὼν ὑπ' ὄψιν ἔκθεσιν τοῦ Διοικητοῦ τοῦ 11ου Λόχου
καὶ τὴν ἐπ' αὐτῆς γνώμην τοῦ Διοικητοῦ τοῦ 3ου Τάγμα-
τος, ἐπιστραφείσης τῆς ὑπ' ἀρ. 1080 ἀναφορᾶς 3ου Τάγ-
ματος, προὔτεινα ὅπως ἀπονεμηθῇ ὁ πολεμικὸς Σταυρὸς
εἰς τὴν οἰκογένειαν τοῦ φονευθέντος στρατιώτου Δράκου
Δημητρίου διὰ τὸν ζῆλον καὶ τὴν αὐταπάρνησιν ὃν ἐπε-
δείξατο περὶ τὴν ἐκτέλεσιν τοῦ καθήκοντος διατηρῶν πρὶν
ἢ φονεῦθῇ τὴν θέσιν του ἐν ὥρᾳ σφοδροῦ βομβαρδισμοῦ
μετὰ ψυχραιμίας καὶ γενναιότητος.

Ἀντίγραφον Ἀποσπάσματος

Ἡμερησίας Διαταγῆς Συν/τος τῆς 22ης-12-1917.

Ὅμοίως λαβὼν ὑπ' ὄψιν ἔκθεσιν τοῦ ἀνωτέρω Λοχαγοῦ
κ. Πλαστήρα Νικολάου προὔτεινα παρὰ τῇ Μερραρχίᾳ ὅπως
ἀπονεμηθῇ ὁ πολεμικὸς Σταυρὸς εἰς τὸν λοχίαν Χειλᾶν
Ἰωάν., διότι κατὰ τὸν ἀνωτέρω βομβαρδισμόν τῆς 1ης
τρέχ. καὶ καθ' ὅλην τὴν διάρκειαν τούτου χρησιμεύσας ὡς
διερμηνεὺς παρὰ τῷ Γάλλῳ Ὑπολ/γῷ κ. Ντεμοντιέρ ἐξετε-
λεσε πιστῶς πᾶσαν ἐντολήν ἀνατεθείσαν αὐτῷ παρὰ τοῦ
ἀνωτέρω Ὑπολ/γοῦ, συνεργήσας εἰς τὸ νὰ τεθῶσιν οἱ
ἄνδρες ἐκτὸς κινδύνου διὰ τῆς ἐκθέσεως αὐτοῦ εἰς προφανῆ
τοιούτον.

Ἀντίγραφον

Ἡμερησίας Διαταγῆς Συν/τος τῆς 8ης-1-1918.

ἩΜΕΡΗΣΙΑ ΔΙΑΤΑΓΗ ΜΕΡΑΡΧ. ΑΡΧΙΠΕΛΑΓΟΥΣ 31-12-17.

Περὶ ἠθικῆς ἀμοιβῆς ὑποδεκανέως Μουτάφη Σπύρ.

Ἀντίγραφον Η.Δ. τῆς 16-12-17 τοῦ 6ου Πεζ. Συν/τος.

Ἐπιστραφείσης τῆς ὑπ' ἀριθ. 13019 ἀναφορᾶς μου,
τὸν ὑποδεκ. Μουτάφην Σπύρ. 9ου Λόχου προὔτεινα πρὸς

ἠθικὴν ἀμοιβὴν τὴν προαγωγὴν τοῦ εἰς τὸν βαθμὸν τοῦ δεκανέως διότι μετὰ θάρρους, προθυμίας καὶ ἐνδεδειγμένης ἰκανότητος ἐξετέλεσε τὰ καθήκοντα αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν ὑπηρεσίαν τῆς περιπόλου, καὶ διότι αὐθορμήτως ἔσπευσε νὰ εἰδοποιήσῃ τὸν Διοικητὴν τοῦ 9ου Λόχου καὶ εἶτα ἐπιστρέψας μετ' ἄλλου συναδέλφου του μετὰ μεγίστης προθυμίας καὶ προφανοῦς κινδύνου τῆς ζωῆς του μετέφερε τὸν τραυματισθέντα στρ. Ἀρβανιτάκη Ἰωαν. ἐκ τῆς 1ης Γραμμῆς.

Ν. Τσερούλης,
Συν/χης.

Ἐχων ὑπ' ὄψιν μου τὴν ὡς ἄνω Η. Δ. καὶ τὴν πρότασιν τοῦ Συν/τος ὑποβληθεῖσάν μοι, διὰ τῆς ὑπ' ἀριθ. 13631 ἀναφορᾶς του, ἐξ ἧς ἐμφαίνεται τὸ ὁμόφωνον τῆς Ἱεραρχικῆς κλίμακος διὰ τὴν ἀπονομὴν ἠθικῆς ἀμοιβῆς,

Ἀπονέμω

τὸν πολεμικὸν Σταυρὸν εἰς τὸν ὑποδ. Μουτάφη Σπυρίδωνα, ὡς ἠθικὴν ἀμοιβὴν τῆς διακεκριμένης αὐτοῦ πράξεως, ἐλπίζω δὲ ὅτι ὁ γενναῖος οὗτος ὀπλίτης τάχιστα θὰ προαχθῇ εἰς τὸν βαθμὸν τοῦ δεκανέως.

Δ. Ἰωάννου,
Ἵποστράτηγος.

Ἀντίγραφον Ἀποσπάσματος

Ἡμερησίας Διαταγῆς Συντάγματος τῆς 7ης-21-1918.

Λαβὼν ὑπ' ὄψιν ἐκθεσιν τοῦ 10ου Λόχου καὶ τὴν ἐπ' αὐτοῦ γνώμην 3ου Τάγματος, ποιούμαι μνεῖαν ἐξαιρετικὴν διὰ τὸν δεκανέα τοῦ 10ου Λόχου Χωρετζιμᾶ Γεώργ., ὅστις ἐν τῇ ἐκτελέσει τῆς ὑπηρεσίας του ἐν τῷ Λόχῳ ἐπεδείξατο διαγωγὴν ἀρίστην, ἐν δὲ τῇ 1ῃ γραμμῇ, ἐν τῇ ἐκτελέσει τῶν καθηκόντων του, θάρρος καὶ ψυχραιμίαν ἀπαράμιλλον καὶ εὗρεν ἠρωϊκὸν θάνατον. Εἰς τὴν οἰκογένειαν τοῦ ἐνδόξως πεσόντος δεκανέως Χωρετζιμᾶ Γεωργίου προτείνω ὅπως ἀπονεμηθῇ ὁ πολεμικὸς Σταυρὸς ὡς ἠθικὴ ἀμοιβή.

Ἀντίγραφον

Ἡμερησίας Διαταγῆς Συν/τος τῆς 3ῆς-10-1917.

Λαβὼν ὑπ' ὄψιν τὴν ὑπ' ἀριθ. 788 ὑποβληθεῖσάν μοι ἀναφορὰν τοῦ Διοικητοῦ τοῦ 2ου Τάγματος, ἀναγράφω τοὺς κάτωθι ὀπλίτας 7ου Λόχου διὰ τὴν κάτωθι πρᾶξιν ἀξίαν μνημονεύσεως·

(1) Λοχίαν Πέπαν Ἰωάν. (2) Δεκαν. Ἀγγελίδην Σωτ. (3) Ἵποδ. Σαλάταν Ἐλευθ. (4) Στρ. Φωτεινὸν Ἰωάν. (5) Στρ. Ξινὸν Ἀντών. (6) Στρ. Δροσινὸν Ἡρακλ. (7) Στρ. Κούσαλον Ξενοφ. (8) Στρ. Ρεβύθην Ἡρακλ. (9) Στρ. Καλόγηρον Μιχ., διότι κατὰ τὸν βομβαρδισμόν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐχθρικοῦ πυροβολικοῦ τῆς θέσεως εἰς ἣν διαμένει ὁ λόχος κατὰ τὴν 29ην παρελθ. καθ' ἣν ἐχθρική ὄβις ἐκραγεῖσα ἐπὶ τοῦ σκεπᾶστρου τοῦ ἀμπρὶ εἰς ὃ διέμενον οἱ δεκαν. Δεληγεώργης Μιχ. καὶ στρατ. Μπουρδαμῆς Γρηγόρ., καὶ Μπουγιάννης Ἰωάν. κατεκρήμνισε τοῦτο καὶ κατεπλάκωσε τοὺς ἐν αὐτῷ διαμένοντας, οἱ εἰρημένοι ὀπλίται αὐθορμήτως ἔσπευσαν ἐπὶ τόπου, καίτοι ἐξακολουθητικῶς ἔβαλλε τὸ ἐχθρικὸν πυροβολικὸν, καὶ κατώρθωσαν νὰ διασώσωσι μὲ προφανῆ κίνδυνον τῆς ζωῆς των τοὺς δύο ἐκ τῶν συναδέλφων των, παρέχοντες οὕτω τρανὸν παράδειγμα συναδελφικῆς ἀλληλεγγύης καὶ αὐταπαρνήσεως.

Ἀντίγραφον

Ἡμερησίας Διαταγῆς Συν/τος τῆς 24ης-11-1917.

Λαβὼν ὑπ' ὄψιν ὑποβληθεῖσάν ἀναφορὰν τοῦ 9ου Λόχου καὶ τὴν ἐπ' αὐτῆς γνώμην τοῦ Διοικητοῦ τοῦ 3ου Τάγματος ἀναγράφω τοὺς κάτωθι Ἀξιωματικούς καὶ ὀπλίτας διὰ τὴν κάτωθι πρᾶξιν ἀξίαν μνημονεύσεως· (1) Ἀνθ/γὸς Τσακατόκας Εὐθ. (2) Ἀνθ/γὸς Γραμματικᾶκης Ι. (3) Ἀνθ/στῆς Παππαγεωργίου Μιχ. (4) Λοχίας Γκριτζαλιώτης Παναγ. (5) Λοχίας Κακκαλιᾶς Εὐάγ. (6) Λοχίας

Παναγιώτου Χ. (7) Δεκαν. Κουφαλέξης Δημ. (8) Δεκαν. Τσακίρης Χ. (9) Δεκαν. Χαλβατζής Άντων. (10) Στρ. Μουτάφης Σπύρ. (11) Στρ. Τσιμπούκας Νικ. (12) Στρ. Σταμπουλής Δημ. (13) Στρ. Μαῦρος Ἰωάν. (14) Στρ. Μπουτζαλής Α. (15) Στρ. Μαμούνας Α. (16) Στρ. Σιδεράκης Π. (17) Στρ. Γκιουλμιχάλης Κ. (18) Στρ. Άνδρέου Παντ. (19) Στρ. Τσιμπινός Π., διότι μετὰ θάρρους, προθυμίας καὶ ἐνδεδειγμένης δεξιότητος, ἐξετέλεσαν τὰ καθήκοντά των εἰς τὴν ὑπηρεσίαν τῶν περιπολιῶν πλησιάσαντες τὰ ἐχθρικὰ χαρακώματα καὶ συναποκομίσαντες ἐχθρικὰ πολεμικὰ εἶδη. Ὁμοίως λαβὼν ὑπ' ὄψιν ἔκθεσιν τοῦ ὑπ/γού κ. Σακελάρη Διον. καὶ τὴν ἐπ' αὐτῆς γνώμην τοῦ Διοικητοῦ τοῦ 3ου Τάγματος ποιῶμαι μνεῖαν ἐξαιρετικὴν διὰ τοὺς κάτωθι ὀπλίτας τοῦ 9ου Λόχου. (1) Στρ. Μουτάφης Επ. (2) Στρ. Παναγιώτογλου Α. (3) Στρ. Κοτσιφάκης Άν. (4) Στρ. Μοσχούρης Βασ., διότι ὁ πρῶτος αὐθορμήτως ἔσπευσε νὰ εἰδοποιήσῃ τὸν Διοικητὴν τοῦ 9ου Λόχου, εἶτα ἐπιστρέψας μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων μετὰ μεγίστης προθυμίας καὶ προφανοῦς κινδύνου τῆς ζωῆς των μετέφερον τὸν τραυματισθέντα στρ. Ἄρβανιτάκην Ἰωάννην, ἐκ τῆς 1ης γραμμῆς· τούτους ὀνομάζω ὑποδεκανεῖς. Ὁμοίως λαβὼν ὑπ' ὄψιν ἔκθεσιν τοῦ Διοικητοῦ τοῦ 3ου Τάγματος, ποιῶμαι μνεῖαν ἐξαιρετικὴν διὰ τὸν Ὑπολ/γὸν κ. Σακελάρη Διον., ὅστις παρὰ τὸν κίνδυνον εἰς ὃν θὰ ὑπέκειτο διατρέχων ζώνην λίαν ἐπικίνδυνον καὶ ἀκάλυπτον εἰδοποιηθεὶς ἔσπευσεν εἰς τὸν τόπον ὅπου ἐτραυματίσθη ὁ στρ. Ἄρβανιτάκης Ἰωάν., ἐνεργήσας ὅτι ἐπεβάλλετο διὰ τὴν μεταφορὰν του, δείξας οὕτω ἀφοσίωσιν καὶ ἄκρον ἐνδιαφέρον διὰ τοὺς ἄνδρας του.

Ἀντίγραφον

Ἡμερησίας Διαταγῆς Συν/τος τῆς 6ης-1-1918.

Λαβὼν ὑπ' ὄψιν ἀναφορὰν τοῦ 3ου Τάγματος ὀνομάζω ὑποδεκανεῖα τὸν στρατ. τοῦ 9ου Λόχου Μπουτζαλὴν

Αναστάσ., διότι θάρρος καὶ θέλησιν ἐπεδείξατο καθ' ὅλην τὴν διάρκειαν τῆς ἐν τῷ Μετώπῳ ὑπηρεσίας του.

Ἐπίσης λαβὼν ὑπ' ὄψιν ὑποβληθεῖσάν μοι ἀναφορὰν τοῦ Διοικητοῦ 3ου τάγματος, Ταγ/χου κ. Πλαστήρα Ν. προὔτεινα ὅπως ἐκφρασθῇ ἡ εὐαρέσκεια τῆς Μεραρχίας εἰς τὸν Ὑπολ/γὸν κ. Σακελάρη Διον. διότι κατὰ τὴν 1ην τρέχ. μεταβὰς εἰς τὴν 1ην γραμμὴν, ἵνα ἠγηθῇ τῶν φρουρούντων στρατιωτῶν, καὶ τραυματισθεὶς ὑπὸ θραύσματος ὀβίδος εἰς τὴν δελτοειδῆ χώραν τῆς δεξιᾶς χειρός, ἐπεδείξατο τοσαύτην ψυχραιμίαν, ὥστε οὔτε κὰν ἠθέλησε νὰ φανερώσῃ ὅτι ἐτραυματίσθη ἐνώπιον τῶν στρατιωτῶν, συναισθανόμενος καίτοι τραυματίας ὡς ὑποχρέωσίν του ἀπέναντι τῶν ὑποδεεστέρων του. Ὁμοίως λαβὼν ὑπ' ὄψιν ἀναφορὰν τοῦ 3ου τάγματος ποιῶμαι μνεῖαν διὰ τοὺς Ἄνθ/γὸν κ. Γραμματικάκην, Ἐπιλοχίαν Γκριτζαλιώτην καὶ λοχίαν Κοκκαλιᾶν Εὐάγ. 9ου Λόχου, διότι κατὰ τὸν βομβαρδισμόν τῆς 1ης τρέχ. καὶ καθ' ἣν στιγμὴν ἐπληγώθη ὁ Διοικητὴς τοῦ Λόχου κ. Σακελάρης Διον. ἐπιδείξαντες θάρρος καὶ ψυχραιμίαν παρὰ τὴν ἐξακολουθητικὴν βολὴν τοῦ ἐχθροῦ ἔθεσαν ἐκτὸς κινδύνου τοὺς ἄνδρας τοῦ λόχου των ἐκθέσαντες ἑαυτοὺς εἰς τοιοῦτον.

Ἀντίγραφον

Ἡμερησίας Διαταγῆς Συν/τος τῆς 19ης Φεβρουαρίου 1918.

Ἡμερ. Διαταγῆς Μεράρχ. Ἀρχιπελάγους 11-24 Φεβρουαρίου 1918.

Περὶ ἀπονομῆς τοῦ Πολεμικοῦ Σταυροῦ εἰς τὴν οἰκογένειαν τοῦ φονευθέντος δεκανεῶς Χωρετζιμᾶ Γεωργίου.

Ἀντίγραφον Ἡμερησίας Διαταγῆς 7ου Συν/τος τῆς 6ης-2-1918.

Λαβὼν ὑπ' ὄψιν ἔκθεσιν τοῦ Διοικητοῦ 10ου Λόχου ὡς καὶ τὴν ἐπ' αὐτῆς γνώμην τοῦ Διοικητοῦ τοῦ 3ου Τάγματος

ποιούμαι μνείαν ἐξαιρετικὴν διὰ τὸν δεκανέα τοῦ 10ου λόχου Χωρετζιμᾶν Γεώργιον, ὅστις ἐν τῇ ἐκτελέσει τῆς ὑπηρεσίας του ἐν τῷ λόχῳ ἐπεδείξατο διαγωγὴν ἀρίστην, ἐν δὲ τῇ 1ῃ γραμμῇ ἐν τῇ ἐκτελέσει τῶν καθηκόντων του, θάρρος καὶ ψυχραιμίαν ἀπαράμιλλον, καὶ εὗρεν ἡρωϊκὸν θάνατον.

Εἰς τὴν οἰκογένειαν τοῦ ἐνδόξως πεσόντος δεκανέως Χωρετζιμᾶ Γ. προτείνω ὅπως ἀπονεμηθῇ ὡς ἠθικὴ ἀμοιβὴ ὁ Πολεμικὸς Σταυρός.

Ν. Τσερούλης.

Ἐχων ὑπ' ὄψιν μου τὴν ὡς ἄνω Η. Δ. καθὼς καὶ πρότασιν τοῦ βου Συν/τος ὑποβληθείσαν μοι διὰ τῆς ὑπ' ἀριθ. 2623 ἀναφορᾶς του, ἐξ ἧς ἐμφαίνεται τὸ ὁμόφωνον τῆς Ἱεραρχικῆς κλίμακος διὰ τὴν ἄνω ἠθικὴν ἀμοιβήν,

Ἀπονέμω

εἰς τὴν οἰκογένειαν τοῦ ἐνδόξου ὑπὲρ Πατρίδος πεσόντος δεκανέως Χωρετζιμᾶ Γεώργ. τὸν Πολεμικὸν Σταυρόν.

Ἡ ἐπίδοσις αὐτοῦ καὶ τοῦ διπλώματος τοῦ ὀριζομένου ἐν τῷ ἀπὸ 31 Δεκεμβρίου π. ἔ. Β. Δ. γενήσεται ἅμα τῇ ἀποστολῇ των ὑπὸ τοῦ Ὑπουργείου.

Δ. Ἰωάννου,
Ὑποστράτηγος.

Ἀντίγραφον Ἀποσπάσματος

Ἡμερησίας Διαταγῆς Συν/τος τῆς 10ης-3-1918.

Ὁ Ἀνθ/γὸς κ. Βασιλάκης Ν. ἐπὶ κεφαλῆς περιπόλου ἀποτελουμένης ἐκ τοῦ λοχίου Λάζου, δεκαν. Γεωργαλά καὶ στρατ. Χαβιάρα Κ. καὶ Μπανάσα Δ. 11ου λόχου, ἐξετέλεσαν μετ' ἐπιδεξιότητος καὶ τόλμης τρεῖς ἀναγνωρίσεις διεισδύσαντες μέχρι τῶν ἐχθρικῶν συρματοπλεγμάτων καὶ ἀναρτήσαντες τὰς προκηρύξεις.

Ἐκ τῶν τολμηρῶν τούτων ἀναγνωρίσεων παρεσχέθησαν τῇ ὑπηρεσίᾳ σπουδαιόταται πληροφορίαι περὶ τῆς καταστάσεως τῶν συρματοπλεγμάτων καὶ φυλακίων τοῦ ἐχθροῦ.

Θεωρῶν τὴν πράξιν ταύτην ἀξίαν ἠθικῆς ἀμοιβῆς ἐπαινῶ τὸν Ἀνθ/γὸν κ. Βασιλάκην καὶ τοὺς ὡς ἄνω ὀπλίτας συγχαίρων τούτους διὰ τὴν καλὴν των διαγωγὴν.

Εἰς τοὺς Ἀνθ/γὸν Παππαδημητρίου Π., λοχίαν Σαλαγάραν Ἰάκ., δεκανέα Κυργιατζῆν, ὑποδ. Χατζαλέξην, Παππακωνσταντίνου, στρατιώτας Πέρρον, Γιάργκο, Ζανῖκον, Ὀργέταν Δημ., Καρίβαλην Ἄνδρ., Παντιλόγλου, Σουρογιάννην Ν. καὶ Βούρον Κωνστ., διότι λαβόντες διαταγὴν νὰ ρίψωσι προκηρύξεις εἰς τὰ ἐχθρικὰ χαρακώματα, ἔφερον εἰς πέρας τὴν ἀποστολὴν των, ἐπιδείξαντες κατὰ τὸ διάστημα τῆς ὑπηρεσίας των θάρρος, ψυχραιμίαν καὶ τόλμην, ἐκφράζω τὴν εὐαρέσκεϊάν μου.

Φ. Φιλιππόπουλος,
Ἀντ/χης.

Ἀντίγραφον Ἀποσπάσματος

Ἡμερησίας Διαταγῆς Συν/τος τῆς 17ης-3-1918.

Ὁ Ἀνθ/στῆς κ. Φθενάκης Ἐμμ. ἐπὶ κεφαλῆς περιπόλου ἀποτελουμένης ἐκ τῶν κ. λοχίου Λεφάκη Μιχ., δεκ. Ρεβενικιώτη Ν., καὶ στρατιωτῶν Κυπριάδη Ἄντ., Κοκκώδη Γεώργ., Μπαγιαζίτη Ἡλία, ἐξετέλεσε μετ' ἐπιδεξιότητος καὶ τόλμης ἀναγνωρίσιν, μεταβὰς μέχρι 30-40 μ. τῶν ἐχθρικῶν συρματοπλεγμάτων, παρασχὼν τῇ ὑπηρεσίᾳ πολυτίμους πληροφορίας.

Θεωρῶν τὴν πράξιν ταύτην ἀξίαν ἠθικῆς ἀμοιβῆς ἐπαινῶ τὸν Ἀνθ/στῆν κ. Φθενάκην Ἐμμ. καὶ τοὺς ὡς ἄνω ὀπλίτας, συγχαίρων αὐτοὺς συνάμα διὰ τὴν καλὴν των διαγωγὴν.

Ἡμερησία διαταγῆ

Συντάγματος τῆς 15ης Φεβρουαρίου 1919.

Ἀπὸ σήμερον παραδίδω τὴν Διοίκησιν τοῦ Συν/τος εἰς τὸν Ἀντισ/χην κ. Βουτσινᾶν Θεόφιλον.

Ἀποχωρῶν τοῦ Συν/τος τούτου εἰς ὃ ἐπὶ 27 μῆνας συνεχῶς ὑπηρέτησα εἰς τὴν κρισιμωτέραν περίοδον τῆς

ἀναπλάσεως τῆς Πατρίδος δοκιμάζω τὴν μεγαλητέραν λύπην διότι ἀποχωρίζομαι προσφιλῶν συμπολεμιστῶν.

Ἀπερχόμενος συναποκομίζω καὶ τὰς ὠραιότερας ἀναμνήσεις μιᾶς ἐνδόξου σειρᾶς δράσεως τῶν ἀποτελούντων τὸ Συν/μα τοῦτο Ἀξιωματικῶν, ὑπαξιωματικῶν καὶ ὀπλιτῶν, τῶν ὁποίων αἱ φυσιογνωμίαι θὰ ἀποτελῶσιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ μου ζωηρὰς εἰκόνας ἀξιοθαυμάστων πολεμικῶν ἀρετῶν.

Δὲν θὰ ἐπεθύμουν νὰ ἀποχωρισθῶ τοῦ Συν/τος τούτου ἂν δὲν ἐπηκολούθει ἄλλος ἐθνικὸς ἀγὼν ὅστις μοι ἐπιβάλλει νὰ προσφέρω τὰς ὑπηρεσίας μου εἰς ἄλλα σημεῖα.— Ἐν τούτοις ἡ μόνη ἐπιθυμία μου εἶναι ὅταν ἐκλείψουν οἱ λόγοι, νὰ ἐπανέλθω καὶ πάλιν εἰς τὸ Συν/μα τοῦτο ἐν μέσῳ τοῦ ὁποίου ἐδοκίμασα τὰς μεγαλητέρας συγκινήσεις καὶ εἶδα πραγματοποιούμενα τὰ ὑψητετέρα πατριωτικὰ ὄνειρα.

Ἐκφράζω τὰς ἀπείρους μου εὐχαριστίας πρὸς πάντας τοὺς ἀξιωματικοὺς καὶ ὀπλίτας τοὺς βοηθήσαντάς με εἰς τὴν προπαρασκευὴν ἀξιωμαχοῦ στρατοῦ· τοὺς ἐργασθέντας μοχθήσαντας κινδυνεύσαντας ἐπὶ 16 μῆνας ἐν τοῖς χαρακώμασι· τοὺς δημιουργήσαντας διὰ τῆς ἐπιμονῆς των τὸ σφοδρὸν ἐπιθετικὸν πνεῦμα καὶ τὴν ἀκατάβλητον πρὸς τὴν Νίκην θέλησιν, ἅτινα μέχρι θαυμαστοῦ ἐξεδηλώθησαν ἐν τῇ μάχῃ τοῦ Σκρᾶ· τοὺς ἐνδειξαμένους ἐν τῇ καταδιώξει τοῦ ἐχθροῦ τῆς πατρίδος ἀδάμαστον ὄρμην ἀντοχὴν θέλησιν αὐτοθυσίαν, διατρέξαντας περὶ τὰ 200 χιλιόμετρα μέχρι Πετσόβου ἐντὸς μιᾶς ἐβδομάδος, διασκορπίσαντας τὸν ἐχθρὸν ὅπου καὶ ἂν τὸν συνήντησαν καὶ ἐμβαλλόντας εἰς αὐτὸν διὰ τῆς πρωτοφανοῦς των ταχύτητος καὶ ἀνδρείας τοσοῦτον πανικὸν καὶ τοσαύτην ἠθικὴν κατάπτωσιν ὥστε νὰ ἐπιβληθῇ παρ' ἐνὸς Συν/τος ἐξευτελιστικὸς ἀφοπλισμὸς εἰς μίαν Βουλγαρικὴν Μεραρχίαν ἣτις μετέφερε εἰς τὴν ἀγρίαν πατρίδα τῆς τὴν καταισχύνην καὶ τὴν τρομερὰν ἀνάμνησιν τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς ἀνδρείας καὶ ταχύτητος.

Καὶ ἤδη ὁπότε τὸ Συν/μα τοῦτο διὰ τὸ ὅποιον οἱ πολε-

μικοὶ ἀγῶνες ἔληξαν μέλλει νὰ δρέψῃ τοὺς καρποὺς τῆς ἐνδόξου δράσεώς του εὐχομαι ἐκ βάθους ψυχῆς εἰς ὅσους μὲν θὰ ἐξακολουθῶσι νὰ ὦσιν μέλη τοῦ Συν/τος ὅπως εὐτυχήσωσι νὰ ἀποτελέσωσι μέρος τοῦ Στρατοῦ κατοχῆς τῆς Μικρᾶς Ἀσίας, εἰς ὅσους δὲ θὰ ἀπέλθωσιν εἰς τὰς ἐστίας των, ὅπως εὐτυχήσωσι νὰ σκορπίσωσιν εἰς τὰς οἰκογενείας των τὴν εὐτυχίαν καὶ χαρὰν ὅπως ἐσκορπίσαν διὰ τῶν τιμίων ἀγῶνων των τὴν ἐλευθερίαν εἰς τοὺς σκλαβομένους ἀδελφούς μας.

Προσφέρω δὲ εἰς πάντας τοὺς ἀγαπητοὺς μου συντρόφους ἀξιωματικοὺς ὑπαξιωματικοὺς καὶ στρατιώτας τὸν πλέον ἐγκάρδιον καὶ ἀδελφικὸν χαιρετισμὸν· παρακαλῶ πάντας ὅπως μετὰ σεβασμοῦ καὶ εὐλαβείας τηρῶμεν αἰωνίαν τὴν μνήμην πρὸς τοὺς ἡρωϊκοὺς νεκρούς μας, οἵτινες διὰ τοῦ τιμίου των αἵματος ἐπεσφράγησαν τὴν ἐνδοξὸν δρᾶσιν τοῦ Συν/τος ἐν τῷ παγκοσμίῳ τούτῳ ἀγῶνι ὑπὲρ τοῦ δικαίου καὶ τῆς ἐλευθερίας τῶν λαῶν.

Ν. Πλαστήρας,

Ἀντισυνταγματάρχης.

(b) INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED BY THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE PROCLAIMING THE REVOLUTION IN CHIOS IN 1922 TO ALL UNITS UNDER THEIR COMMAND.

Σχέδιον Ἐνεργείας

I. Κατάλυσις Ἀρχῶν

Ἄμα τῇ κηρύξει τῆς Ἐπαναστάσεως παρὰ τοῦ Στόλου, ἣτις θὰ λάβῃ χώραν τὰς πρωῖνὰς ὥρας, τὰ τμήματα :

1. Φεσοπούλου (62ον Συν/μα Πεζικοῦ) καὶ
2. Βεντήρη (23ον Συν/μα Πεζικοῦ), θελουσι καταλάβῃ τὰ Στρατιωτικὰ Καταστήματα.

Τμήμα Φεσοπούλου θὰ καταλάβῃ :

1. Στρατιωτικὴν Διοίκησιν,

2. Φρουραρχεῖον,
3. Ἀστυνομίαν, καὶ

Τμήμα Βεντήρη θὰ καταλάβη :

1. Λιμεναρχεῖον,
2. Τηλεγραφεία (ἀγγλικὸν καὶ ἑλληνικὸν) καὶ
3. Παραλίαν.

Αἱ διοικήσεις τῶν Μεραρχιῶν θέλουσι καταργήσῃ ομάδες ὀργανούμεναι εἰδικῶς ἐντὸς τῶν Μεραρχιῶν. Τὰ μέτρα ταῦτα θέλουσι ληφθῆ παρ' Ἐπιτροπῆς ἐν ἐκάστη Μεραρχίᾳ.

II. Συγκέντρωσις τμημάτων.

Πάντα τὰ ἐν Χίῳ συγκεντρωμένα τμήματα θὰ συγκεντρωθῶσιν εἰς τὸν τόπον τοῦ καταυλισμοῦ των ἀναμένοντα ὁδηγίας.

Εἰδικὸν σχέδιον παρουσιάσεως ἀξιωματικῶν ἐκτὸς μονάδων εἰς τὰς ἐνταῦθα μεραρχίας θέλει καταρτισθῆ προσεχῶς.

Γενικαὶ ὁδηγίαι.

Πάντες οἱ ἀντιφρονούντες θέλουσι φυλακισθῆ. Πᾶς ἀντιδρῶν θὰ τουφεκίζεται ἐπὶ τόπον.

Αἱ διοικήσεις θὰ καταργηθῶσιν, καὶ ὑποδειχθησόμενοι ἀξιωματικοὶ θ' ἀναλάβωσι τὴν ἀρχηγίαν.

III. Σύνδεσμοι.

Ἐξ ἐκάστης μεραρχίας νὰ ὀρισθῆ εἰς ἀνώτερος ἀξιωματικὸς ἢ λοχαγὸς ὡς σύνδεσμος παρὰ τῷ κ. Πλαστήρα Ν., πρὸς λήψιν ὁδηγιῶν.

Ἐξ ἐκάστου συντάγματος τῆς μοίρας πυροβολικοῦ νὰ ὀρισθῆ εἰς ἀξιωματικὸς σύνδεσμος ὅστις θὰ λαμβάνη ὁδηγίας παρὰ τοῦ συνδέσμου τῆς μεραρχίας.

Σχέδιον καταλύσεως τῶν Ἀρχῶν.

Πρὸς τὰ τμήματα τοῦ ἀντισυνταγματάρχου Φεσσοπούλου καὶ ταγματάρχου Βεντήρη :

(α) Τμήμα ἀντισυνταγματάρχου Φεσσοπούλου.

Τοῦτο θὰ καταλάβη τὰ κάτωθι Στρατιωτικὰ Καταστήματα :

1. Στρατιωτικὴν Διοίκησιν,
2. Φρουραρχεῖον,
3. Ἀστυνομίαν,
4. Μικρὸν τμήμα θέλει καταλάβη τὰς στρατιωτικὰς ἀποθήκας.

(β) Τμήμα ταγματάρχου Βεντήρη θὰ καταλάβη :

1. Τὸ Λιμεναρχεῖον,
2. Τὰ Τηλεγραφεία ἀγγλικὸν καὶ ἑλληνικὸν,
3. Τὴν παραλίαν, ἐξασφαλίζον τὴν τάξιν καὶ τὴν ἀπομάκρυνσιν παντὸς μὴ ἀνήκοντος εἰς τὴν Ἐπανάστασιν ἐκ τοῦ μεταξὺ τῶν δύο λιμενοβραχιόνων χώρου.
4. Τοποθέτησις πολυβόλων εἰς ἕκαστον τῶν λιμενοβραχιόνων πρὸς παρεμπόδισιν ἐξόδου ἐκ τοῦ λιμένος Χίου παντὸς ἀτμοπλοίου.

Γενικαὶ ὁδηγίαι.

Ὦρα εἰδοποιήσεως ἢ 2^α (ἢ ὥρα ἐκρήξεως τοῦ Κινήματος).

Εὐθὺς ἀμέσως θὰ βαδίσετε πρὸς κατάληψιν τῶν ὡς ἄνω ἐνδεικνυομένων μερῶν.

Ἀποσπάσματα εἰδικὰ δέον νὰ ὀρισθῶσιν ἐκ τῶν προτέρων μὲ ἱκανὸν ἀριθμὸν ἀξιωματικῶν. Δέον ἐκ τῶν προτέρων ν' ἀναγνωρισθῶσιν τὰ δρομολόγια παρὰ τῶν ἐπὶ κεφαλῆς ἀξιωματικῶν.

Ἔδρα Διοικήσεως ἀντισυνταγματάρχου Φεσσοπούλου τὸ Φρουραρχεῖον.

Ἔδρα Διοικήσεως ταγματάρχου Βεντήρη τὸ Λιμεναρχεῖον.

Εὐθὺς ὡς περαιωθῆ ἢ κατάληψις ν' ἀποσταλῶσιν ἀξιωματικοὶ σύνδεσμοι παρὰ τῆ Ἐπιτροπῆ τῆς Ἐπανάστασεως ἔνθα καὶ θὰ παραμείνωσιν.

Ὁ ἐπὶ κεφαλῆς τῶν συνδέσμων ἀξιωματικὸς ὀρισθῆσεται ἐν καιρῷ.

Συγκέντρωσις Τμημάτων :

Ὡς ἐν τῷ γενικῷ σχεδίῳ ὀρίζεται, τόπος συγκεντρώσεως ὁ χώρος τοῦ καταυλισμοῦ ἐκάστης μονάδος.

Προκαταρκτικὴ ἐργασία :

(α) Σχηματισμὸς ἐπιτροπῆς, ἣτις θ' ἀναθέσῃ τὴν διοίκησιν εἰς τὸν ἰκανώτερον ἀξιωματικόν.

(β) Σχηματισμὸς μονάδων συγκεκροτημένων στρατιωτῶν νὰ ὀρισθῇ ὁ λόχος εἰς ἕκαστον προσκεκολλημένον ἀξιωματικόν.

(γ) Σχηματισμὸς μιᾶς πολυβολαρχίας τοῦλάχιστον κατὰ σύνταγμα.

(δ) Σχηματισμὸς μιᾶς τοῦλάχιστον πυροβολαρχίας κατὰ μεραρχίαν.

(ε) Ἐφοδιασμὸς ἢ μᾶλλον ἀνεύρεσις ἰκανοῦ ἀριθμοῦ κιβωτίων πυρομαχικῶν.

Ἔργασίαι μετὰ τὴν κήρυξιν τοῦ κινήματος :

Ἡ ὥρα τῆς ἐκρήξεως τοῦ κινήματος θὰ κοινοποιηθῇ εἰς τὰς διαφόρους μονάδας διὰ τῶν ἀξιωματικῶν συνδέσμων αὐτῶν παρὰ τῇ Ἐπιτροπῇ τοῦ Κινήματος ἢ καὶ δι' ἀπαυθείας συνεννοήσεως τῶν μελλόντων διοικητῶν τῶν μεραρχιῶν μετὰ τῆς Ἐπιτροπῆς. Πάντως θὰ συγχρονισθῇ μετὰ τοῦ κινήματος τοῦ Στόλου. Εὐθὺς ὡς ἐκραγῇ τὸ κίνημα, τὰ ἐνδεικνύμενα μέτρα εἰσὶ τὰ κάτωθι.

(α) Περιορισμὸς τῶν ὑπόπτων ἀντιδράσεως. Φυλάκισις τῶν ἀντιφρονούντων. Τυφεκισμὸς ἄμεσος τῶν δεικνύοντων τάσεις ἀντιδράσεως.

(β) Οἱ διοικηταὶ τῶν λόχων καὶ ταγμάτων νὰ συντάξωσι τὰ τμήματά των, ἔτοιμοι ὄντες διὰ τὴν ἐκτέλεσιν πάσης ἐντολῆς.

(γ) Νὰ ληφθῶσιν ἄμεσα μέτρα ἀσφαλείας καὶ νὰ χρησιμοποιῶνται οἱ μᾶλλον ἔμπιστοι.

(δ) Θὰ παραμένωσι τὰ τμήματα ἐν συναγερμῷ ἔτοιμα δι' ἐκκίνησιν.

(ε) Χειροβομβίδες θὰ δοθῶσιν εἰς τοὺς μᾶλλον ἔμπιστους.

Πληροφορίαι καταλήψεως Χίου.

Δύο κυρίως ἀρτηρίαι ὀδηγοῦσιν εἰς τὴν πόλιν. Αὗται εὐθὺς θέλουσι καταληφθῇ μετ' ἀναλόγου δυνάμεως πρὸς παρεμπόδισιν πάσης ἐκ τῶν ἔξω εἰσόδου ἐνόπλων.

(α) Ἀρτηρία πρώτη. Παραλιακὴ ὁδὸς παρὰ τῶν τμημάτων τῆς 5ης καὶ 9ης Μεραρχίας.

(β) Ἀρτηρία δευτέρα. Ὀδὸς ἀπὸ Βροντάδες πρὸς παραλίαν παρὰ τμημάτων τῆς 1ης Μεραρχίας.

Γενικῶς ὁ περίξ τῆς πόλεως καταυλισμὸς τῶν Μεραρχιῶν παρουσιάζει σπουδαῖον πλεονέκτημα, ἀρκεῖ μόνον νὰ ληφθῶσιν ἄμεσα μέτρα ἀσφαλείας.

Ἐξουδετέρωσις ἀντιθέτων τοῦ Κινήματος μονάδων.

Πάντες οἱ ἀντιφρονούντες θὰ τεθῶσιν ὑπὸ ἐπιτήρησιν.

Πᾶς μέλλον ν' ἀντιδράσῃ, εἴτε μεμονωμένως, εἴτε μετὰ τμήματος, θὰ τυφεκίζεται ἀμέσως.

Μετὰ τὴν ἐκρήξιν τοῦ κινήματος πᾶς συλλαμβανόμενος θὰ ὀδηγῆται εἰς τὸ Φρουραρχεῖον. Τόπος συγκεντρώσεως συλλαμβανομένων τὸ οἶκημα τῆς Στρατ. Διοικήσεως.

Κατάληψις τοῦ Στόλου.

I. Ὁ ἐπὶ κεφαλῆς τῶν ομάδων ὑγειονομείου (παλαιοῦ λιμεναρχείου) λοχαγὸς Ἀλαμανῆς Ξενοφῶν, θέλει συναντηθῇ μετὰ τοῦ ἐκεῖ εὑρισκομένου ἀξιωματικοῦ τοῦ ναυτικοῦ ὑποπλοιάρχου Βιτάλη, πρὸς συντονισμῶν τῶν ἐνεργειῶν των. Τὸ τμήμα τοῦτο θὰ συνδράμῃ διὰ τὴν καταστολὴν πάσης ἀντιδράσεως ἐπὶ τῶν πολεμικῶν "Δῆμος" καὶ "Νάξος".

Θωρηκτὸν “Λῆμνος”.

- (α) 15 Ἀξιωματικοὶ διὰ τὰ δωμάτια τῶν ἀξιωματικῶν.
 (β) 5 „ διὰ τὰ δωμάτια σημαιοφόρων καὶ ἀρχικελευστῶν.
 (γ) 5 „ διαμέρισμα ὑπαξιωματικῶν.
 (δ) 10 „ διὰ τὸ ὄπλοστάσιον.
 (ε) 15 „ διὰ τὸ κατάστρωμα.

Εὐδρομον “Νάξος”.

6 Ἀξιωματικοὶ διὰ τὰ διαμερίσματα ἀξιωματικῶν.

Εὐδρομον “Τένεδος”.

2 Ἀξιωματικοί.

II. Ὁ ἐπὶ κεφαλῆς τῶν ομάδων καφενείου “Κέντρου” λοχαγὸς Παπαμαντέλος, θὰ χρησιμεύσῃ διὰ τὴν ὑποστήριξιν πρὸς κατάληψιν τοῦ ἀντιτορπιλικοῦ “Σφενδόνη”.

Ἀντιτορπιλικὸν “Σφενδόνη”.

(α) 5 Ἀξιωματικοὶ διὰ τὰ διαμερίσματα ναυτῶν. Ἡ ὁμὰς αὕτη θὰ ἐπιβιβασθῇ προηγουμένως ἐπὶ τοῦ τορπιλλοβόλου “Δωρίς”.

(β) 5 Ἀξιωματικοὶ διὰ τὰ διαμερίσματα ἀξιωματικῶν καὶ ὑπαξιωματικῶν. Ἐπιβίβασις ἀπὸ τὴν ξηράν. Ὁ λοχαγὸς Παπαμαντέλος θὰ συνεννοηθῇ διὰ τὰς λεπτομερείας μετὰ τοῦ ὑποπλοιάρχου Σκουφοπούλου. Σημειώσεις. — Νὰ συστηθῇ εἰς τοὺς κ.κ. Ἀξιωματικοὺς καὶ ὀπλίτας ὅπως τηρήσωσιν ἀμεμπτον στάσιν πρὸς τοὺς συναδέλφους των τοῦ ναυτικοῦ. Νὰ φροντίσωσι διὰ καλοῦ τρόπου νὰ μεταπέισωσιν ἢ ἐξουδετερώσωσιν αὐτοὺς. Πάντως δὲν πρέπει νὰ τοὺς διαφύγῃ ὅτι εἶναι ἐπαναστάται. Ὡσαύτως νὰ ἔχωσιν ὑπ’ ὄψει ὅτι θὰ εὐρίσκονται καθ’ ὅλην τὴν διάρκειαν τῆς ἐνεργείας ταύτης ὑπὸ τὰς διαταγὰς τῶν μεμνημένων ἀξιωματικῶν τοῦ ναυτικοῦ. Παρ’ αὐτῶν δὲ θὰ δίδωνται ὁδηγίαι.

ΚΗΡΥΞΙΣ ΤΗΣ ΕΠΑΝΑΣΤΑΣΕΩΣ

Εἶναι 2^α πρωϊνὴ τοῦ Σαββάτου ἢ ὥρα τῆς ἐνάρξεως τῆς ἐκετελέσεως τῶν διαταγῶν τοῦ γενικοῦ σχεδίου τοῦ κινήματος. Ἡ διαταγή:

Πρὸς ἅπαντα τὰ Ἐπαναστατικὰ Τμήματα.

Ὡρα ἐκρήξεως κινήματος . . . ἢ 2^α ὥρα πρωϊνὴ τῆς 11ης Σεπτεμβρίου.

Σύνθημα . . . Ἑλλάς — σωτηρία.

Χίος, τῇ 10 Σεπτεμβρίου 1922.

Ἡ Ἐπαναστατικὴ Ἐπιτροπὴ
Ἐθνικῆς Σωτηρίας,

Πλαστήρας.

Γαρδίκας.

Κοιμήσης.

ὁ Ἐπιτελάρχης

Σ. Μπακιρτζῆς,

ταγ. Πυρ/κοῦ.

Τίθεται εἰς ἐφαρμογὴν—ἢ Ἐπανάστασις ἐκηρύχθη.

(c) REPORT OF B. KRIMPAS, DIRECTOR OF AGRICULTURAL COLONIZATION, SUBMITTED TO THE BOARD OF THE REFUGEE SETTLEMENT COMMISSION.

LE PROBLÈME DES RÉFUGIÉS A L'ÎLE DE CHIOS

Introduction. L'île de Chio d'une étendue de 832 kilomètres carrés était habitée en 1920 par 63,235 habitants. Parmi ces familles il y avait à peine 250 familles de Musulmans qui ont quitté le pays.

Plus de la moitié de l'étendue de l'île comprend des montagnes et des rocs incultes et nus. Le reste comprend des forêts de pin, des terres de pâture et des terres cultivables. Les marais se chiffrent par 15,000 stremmas.

Agriculture. L'île de Chio est un district agricole.

On estime à 86,000 les stremmas cultivés
 46,000 les jachères
 180,000 les pâtures
 100,000 les forêts
 6,000 les oliveraies

La production de l'île est indiquée dans les tableaux suivants :

Tableau indiquant en ocques la production de l'île.

	1921-2	1924-5	1925-6	1926-7
Blé	644,198	675,000	783,650	787,215
Orge	299,550	315,000	172,935	352,325
Méteil	151,400	100,000	111,500	113,110
Avoine	5,750	8,000	12,150	10,100
Seigle	2,000			
Haricots	9,170	10,000	2,300	
Fèves	296,380	560,000	428,730	
Pois chiches	74,830	60,000	106,556	401,083
Lentilles, etc.	24,880	35,000	21,270	
Pommes de terre	251,550	270,000	135,950	305,209
Produits de jardins	300,400	450,000	327,150	
Tabac	133,010	700,000	474,682	451,611
Anisette	5,450		10,600	
Sanos	421,200	412,000	425,000	330,140
Luzerne	4,000			
Raisins	102,300	150,000	99,950	118,222
Moût	112,350	110,000	120,050	66,200
Huile	522,508		478,600	814,210
Olives	118,800		379,800	214,916
Mandarines (pièces)	43,828,000	30,000,000	19,222,000	
Oranges „	20,142,500	25,000,000	8,974,000	
Citrons „	1,179,500	6,500,000	2,448,000	49,951,100
Bigarades „	400,000	500,000	40,000	
Mastic (ocques)	210,000	210,000	30,500	250,000
Pommes „	4,900	8,500	8,750	
Poires „	12,150	30,000	26,450	137,700
Figues sèches „	123,250	250,000	225,000	
Amandes „	145,750	80,000	128,000	
Caroubes „	222,500	560,000	233,500	318,646

Il ressort de ces tableaux qu'il y a une augmentation croissante des récoltes des céréales, des légumineuses et en général des produits annuels, qui peut être certainement attribuée à l'augmentation de la population par l'élément réfugié agricole.

Industrie. L'industrie actuelle de l'île consiste :

1. Aux tanneries. Les peaux sont importées, ainsi que la matière contenant le tanin. Les peaux après la préparation sont exportées. Cette industrie est confiée aux mains des ouvriers indigènes, parce qu'elle exige des notions et de l'expérience techniques que les réfugiés ne possèdent pas encore.

2. Une fabrique de tuiles et briques de terre, nouvellement installée, qui occupe une cinquantaine d'ouvriers.

3. L'industrie de compotes et confitures renommées de Chio, donnant du travail à 50 ouvriers.

4. Deux ateliers de tissage (dont les produits sont consommés dans l'île). Les ateliers donnent du travail à 100 ouvrières.

5. Un atelier (bonneterie) pour la confection d'articles en laine exportés partout en Grèce.

6. Une fabrique d'étoffes en coton.

L'exportation des produits agricoles et industriels et l'importation des différents articles, se fait par le très bon port de Chio, aux travaux duquel s'occupent, en proportion de 9/10, des réfugiés.

Balance commerciale. La production agricole et industrielle n'est pas suffisante pour couvrir les besoins d'importation. En 1926 ont été exportés des articles de

	150,823,000 drs.
importés	175,695,788 „
Exportation de	24,872,788 drs.

Par contre, en 1926, le change qui a été importé dans l'île était de £160,241 soit : 61,532,544 drs. (à 384 drs. par £).

De ce qui a été cité et des chiffres qui seront cités plus bas, il ressort que non seulement d'autres réfugiés ne devront pas s'installer, mais que ceux qui sont actuellement dans l'île se trouveront dans une situation problématique, si des mesures spéciales ne sont prises pour le développement de l'industrie, dont nous reparlerons.

Réfugiés. L'île de Chio, par suite de sa proximité à l'Asie Mineure, a servi de premier refuge aux populations chassées de l'Asie. Le nombre actuel de réfugiés paraît être le suivant : Dans la ville de Chio 13,000 réfugiés. (La population de la ville était de 20,032 en 1920 ; elle monte, selon les renseignements fournis par le maire, à 33,000 habitants.) 4000 réfugiés, en chiffre rond, sont dans les autres villages de l'île. En tout cas, on peut se baser sur 18,000 à 18,500 réfugiés, soit 4300 à 4500 familles, en chiffre rond.

De ces 4500 familles, les 1700 étaient des familles d'agriculteurs. A présent toutes celles qui restent dans la ville ne le sont plus et on peut se baser sur 1000 familles agricoles. Les agriculteurs étaient ainsi répartis :

Dans la ville de Chio et environs	900 familles
Kamphora (villages de la plaine)	100 „
Kardamyla	120 „
Volissòs	40 „
Oenoussai-Psarà	300 „
Mastichochora (villages à production de mastic)	<u>240</u> „
	1700 „

De ces 900 familles qui restent dans la ville de Chio et aux environs, les 600 sont devenues des urbains. Il faut excepter une centaine qui sont aux environs et celles qui ont été établies dans les jardins et dont nous reparlerons.

Au point de vue d'habitation, les réfugiés, dans la ville de Chio, sont ainsi répartis :

Dans la forteresse, la Banque possède 272 immeubles dans lesquels elle a casé 786 familles et en ville elle possède 496 immeubles, dans lesquels elle a casé 536 familles de réfugiés. Soit en tout 1032 familles.

A mon avis, les réfugiés existant actuellement à Chio sont ainsi répartis :

Dans la forteresse (maisons musulmanes)	786 familles
En ville („ „)	536 „
Quartier de Vardatsi	289 „
„ de Limni	48 „
Dépôts et maisons réquisitionnées	670 „
Maisons à loyer	<u>400</u> „
	2729 „
Pêcheurs et familles hospitalisées par d'autres familles	<u>600</u> „
Total de la ville	3329 „
Agriculteurs	<u>1100</u> „
	4429 „

Chiffre rond maximum $4500 \times 4 = 18,000$ personnes.

Des réfugiés habitant la ville, il y a 1956 familles (soit

5439 personnes) sans protecteur, parce que tous les hommes ont été massacrés. De ces 5439 personnes, seulement les 2000 sont des travailleurs. Les autres sont des enfants ou des gens incapables de travailler.

Il y a encore 800 familles de réfugiés urbains dont la plupart sont des médecins, des commerçants, des épiciers, des fonctionnaires, des chauffeurs etc.

Il y a à peu près 200 familles qui vivent du petit commerce, ayant construit de petites baraques, dans lesquelles elles ont installé de petits magasins.

On m'a assuré qu'il existe à Chio 200 familles de pêcheurs dont 20 seulement sont installées, les chefs de ces familles ainsi que les hommes pouvant travailler n'habitent pas la ville, mais pêchent autour de l'île Eubée. J'ai appris que les pêcheurs que la R.S.C. comptait établir à Skiatho sont de ces familles. Les autres membres de leurs familles habitent l'île.

État sanitaire. Les familles qui restent dans la forteresse et les dépôts se trouvent dans une situation affreuse, à tout point de vue. Les médecins de réfugiés m'ont certifié que 60 à 70% des malades sont tuberculeux. Tous les réfugiés habitant la forteresse et les dépôts souffrent d'une inflammation des yeux due à l'humidité excessive et à la fumée qui y règne, vu que les familles préparent leurs repas dans les dépôts.

Indemnités. Le Directeur de la succursale de la Banque Nationale m'a donné les chiffres suivants des indemnités qui ont été touchées par les réfugiés :

En argent 28,874,649 drachmes	} touchées par 3968 personnes.
En bons 115,798,000 „	

Besoin en toit des réfugiés urbains. Les représentants des réfugiés estiment que pour soulager les besoins des réfugiés de la ville, il faudrait construire :

(a) 50 maisons pour l'association déjà constituée	
150 „ pour des réfugiés de la catégorie A	
(b) 500 „ „ „ „ „	B
(c) 250 „ „ „ „ „	C
<u>1000</u> maisons	

Catégorie A. Cinquante des réfugiés urbains (médecins, commerçants) ont constitué une association 'ASTY' dans le but de construire des maisons. Ils ont acheté déjà le terrain (du prix de 8000 drs. par membre) et demandent le secours de la R.S.C. Ils estiment à 5-6,000,000 de drs. les besoins en argent pour la construction. Ils disposent de 1,250,000 drs. Ils sont disposés d'acquitter leur dette en payant 500,000 drs. par an (voir leur requête).

Les autres 150 peuvent également payer de 10 à 15,000 drs. par an d'amortissement. Ils demandent un secours de 75,000 par famille. Ils sont disposés de verser tout de suite 25,000 drs. de façon à construire des maisons de 100,000 drs.

Catégorie B. La deuxième catégorie de 500 familles comprend ceux qui peuvent payer un amortissement de 4-5000 drs. par an, mais qui ont besoin de maisons de moindre valeur.

Catégorie C. Les 250 familles de la troisième catégorie ne peuvent rien payer. Pour celles-ci, qui d'ailleurs sont de celles qui vivent dans les pires conditions, l'État doit s'en occuper le plus tôt possible.

Les pêcheurs dont nous nous sommes occupés plus haut sont répartis comme il suit :—

50 dans la première catégorie, 100 dans la deuxième et le reste dans la troisième (les 20 familles sont déjà bien installées).

Terrains à bâtir. L'association 'ASTY', comme il a été dit, a déjà trouvé le terrain nécessaire.

La R.S.C. a déjà choisi 2 autres terrains à bâtir. Le premier, situé au côté N. de la ville entre la route de Kardamyla et la rue Ste-Anne, de 37,970 m², appartient en grande partie à la Mairie de Chio, le reste appartenant à la Défense Aérienne. La situation est très bonne. La R.S.C. a également demandé l'expropriation d'un terrain appartenant à la veuve Pagiavla. Le terrain était destiné pour la colonie des pêcheurs. Il y a d'autres terrains à bâtir dans d'autres situations, moins convenables. Les meilleurs appartiennent à la Banque Nationale et quelques-uns à des monastères.

Marché. Comme il a été relaté, les petits commerçants de Chio (réfugiés) n'ont pas de magasins. La Mairie se propose de soumettre à la R.S.C. une proposition concrète.

Industries à développer. Dans le chapitre de l'industrie nous nous sommes occupés des réfugiés qui travaillent à Chio. A mon avis, on peut facilement trouver du travail aux veuves et aux jeunes enfants qui se sont trouvés à Chio. Une cinquantaine de familles de Kerkentzé et une cinquantaine de Alatzata, connaissent bien l'art du tapissier. Mais aucun industriel n'a été trouvé pour y installer une fabrique.

La totalité des autres familles savent très bien le tissage. Nous avons dit que 2 ateliers sont en fonctionnement donnant du travail à 100 ouvrières. Les installations faites ne sont pas suffisantes et les industriels donnent du travail aux veuves en maison.

Deux demandes ont été soumises par ces industriels ; l'une d'elles est signée par deux (qui n'ont pas installé d'ateliers) qui demandent des renforts économiques pour étendre leurs entreprises. Il y a à mon avis beaucoup à faire dans cette direction. On pourrait également envisager la question de la constitution d'une coopérative entre les veuves, mais il faudrait avant tout trouver la personne qui se chargerait de la direction des affaires.

Conclusion. Après l'investigation que j'ai faite sur le problème urbain à Chio, je crois que la R.S.C. devrait laisser au Gouvernement le soin de bâtir des maisons pour les réfugiés de la catégorie C et qu'elle devrait se charger de la construction pour les deux autres catégories d'un certain nombre de maisons que ses moyens lui permettront.

Le problème des réfugiés agriculteurs à l'île de Chio. Il y a, comme il a été dit, 1100 familles de réfugiés agriculteurs existant dans toute l'île de Chio. La propriété rurale, quittée par les Musulmans échangés, d'assez grande valeur, est de :

113 champs	829,30 str.
119 jardins	959,50 „
	<u>1,788,80 „</u>

Les 74 pièces d'une étendue de 489,84 str. ont été vendues pour 10,199,800 drs. (prix d'estimation 4,061,407). Dans ces domaines sont installés comme locataires :

(a) champs : 138 réfugiés sur 208 locataires.

(b) jardins : $\frac{92}{230}$ „ „ $\frac{105}{313}$ „ „

Ces réfugiés étaient placés comme locataires, par le bureau d'échange, après mille difficultés. Car les indigènes s'y trouvant exploitent ces domaines de temps immémorial. Les Turcs encaissaient un loyer et étaient des propriétaires de nom. Toute cette propriété musulmane se trouve autour de la ville de Chio. A l'intérieur de l'île, il n'y a pas de propriété musulmane.

La B.N. a exigé de la part des locataires le 5% de l'estimation faite par elle comme loyer. Les jardins sont vendus à de grands prix, en moyenne 40,000 drs. par stremma. Les champs 10,000 drs. Ce sont les indigènes qui les ont achetés.

Quelques familles de réfugiés, placées comme locataires, ont loué leurs parcelles aux indigènes. Il est à prévoir que quand les jardins seront mis en adjudication, elles seront achetées par les indigènes. En tout cas, les prix seront tellement haussés que les réfugiés ne pourront pas avoir de bons revenus. Ce n'est qu'en diminuant les prix que réfugiés et indigènes pourront rester avec profit dans ces domaines.

Dans l'intérieur de l'île, sauf deux petites propriétés musulmanes à Kardamyla, il n'y a pas de fortune musulmane. Les 700 familles qui restent dans les villages travaillent comme ouvriers agricoles. Quelques-uns louent des champs et font la culture du tabac. Autrefois (1921) on cultivait 4000 str. de tabac, avec une production de 133,010 ocques. En 1926, ont été cultivés 11,084 str. avec une production de 451,611 ocques. Le tabac est de bonne qualité, vendu à 25-40 drs. l'ocque, et en moyenne générale 30 drs.

Il y a des terres appartenant à des monastères sur lesquelles on pourrait établir des agriculteurs. Le Directeur des services agricoles de l'île a déjà soumis des rapports au Ministère de l'Agriculture.

70 familles pourraient s'établir sur des terres du monastère de Moundōn.

50 familles pourraient s'établir dans un domaine à Prastia (du Nouveau Couvent).

Ce couvent est estimé avoir une fortune de plus de 100 millions de drachmes dont la propriété rurale est louée à vie à des moines ou des laïques. 5161 stremmas ont été loués et 21,125 sont revendiqués par les communautés.

La question agricole et urbaine à Oenoussai. Entre l'Asie Mineure et l'île de Chio, il y a un réseau de petits îlots appelés Oenoussai, pays d'armateurs très riches. Sur l'île centrale se trouvent actuellement 300 familles environ dont voici les métiers :

157	familles d'agriculteurs
34	veuves „
	21 familles de marins
10	„ de pêcheurs
18	„ d'épiciers
9	„ d'ouvriers de briques
10	„ de maçons
4	„ de cordonniers
2	„ de menuisiers
3	„ de cafetiers
3	„ de coiffeurs
2	„ de bouchers
2	„ de maîtres d'école

Total 275 familles (soit 1117 personnes).

On m'a assuré qu'il y a encore 25 familles qui ont bâti des maisons.

Tous ces gens travaillent comme ouvriers ou comme matelots auprès des armateurs de l'île. Ils ont travaillé comme ouvriers agricoles et ont créé plus de 1000 str. de vignobles. Ils ont même, avec la permission des indigènes, cultivé les étendues incultes.

Les étendues de l'île sont calcaires et schisteuses de fertilité moyenne.

Les terres des collines sont des pâtures qui ont été dernièrement cultivées en orge. La production est montée à

250,000 ocques. Les indigènes revendiquent ces terres comme leur propriété, et sont pourtant disposés de les vendre à très bon prix. Les réfugiés insistent qu'il s'agit de propriétés communales. Les petits îlots autour de l'île centrale sont la propriété de la Défense aérienne.

Une étude a été faite par le Directeur des Services Agricoles et soumise au Ministère de l'Agriculture. Je crois que la R.S.C. ne doit s'occuper de l'affaire que quand le Ministère la résoudra et si elle veut s'occuper de l'établissement agricole.

Si la R.S.C. compte entreprendre l'établissement agricole dans toute la ville, il faudrait une étude approfondie de toute la question agricole.

Le Directeur,
B. Krimpas.

(d) LETTER FROM GENERAL N. PLASTIRAS
ADDRESSED TO THE AUTHOR.

Εὐγενέστατε Κύριε Ἀργέντη,

Ἡ μεγάλη σας καὶ μεγάλη μου ἀγάπη πρὸς τὴν Χίον καὶ τοὺς Χίους ἐπωφελούνται τῆς εὐχαρίστου εὐκαιρίας νὰ πλουτίσουν τὸ νέον τοῦτο περὶ Χίου ἔργον μὲ τὸν πανηγυρικὸν καὶ χαρακτηρισμὸν τοῦ τιμήσαντος τὰ ὄπλα τῆς πατρίδος νεωτέρου Χίου, τοῦ Χίου στρατιώτου.

Μακροὶ αἰῶνες παρήλθον ἀφ' ὅτου ἔπαυσε ν' ἀκούεται τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ Χίου ἠνωμένον μὲ κλαγγὴν ὄπλων. Βάρβαρος καὶ μακραίων δουλεία εἶχε σβύσει εἰς τὰ ὦτα τῶν ἀτυχῶν κατοίκων τῆς πατρίδος σας τὸν γλυκὺν ἀλλὰ καὶ τραχὺν ἄμα ἦχον τῆς ἐνόπλου μουσικῆς. Ὑπήρξαν δὲ οἱ κατὰ καιροὺς πιστεύσαντες ὅτι ὁ Χίος, γνωστὸς εἰς τὴν παγκόσμιον ἀγορὰν διὰ τὸ ἐπιχειρηματικὸν καὶ ἐμπορικὸν δαιμόνιον, θὰ ἦτο ὄχι ὁ ὑποδειγματικὸς στρατιώτης. Οἱ τοῦτο φρονούντες, ἐν ᾧ ἠμολόγουν ὅτι ὁ Χίος ἦτο τέλειος καὶ χρηστὸς πολίτης, ἐλησμόνουν ἐν ταυτῷ

τὸ ἀξίωμα ὅτι εἶναι ἀδύνατον νὰ φαντασθῇ τις καλὸν πολίτην χωρὶς οὗτος νὰ εἶνε καὶ καλὸς στρατιώτης καὶ τἀνάπαλιν, ἀξίωμα τὸ ὁποῖον ἐπηλήθευσεν ἐκ τῶν ὑστέρων διὰ πολλοστὴν φορὰν περὶ τοῦ Χίου.

Ἄλλ' ἀνέτειλε τέλος καὶ ἡ ἀγγὴ ἢ εὐλογημένη, ἢ πρωῖα τῆς 12 Νοεμβρίου 1912, καθ' ἣν ἤστραψαν εἰς τὸ φῶς τῶν ἀνατολικῶν ἀνταυγείων αἱ νικηφόροι καὶ μεσταὶ δαφνῶν λόγχοι τοῦ ἀπελευθερωτικοῦ στρατοῦ. Ἡ Χίος ἀνέπνεεν ἀπλήστως τὸν μυρωμένον ἐλεύθερον ἀέρα τῆς γλυκείας ἀτμοσφαιρας τῆς.

Ταχθεὶς νὰ μετᾶσχω τῆς ἀναλαβούσης τὴν ἐκπαίδευσιν τῶν πρώτων ὑπὸ τὰς σημαίας προσελθόντων νεαρῶν Χίων ἀποστολῆς, ἦλθα εἰς τὴν Χίον τῷ 1914 καὶ εἰργάσθη κατὰ δύναμιν καὶ τότε καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην πρόσκλησιν τοῦ 1916 τῆς προσωρινῆς Κυβερνήσεως τῆς Θεσσαλονίκης, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο δύναμαι νὰ εἶπω ὅτι εἶμαι εἰς θέσιν νὰ ἔχω, εἴπερ τις καὶ ἄλλος, ἔγκυρον γνώμην περὶ τοῦ στρατευομένου Χίου, καὶ ἐπειδὴ ὁ στρατὸς εἶνε τὸ καθ' ἑαυτὸ κοινοτικὸν σχολεῖον καὶ τὸ χαλκεῖον πάσης κοινοτικῆς ἀρετῆς, ἐγνώρισα καὶ ἀξιοτίμους καὶ πολλαπλᾶς ψυχικὰς καὶ πνευματικὰς ιδιότητας τοῦ Χίου.

Εὐρεθεὶς ἀπέναντι τοῦ κατὰ πρῶτον τασσομένου ὑπὸ τὰς σημαίας Χίου διέγνωσα αὐτὸν εὐφυῆ, εὐμαθῆ, ἐνθουσιώδη, ὑπερήφανον καὶ ἐν τελείᾳ ἐπιγνώσει τοῦ καθήκοντος διατελοῦντα. Εἶδα ἓνα μορφωμένον καὶ χρησιμώτατον εἶτα ὀπλίτην, ἱκανὸν καὶ ἔτοιμον νὰ προσφέρῃ τὰ πάντα ὑπὲρ τοῦ σκοποῦ τῆς πατρίδος καὶ τοῦτο μετὰ πολλῆς προθυμίας καὶ αὐτοπεποιθήσεως. Τοιοῦτόν τον εὗρον πανταχοῦ καὶ πάντοτε—καὶ βεβαίως ἐπὶ μακρὸν εἶχον ὑπὸ τὰς διαταγὰς μου Χίους, εἰς τὸ Μακεδονικὸν μέτωπον, εἰς τὴν Οὐκρανίαν, εἰς τὰς ἐσχατιὰς τῆς Μικρᾶς Ἀσίας—πρῶτον εἰς τὴν ἐπίθεσιν, τελευταῖον εἰς τὴν ὑποχώρησιν, πολμηρόν, σταθερὸν καὶ φιλότιμον. Ἡ ἐκτίμησίς μου πρὸς τὸν Χίον στρατιώτην βασίζεται ἐπὶ τῆς προσωπικῆς μου

ἀντιλήψεως καὶ ἐξ αὐτοψίας, διότι εἶχα κυρίως Χίους εἰς τὸ βον Σύνταγμα Ἀρχιπελάγους, τοῦ ὁποίου ἤμην διοικητής, καὶ εἶμαι εἰς θέσιν νὰ γνωρίζω ὅτι ἐντελῶς ἀβάσιμος ἀποδεικνύεται ἡ φήμη, τὴν ὁποίαν ἀπέδωκαν ἄλλοι εἰς τοὺς Χίους διὰ τὰ γεγονότα τοῦ 1822. Ἡ φήμη αὕτη κατὰ τὸν μέγαλον πόλεμον ἀπεδείχθη ὡς ἀνήκουσα εἰς τὴν μυθολογίαν. Ποῦ ἢ σκιά, ποῦ ἢ ἰδέα τῆς φήμης περὶ ἀτολμίας τῶν Χίων; Εἰς τοὺς ἐπικούς ἀγῶνας τοῦ Σκρᾶ καὶ τοῦ Πετσόβου; ἢ εἰς τὰς ὀμηρικὰς τῆς Μικρᾶς Ἀσίας μάχας; Βεβαίως οὐδεὶς γεννᾶται ἥρως, ἀλλὰ γίνεται διὰ τῆς ἔξεως, τῆς ἀγωγῆς καὶ τῆς ἐκπαιδεύσεως· ἂν ὅμως δὲν προὔπῃρχον αἱ ὑπέροχοι αὐταὶ ἀρεταί, ἔστω καὶ λανθάνουσαι ἐν τῷ μυχίῳ βάθει τῶν ψυχῶν τῶν φιλοτίμων τούτων νησιωτῶν, ἐνισχυόμεναι ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκογενειακῆς καὶ τῆς καθόλου τοπικῆς αὐτῶν ἀνατροφῆς, οὐδέποτε θὰ ἠδύναντο ν' ἀφυπνισθοῦν μὲ τόσην τελειότητα. Ἐντὸς τοῦ στρατιωτικοῦ περιβάλλοντος καὶ ὑπὸ τὸ ἀντίσκηνον ἀπεκαλύφθη ἐν ὅλῃ του τῇ λαμπρότητι ὁ θησαυρὸς τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦ Χίου στρατιώτου. Εὐθύμος, πρωτότυπος, δημιουργικός, ἀκαταπόνητος, καρτερικός, λιτοδίαιτος, ἔξυπνος, πατριώτης μέχρι φανατισμοῦ ἀνεῦρεν ὅλην τὴν ἐσωτερικὴν ἠθικὴν του δύναμιν, μόλις ἀνέπνευσε τὸν ζωογόνον ἀέρα τοῦ βουνοῦ, τὸν ἀέρα ἐκείνου ποῦ ἐθέρμαινε τὰ στήθη τῶν ἀνδρῶν τοῦ 1821 καὶ τῶν νεωτέρων συγχρόνων μας ἡρώων.

Καὶ δύναμαι νὰ εἶπω ἀδιστακτῶς ὅτι ὑπήρξεν ὑποδειγματικὸς καὶ τὸ ἀπέδειξεν εἰς ὅλας τὰς ἐκστρατείας καὶ τὰς μάχας, εἰς ἃς ἔλαβε μέρος, καὶ προσέφερεν ἑαυτὸν εἰς τὸν βωμὸν τῆς πατρίδος αὐθορμήτως, ἀβιάστως, ἀγογγύστως καὶ πάντοτε ἐν ἐπιγνώσει τοῦ μεγάλου ἐπιδιωκομένου σκοποῦ. Οὐδέποτε ἀπέκαμε, οὐδέποτε ἀπεθαρρύνθη, ἀλλ' ἔμεινεν ἄγρυνπος καὶ ἀκάματος φρουρὸς τῶν ἐντολῶν τῆς πατρίδος, ἔστω καὶ ὑποφέρων, πάσχων ἢ στερούμενος, ἄτρωτος ὅμως τὴν ψυχὴν, ὡς ἡ ἐνσάρκωσις τοῦ ιδεώδους ὀπλίτου τῆς παλαιᾶς ἐποχῆς, ἄξιος ὀμηρικοῦ

ἐπαίνου, διότι ὀμηρικαὶ ἦσαν καὶ αἱ μάχαι εἰς τὰς ὁποίας ἔλαβε μέρος.

Τῶν μαχῶν τούτων καὶ τῆς ἐν γένει ὑπὸ τὰ ὄπλα δράσεως τῶν Χίων εἰκὼν ἀψευδῆς εἶνε αἱ σχετικαὶ ἡμερήσιαι διαταγαί, τῶν ὁποίων δύναται νὰ γίνῃ χρῆσις, διὰ νὰ γνωσθῶσι πληρέστερον γεγονότα συνδεδεμένα ἀρρήκτως μὲ τὴν ὅλην ἱστορίαν τῆς Χίου τῶν νεωτέρων χρόνων.¹

Ἀθῆναι,

5-11-29.

Μετὰ πάσης τιμῆς,

Ν. Πλαστήρας.

¹ A selection of these orders is reproduced amongst the documents (see pages 25-41).

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 **SISMANGOLIO**
MEGARÒ



SISMANOGLIO
MILCARO

